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Abstract
In this thesis it is argued that the age-old philosophical "Problem of the
Self' can benefit by being approached from the perspective of a relatively
recent science, namely that of Complexity Theory. With this in mind the
conceptual features of this theory is highlighted and summarised.
Furthermore, the argument is made that the predominantly dualistic approach
to the self that is characteristic of the Western Philosophical tradition serves to
hinder, rather than edify, our understanding of the phenomenon. The benefits
posed by approaching the self as an emergent property of a complex system
is elaborated upon, principally with the help of work done by Sigmund Freud,
Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, and Paul Cilliers. The aim is to develop a
materialistic conception of the self that is plausible in terms of current
empirical information and resists the temptation see the self as one or other
metaphysical entity within the brain, without "reducing" the self to a crude
materialism. The final chapter attempts to formulate a possible foil against the
accusation of crude materialism by emphasising that the self is part of a
greater system that includes the mental apparatus and its environment
(conceived as culture). In accordance with Dawkins's theory the medium of
interaction in this system is conceived of as memes and the self is then
conceived of as a meme-complex, with culture as a medium for meme-
transference. The conclusion drawn from this is that the self should be studied
through narrative, which provides an approach to the self that is material
without being crudely physicalistic.
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Abstrak
In hierdie tesis word daar aangevoer dat die relatiewe jong wetenskap
van Kompleksiteitsteorie 'n nuttige bydra kan lewer tot die eeue-oue filosofiese
"Probleem van die Self'. Met die oog hierop word die konseptueie kenmerke
van hierdie teorie na vore gebring en opgesom. Die argument word gemaak
dat die meerendeels dualistiese benadering van die Westerse filosofiese
tradisie tot die self ons verstaan van die fenomeen belemmer eerder as om dit
te bemiddel. Die voordele van dié nuwe benadering, wat die self sien as 'n
ontluikende (emergent) eienskap van In komplekses sisteem, word bespreek
met verwysing na veral die werke van Sigmund Freud, Richard Dawkins,
Daniel Dennett en Paul Cilliers. Daar word beoog om In verstaan van die self
te ontwikkel wat kontemporêre empiriese insigte in ag neem en wat die
versoeking weerstaan om ongeoorloofde metafisiese eienskappe aan die self
toe te ken. Terselfdetyd word daar gepoog om geensins die uniekheid van die
self te "reduseer" na 'n kru materialisme nie. In die finale hoofstuk word daar
gepoog om 'n teenargument vir die voorsiene beswaar van kru materialisme te
ontwikkel. Dit word gedoen deur te benadruk dat die self gesien word as deel
van 'n groter, komplekse sisteem, wat die masjienerie van denke en die
omgewing (wat as kultuur gekonseptualiseer word) insluit. Insgelyks, in die
teorie van Dawkins word die medium van interaksie in hierdie sisteem gesien
as "memes", waar die self dan n meme-kompleks vorm, en kultuur die
medium van meme-oordrag is. Daar word tot die konklusie gekom dat die self
op 'n narratiewe manier bestudeer behoort te word, wat dan 'n benadering tot
die self voorsien wat materialisties is, sonder om kru fisikalisties te wees.
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Opgedra aan Dr. H. F. Kotzé en Prof. F. P. Cilliers, sonder wie hierdie werk
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Preface
Questions concerning the self are some of the oldest questions in
philosophy. And, as seems to be the case with most philosophical questions,
the more one tries to study or define this elusive "I", the more intangible it
seems to become. In surveying the literature on this subject, it seems that one
can never quite be satisfied that what one is reading is getting to the heart of
the problem. One reason for this is that there is no real consistency in the way
that concepts pertaining to the self, such as "the I", "ego", "personality",
"consciousness", "cogito", etc., are applied. All of these concepts crop up
somewhere along the line, seemingly denoting the same phenomenon. At the
same time, depending on whom one is reading, there could also be subtle
distinctions between the denotations of these different terms - subtle
distinctions with critically important implications.
This work will not be an extended exercise in conceptual clarification,
however. This is partly because we would contend that such an exercise
would be, to a significant extent, ineffectual. The reason for this ineffectuality
may not so much lie in a shortcoming in the concepts that are used, or in the
way that they are generally applied, but in the phenomenon itself - in these
elusive things that we lump together as aspects of the "self'. Bearing this in
mind, this work will focus mainly on what kinds of things have been relegated
to the realm of self, consciousness, even mind, and to look at the way that
certain presuppositions concerning the kind of phenomena that belong to this
realm have influenced resultant theories.
As we shall see, the question as to what human beings are, in
essence, is as old as philosophy itself. What seems to be an especially
7
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contentious issue in the Western philosophical tradition is the materiality or
non-materiality of this essence. Is the self, the soul, consciousness, the truly
human part of "us" simply an extension of the material body - a useful
evolutionary tool that optimises our chances for survival? Or is it some kind of
essence - divine, spiritual or reasonable - that animates the material body
and endows it with characteristic that elevates it above the grossly material?
Of course, many factors come into play in the case of such questions,
ranging from theoretical, political and religious contexts and agendas to the
availability of information and established models with which to work. Central
to this work will be the possibility of developing a contemporary model of the
self that is based on a contemporary science. We hope to explore how
bringing a new theoretical angle into the debate may highlight possible
alternative perspectives, and perhaps lead to fresh, interesting, and even
useful new insights on this ancient topic. A contemporary discipline that could
prove useful in this regard is that of complexity theory.
Keeping this in mind, the first chapter will consist of a brief overview of
the main tenets of complexity theory. Readers already familiar with the subject
might want to proceed to the following chapter.
The second chapter will briefly examine the tradition in which current
conceptions of the self where born. Inevitably such an enquiry would need to
address Descartes' dualism, which can safely be said to be the defining
contribution to the debate in the Western philosophical tradition. Most of the
genealogy of current conceptions of the self can be traced back to Descartes
and his (relative) contemporaries, with the rationalist/empiricist debate. For
this reason Hume and Kant will also be discussed in some detail.
While the rationalist/empiricist debate over the subsequent centuries
can with some justification be described as a family feud, the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries would bring a radical turning point in traditional
conceptions of the phenomena associated with consciousness and the self.
Whereas phenomena to do with the mental were generally associated with
the immaterial, and where the self had always been associated with the
conscious, a new possibility would enter the scene. Sigmund Freud would
open up a whole new realm of possibilities with his postulation of the
existence of the unconscious. Chapter 3 consists of a summary of Freud's
8
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view, and will also explore the impact that not only Freud, but also advances
in the neurological sciences and psychology had on theories of the self. We
will primarily be concentrating on the work of Daniel Dennett.
The fourth chapter is an attempt to consolidate all of these themes and
to construct a contemporary model of the self, based on complexity theory.
The feasibility and possible advantages of such a model are discussed.
Finally, chapter 5 will highlight some of the possible implications that a
theory of the self, based on complexity, might have. One such implication
would be the possible revision of both the concept of the human environment
and the role that is usually ascribed to this environment as it pertains to the
self. As can be imagined, such a project would have vast possibilities and far-
reaching implications. So much so that it would range far beyond the scope of
this work, and the discussion will be constrained to some of the most
pertinent, and interesting, implications. Other possible implications that are
raised will be mentioned, with the hope that they will be subjected to further
investigation elsewhere.
9
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Chapter One
A Primer on Complexity
Gone is the image of the clockwork universe
Auyang (1998)
One should be leery of these possibilities in principle. It is also possible,
in principle, to build a stainless-steel ladder to the moon and to write out, in
alphabetical order, all intelligible English conversations consisting of less than a
thousand words. But neither of these two are remotely possible in fact, and
sometimes an impossibility in fact is theoretically more interesting than a
possibility in principle ...
Dennett (1991 :4)
1. Introduction
Since the argument hinges around the thesis that aspects of
complexity theory can offer us a viable and useful model of the self, a brief
overview of complexity theory may be useful. Theories of complexity, rooted
primarily in the physical sciences spawn literature with a high degree of
mathematical content, which is likely to be inaccessible to the lay reader. This,
coupled with the vast amount of pop-science books that have appropriated
some of the ideas of complexity, may create the impression that it is
impossible to give a thoroughly qualitative reading of the theory, without
veering off into the esoteric or the mundane. We would contend that it is
indeed possible to give a general reading that touches upon the central
aspects and ideas of the field, without losing too much content. Hence, a
philosophical account of various theories of complexity might busy itself with
the underlying assumptions and conceptual structures of such theories and
explore their applicability to other spheres of thouqht.' Naturally, such an
overview would lack the depth and intricacy of a mathematical theoretical
account. Nevertheless it could prove useful to introduce the field to an
audience with little mathematical knowledge, but who might still find the ideas
1 I agree with Auyang (1998:X) that philosophy as a discipline seeks "general patterns
of thought."
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encompassed in it both interesting and useful with regard to their own fields of
speciality.
The idea that science and indeed all theory is context-bound and
reflects or encompasses a prevailing and general theoretical paradigm is
nothing new to contemporary philosophy (Kuhn: 1970, Cilliers1998:1-2; 87-
88). There is a long standing tradition in Western philosophy that argues that
our experience and knowledge is structured by a framework of categories or
general concepts; a categorical framework being the most basic of
presuppositions about the intelligible world, and our relation to it
(Auyang1998:XI). These categorical frameworks permeate our thinking and
find their way into all our theories of the world. Classical science operated
against a background of reversibility and timelessness (Prigogine 1984:7) and
many complexity theorists would argue that this presupposition has led to a
crude model of the universe which does not provide for the complexities of
actual existing phenomena (Auyang 1998:X; Cilliers1998: 9-10).
Central to classical Western science is the analytical method. In order
to grasp a phenomenon it is divided into manageable units, which can be
studied and strung together again, to form a picture of the whole. The main
criticism regarding this approach from some contemporary theoretical circles
is its inability to allow for the relationships between the artificially separated
components that to a large extent constitute the system's make up in the first
place (Kauffman 1993:vii). Cilliers (1998:2) goes so far as to assert that in
cutting up the analysed system this method destroys exactly that which it
wants to explain. The person whom many would regard as a pioneer of
complexity theory as we know it today, lIya Prigogine, uses the metaphor of
reducing a building to a pile of bricks, in the sense of not being able to see the
building for the bricks, to describe this reductionistic method (1984 :7).2
In discussing the rise of complexity sciences it might prove useful to
give a brief overview of the background against which this (very broad and
2 This metaphor is somewhat misleading in that it does not capture the idea of
relational dynamism, interaction, and flux, which complexity theory places so much emphasis
on.
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very diverse) discipline originated. The discussion will follow the lead of
Prigogine and discuss the evolution of the ideas encompassed in this theory
with reference to the developments in the Western physical sciences, with
emphasis on theories that deal with macroscopic phenomena. He makes the
telling observation that most of the scientific disciplines exhibit more or less
the same characteristic changes over roughly the same time frame (1984:10).
In the seventeenth century Newton's physics allowed for what
Prigogine dubs "a scientific revolution" (1984:28), which ushered in a new
paradigm in what was then called natural philosophy. With the help of
Newton's laws of motion scientists were now able to predict trajectories and
formulate complete descriptions of dynamic systems. His law of gravity could
be applied equally to explain the motion of planets and of atoms, and to
explain why bodies fall back down to earth. Newton was hailed as a scientific
hero, having discovered the basic laws of the universe, where every physical
body has a mass and acts as a source of the forces that are a prerequisite for
interaction. The basic characteristics of the resulting trajectories are
lawfulness, determinism and reversibility (Prigogine1984: 59-60). In order to
calculate a trajectory, all that is needed is an empirical definition of a single
instantaneous state of the system. This state can be thought of as an "initial
state" and from such a state a subsequent series of states that the system will
pass through in time (its trajectory) can be predicted. The implication being
that the whole past and the future of a system can be deduced from a single
given state; all states in the trajectory are equivalent and can be used to
calculate all other states. An important prerequisite for this possibility is the
reversibility of the trajectory of the dynamic system (61). A reversible
trajectory is time independent, and the states of the system are, at least in
principle, reversible.
Newton's theories were timeless and reversible, thus universally
applicable. The resultant view was that reversible processes are the norm,
while processes which are irreversible and time dependent, are the
exceptions, anomalies. The only difference between simple and complex
systems was that complex systems needed a complex description, which may
or not be beyond current scientific capabilities - progress in science would
12
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undoubtedly eventually lead to complete descriptions of even complex
phenomena. A" systems, in principle lent themselves to scientific description.
In the nineteenth century the new sciences of heat were to present a
challenge to Newton's science of gravity (12). Fourier, with his law of the
propagation of heat, presented, for the first time, a quantitative description of
an irreversible process, something inconceivable in classical dynamics.
Thermodynamics and its second law,' reintroduced time into physics,
providing what theorist like Prigogine regard as a conceptual revolution in the
physical sciences (1984: xxviii). Newton's theories now had to contend with
processes dependent on the direction of time, and which were for this reason,
irreversible. Irreversible processes include processes such as chemical
reactions, heat conduction and diffusion (Prigogine 1980:5).
The result, in Prigogine's view, is a scientific heritage that generates
two questions, which it cannot contend with (1984:xxix). The first is the
relation between order and disorder. The second law of thermodynamics calls
for an increase in entropy, where, in the course of time a system would
maximise its entropy and where disorder seems to be the natural state for a
dynamical system, leading to the "heat-death of the universe". Yet at the
same time we are confronted with the phenomena of biological and social
evolution, where order and complexity seem to be on the increase. Structure
arising from the disorder as Prigogine (ibid.) puts it. Secondly, both classical
and quantum physics view reversible processes as the norm. This would
seem to disallow evolution, where structures evolve towards greater
complexity and where the reversibility of this process seems highly
3 According to the first law of thermodynamics the total amount of energy in the
universe is conserved. The second law states that, with time, entropy (the disorderly
arrangement of energy) will increase until it reaches its maximum value, which would result in
a state of thermodynamic equilibrium (Prigogine 1980:5; Juarrero 1999:104) (Refer to section
3 for a more detailed discussion of the second law of thermodynamics and its implications.)
The increase of entropy furnished classical thermodynamics with a criterion for differentiating
between past, present and future. With the increase in entropy being irreversible we gain a
measure for temporality, with a state of less entropy preceding a state of greater entropy.
Thermodynamics and its laws only apply to closed systems, however, which are isolated from
their environment and consequently do not exchange matter and energy with it. Hence,
trajectories might not be reversible, but they are certainly predictable: all processes are
heading towards equilibrium (Juarrero 1999:105). Classical mechanics and thermodynamics
seem to be in accord about the deterministic nature of the universe.
13
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improbable. A further difficulty, mainly with regard to classical biology, raised
by Von Bertalanffy (1973:44), is the Darwinian view of evolution where
organisms appear as the random products of chance - haphazard products of
the undirected mutations and random selections. Similarly the mental world
was seen as a curious epiphenomenon of events in the material world.
Arbitrary and peripheral phenomena do not make sense in a universe based
on lawfulness, determinism and reversibility. With the reintroduction of time
into physics it was recognised that irreversibility, far from being an aberration,
is an essential aspect of the natural world and lies at the origin of most
instances of self-organisation. Reversibility and determinism only applied to
limited and simple cases in the world or to theoretical abstractions (Prigogine
1984:8).
In addition to the objection that classical science cannot account for
time, Newton's laws were discovered to hold only for two-bodied systems. As
soon as further elements were added to the system and the interaction
between the various bodies came into play, it became necessary to simplify
the system, which complies with the theoretical approach of classical
dynamics: the analytic method. If a given system is too complex to be grasped
as a whole, it is divided into its smaller constituents, which are examined
separately and then put together again. Presumably the characteristics of the
system will be a compilation or a superposition of the characteristics of its
parts. As said earlier, many contemporary theorists would question this
assumption, given the realisation that elements in a system necessarily
interact with one another, and that many of the properties of a system arise as
a result of these interactions. The individual elements of a system in isolation
cannot display the characteristics of elements in interaction. The further
realisation that systems usually comprise of much more than two elements,
and that additional elements complicate the dynamics of a system, gave rise
to a new approach to the systems theories.
14
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2. What is a complex system?
The field of the complexity sciences is vast and its theories find their
application in very divergent disciplines. Consequently the terminology used
differs depending on the theorist and on the scientific field in question.' Here
we have elected to speak about "complex systems", but there are many terms
that approximately denote the same phenomenon, such as: many-bodied
systems (Auyang), complex adaptive systems (Gell-Mann), dissipative
structures (Prigogine), etc. And, seeing that theories of complexity study
complex systems, a definition of what a complex system is seems to be in
order.
Defining a complex system is not a simple matter. As we will argue,
complex systems, in principle, do not lend themselves to definition. A
definition entails an abstraction that is unable to allow for the actual,
contingent characteristics of individual systems. Furthermore, all complex
systems do not display the same sets of properties. What we can do,
however, is give a very general, very sparse description, which can serve to
orientate us with regard to our subject matter, but which, by no stretch of the
imagination encompasses all complex systems. Von Bertalanffy's definition of
a system gets us off the mark. He defines a system as "a set of elements
standing in interconnection" (quoted by Wuketits 1998:318). Von Bertalanffy
also designates as "systems problems" the problem of the interrelations of a
great number of variables (1973:xix).
This definition does not seem to have to much to it, but it does point to
two of the most important considerations of the sciences of complexity:
systems that consist of many elements, and the interactions between these
elements. Complexity theory takes note of the fact that the composition of a
system is not merely the result of the aggregation of its individual
components, but is generated by means of the interaction between
components. These individual components do not operate in terms of a
predetermined te/os or goal, but act in terms of their own properties and
4 Refer to Juarrero (1999) pp. 109-117 for a brief survey of some of the largely non-
uniform terminology used in the field.
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purposes. Furthermore, characteristics that appear complex and disjointed at
a relatively small scale generally prove to form recognisable and stable
patterns at a larger scale.
Both Cilliers (1998:ix) and Kauffman (1995:18-19) make the point that
in discussing complexity it is necessary to engage with a specific complex
system, mainly because complexity arises from the specific interactions of
specific components. The whole point of a complex approach to systems is to
try and avoid abstractions and generalisations, which may not be sensitive to
the particularities and contingencies of a specific system, as much as
possible. Kauffman further asserts that though we are unable to predict detail
(in principle), we are able to predict "kinds of things". He believes that such
theories serve to explain what he calls "generic properties" of dynamic
systems (Kauffman1995: 17).
Having many components does not necessarily make a system
complex. Cilliers (1998:3) makes the distinction between complex and
complicated. Systems can have large numbers of components, which can be
analysed accurately - the individual parts do aggregate into the whole system.
Things like aeroplanes, snowflakes and the Mandelbrat set5 can be
considered to be merely complicated." Other systems are comprised of
components with such intricate interactions, that only certain aspects of them
can be analysed at a time. These analyses would more often than not cause
some sort of distortion of the system. These systems are complex. The
distinction between a complicated and complex system can often be a
function of the distance that the observer takes from the system (1998:3).7
Gell-Mann calls this "coarse-graining" by which he means that we need to
5 The Mandelbrat Set is often presented as an example of complexity arising from
simple rules as the result of non-linear interaction. As Peak and Frome would have it: "The
Mandelbrat set is the prototypical fractal: so easy to generate, yet so complex in structure. It
forces us to question the essence of our understanding of simplicity and complexity. Diversity
of forms set at all levels of magnification. The slightest bit of non-linearity can lead to such
complexity" (Peak and Frome 1994:243). This approach overlooks both adaptability and
interaction with the environment - abilities which characterise complex systems.
6 Cilliers (1998) does allow for the ambiguity that new technology can create.
Powerful new computers would generally not be considered to be "living" in the traditional
sense, yet there is an argument to be made out for their complexity (3).
7 Cilliers (1989) calls this activity "framing" (32-46).
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specify the level of detail at which the systemwill be described (1994:29).8It is
important to stress that this does not mean that complexity is merely a
function of human observation and human description. Because the
complexity of a system is a result of the interaction between the different
components of the system, it occurs at the level of the system itself (Cilliers
1998:2-3), and it would be perfectly plausible to speak of a complex system,
independent of a human observer. It seems to make as much sense to say
that there are components in the world that interact in a complex manner, as it
does to say that there are components in the world (the objections of
Cartesian solipsism aside).
There are many levels of complexity. Important in this regard is the
realisation that complexity remains at the level of the system. When we talk
about levels of complexity we do not mean some meta-level description
"above" the system nor an underlying source "below" the system. Where our
influence does make itself felt is at our choice of the distance that we will take
from the system (due to interest, technical constraints, available knowledge
etc.). Complex systems exhibit many characteristics, many structures at
various scales and undergo various processes at various rates and, most
importantly, they exhibit the ability to acquire information about their
environment and to change and adapt (Auyang1998:13; Gell-Mann1994:17).
Complex systems also interact upon and change their environment. In the
light of this ability complex systems are often characterised as living systems.
This does not imply that all complex systems are biologically alive - language,
social structures, the economy, organisms and the ecosystem are all
complex.
A complex system has more possibilities than can be actualised
(Cilliers 1998:2). The number of components that can be considered to be a
part of a complex system and the number of possible interactions between
these different components make for a vast amount of possible configurations
8 It is useful to note Auyang's (1998) assertion that coarse-graining filters out
insignificant details and serves to bring emergent properties into relief (4). These details are
of course insignificant only in relation to a specific description and may gain in importance as
the focus of our study shifts.
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and possible future states for the system. As the system increases in size the
number of possibilities increases accordingly. The difference between the
enormity of the possibilities and the scarcity of actualisations underpins
concepts like probability, contingency, temporal irreversibility and uncertainty
(Auyang 1998:18). In attempting to account for these occurrences
theoretically, the complexity sciences distinguish themselves from the modern
scientific world-view as well as thermodynamics and evolutionary theory.
3. Non-linear interactions
Dynamic systems as characterised in Newtonian physics are linear
systems. Crudely simplified this means that the trajectory of a system (its
successive states through time) can be analysed as the sum-total of its
normal modes. Auyang (1998:178) explains this by way of the vibration of a
violin string. The sound that the string produces can be seen as a succession
of its normal modes, strung together to form a harmonic motion. Analogously
the behaviour of a linear system is the result of superposition:" an aggregation
of its parts. Thus a linear response to a disturbance is proportional to the
magnitude of the disturbance. To cast this in complex vernacular: small
causes have small effects. This results in a stable, and predictable system,
where its final state is determined by its initial conditions. As seen in the
previous section, such systems lend themselves to prediction, because a
particular state in the system, coupled with its basic laws enables theorists to
project past and future states with accuracy. The trajectory of the system is
stable, predictable and time independent (it can, in principle, be reversed). In
a low-energy equilibrium system the system moves to equilibrium and no
additional energy is needed to maintain it (Kauffman 1995:20). Linear systems
are also closely related to the principle of symmetry, where linear
relationships are symmetrical and hence give rise to simple systems with
transparent structures (Cilliers 1998:120), and when dynamic processes are
9 Auyang defines the principle of superposition as a combination of solutions yielding
another solution (1998:234). Hence, when a difficult problem is encountered it can be broken
into simpler problems; the solutions of the simpler problems can then be superposed on to the
original problem and would presumably provide a solution.
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reversible. As stated above, thermodynamics and its second law re-introduces
time into the systems equation and shows linear, stable systems to be the
exception rather than the norm. The important difference is that the dynamic
process of a thermodynamic system is irreversible.
The second law of thermodynamics states that in a closed system, a
certain quantity, entropy, must increase to a maximum, where the system
comes to rest in a state of equilibrium (Von Bertalanffy 1973:38). Von
Bertalanffy characterises entropy as a measure of probability. A system tends
to the state of most probable distribution, which is a state of complete
disorder. Indeed, Kauffman (1995:9) defines entropy as a measure of
disorder.
This point can be illustrated with the classical example of a dark blue
droplet of ink, which is dropped into a jar of still water. Inevitably the ink will
diffuse through the water and tint it a light blue. The most probable state of the
system (water + dark ink) is that the ink would spread evenly throughout the
jar of water. In the words of Kauffman: "Left to its own devices the system will
visit all possible microscopic configurations equally often" (9). This is an
irreversible process - the likelihood that the ink molecules would reverse the
process and reassemble into an inkblot being minimal. As maximum disorder
seems to be the most probable state of distribution of a system, in order for
order to be maintained some work has to be done on the system (Kauffman
1995:10).10
4. Open systems
A useful distinction to make when trying to come to grips with concepts
like that of reversibility and irreversibility or linearity and non-linearity is that of
closed and open systems. The distinction between closed and open systems
rests with the system's relation (or lack of it) with the environment. Reversible
processes are generally restricted to closed systems: systems that are
10 Gregory Bateson (1972:3-8) uses the simple analogy of a little girl's room that just
cannot seem to keep itself tidy; it naturally tends to disorder and it takes effort on the part of
the girl to keep things tidy.
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isolated and do not interact with their environments. Open systems, on the
other hand, continuously exchange energy and matter with their environment
and exist by virtue of their interaction with their environment. Closed systems
move to a state of equilibrium. Equilibrium structures are inert at a global
level, and once formed, they can be isolated and maintained indefinitely. The
final state of a closed system will be determined by its initial conditions,
whereas, in open systems, the final state is in essence unpredictable.
Whereas a closed system is an isolated system and exchanges no matter or
energy with its environment, an open system can, by definition, not exist in
isolation; it exists in its exchange of matter and energy (or information) with
the environment. In this sense biological cells and cities are open systems in
that they "feed" on matter and energy coming from outside of the system
(Prigogine 1984:127). This is not a one-way process though, open systems
contribute to their environment; they make up part of a greater system.
All living organisms are essentially open systems (Von Bertalanffy
1973:31). It is still possible for a complex system to have a structure - a
steady-state - which is maintained at a distance from equilibrium and where
the system is capable of doing work. In spite of consisting of continuous
irreversible processes, the constant import and export of matter, the system
stays constant in its composition (more about this in our discussion on self-
organisation).
It is important to emphasise that the second law of thermodynamics
applies only to closed systems, which undergo irreversible processes. Only
irreversible processes contribute to entropy production (Prigogine 1980:5).
Examples of irreversible processes include: chemical reactions, heat
conduction and diffusion (5). The irreversible processes of the second law of
thermodynamics leads to a kind of one-sidedness of time, the increase in
entropy is associated with a positive time direction. 11 Introducing directionality
into closed systems does not, in itself, translate into a radical overhaul of our
understanding of open systems and the role that time and the environment
play in their structures and their characteristics. As we have seen in the
11 Refer to footnote 3.
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previous section, many contemporary theorists believe open systems to be
the norm and in the light of the characteristics of open systems it becomes
necessary to revise the laws of classical science and even the second law of
thermodynamics, which pertain to closed systems in a state of equilibrium.
Prigogine insists that the second law can be extended to include open
systems, which do exchange energy and matter with their environment (i.e.
living/complex systems). He states that there is an essential difference
between the laws for systems at equilibrium and for non-equilibrium systems:
where laws for equilibrium systems are universal, laws for non-equilibrium
systems become very specific (1980:93). While in isolated (closed systems)
the law only allows for the fact that the system will increase in entropy and
come to rest in a state of maximum disorder, applied to non-equilibrium open
systems, Prigogine speculates, it may account for a new type of structure,
which he calls a dissipative structure. Furthermore, it might account for the
coherence and organisation found in the non-equilibrium world around us.
Consequently it may explain why living systems, which are by definition not
closed, and maintain themselves through a continuous inflow and outflow of
mass and energy to and from their environment, are never in their lifetime in a
state of thermodynamic equilibrium, yet are able to maintain a constant state.
Many of the characteristics of living/open systems, which seem paradoxical in
the light of the laws of physics could be accounted for in this manner."
12 Von Bertalanffy (1973:38-40) elaborates on his point with reference to recent
scientific efforts to account for open systems. He briefly highlights two consequences:
First, the conclusion that the final state of a closed system is unequivocally accounted
for in its initial conditions (what he terms the principle of equifinality). He gives the examples
of a planetary system in which the positions of the planets at time t are unequivocally
determined by their position at time to, and that of the final concentrations in a chemical
system that are dependent on the initial concentrations of the reactants. If the initial conditions
or the process were to be altered, the final state would be altered accordingly.
Secondly, the apparent contrast between animate and inanimate nature was
highlighted. Hence the law of dissipation in physics, which seemed to be diametrically
opposed to the law of evolution in biology. According to the second law of thermodynamics
the general trend of physical nature is toward a state of maximum disorder and the leveling
down of differences, which would end in the "heat-death" of the universe, where all energy will
be degraded into an evenly distributed heat of a low temperature and the process comes to a
stop. By contrast, the living world is characterised by embryonic development and evolution,
and the trend is towards order, heterogeneity and organisation.
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Prigogine asserts that without non-equilibrium and the processes that
result from it, the universe would have a completely different structure and
that there would be no appreciable amount of matter (1984:231).
Thermodynamics is, for him, the first attempt of physics to address the
complexity of nature, where the passing of time brings about ever greater
complexity in the form of structures, but also degradation and death
(1984:129).
As soon as time, interaction between the components of a system and
the environment in which a system operates in are brought into consideration
the linear picture of the universe changes somewhat. We have seen that the
second law of thermodynamics introduced "the arrow of time" back into
physics by describing irreversible processes that are dependent on the
direction of time (Prigogine1984:12). As time passes, entropy increases and
reversibility becomes improbable. The superposition principle breaks down in
non-linear systems and it doesn't make sense to talk about the individual
behaviour of the elements of the system - the properties of a non-linear
system differ qualitatively from the properties of its components. For the
system to exist the elements necessarily interact amongst themselves and
with the environment.
Non-equilibrium structures need a constant source of energy to
maintain them. Because these systems are sustained by a continuous
dissipation of matter and energy, Prigogine calls them "dissipative structures"
(Kauffman1995:20). Kauffman characterises all living systems as dissipative
structures. In complex systems symmetry is broken and the resultant
asymmetrical structures ensure a rich level of interaction among components
of the system and also create competition for resources. Non-linearity is a
necessary, but not sufficient, precondition for complexity (Cilliers 1998:120).
5. Emergence
The concept of emergence is central to theories of complexity. As we
have seen the law of superposition does not hold in descriptions of these
systems. The argument is that there is more to certain systems than is evident
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from examining the individual parts that make up the system. This something
"more" - these extra characteristics which emerge in the system, but which
are not attributes of its individual parts - is what is meant with the concept of
emergence. Certain properties become evident when a system is viewed as a
whole - they arise as a result of the interactions of the elements that comprise
a system. Interaction (of the elements amongst one another, and also of the
system with the environment) generates emergent properties.
John Holland states that he is unable to give a concise definition of
emergence, citing the complicated nature of the phenomenon as reason
(1998:3). His inability to define the phenomenon does not prohibit him from
writing extensively on it, and he is adamant that emergent properties should
not be regarded as mystical or even rare phenomena. Holland (1997:11) calls
emergence a "pervasive phenomenon", which can be seen in domains as
diverse as seeds, scientific models, ethical systems, the evolution of nations,
the spread of ideas and board games - the latter being a useful analogy for
explaining emergence.
Holland uses chess as an example for explaining the rudiments of the
concept: Firstly, even though the game has fewer than two dozen rules, there
are a vast number of possible configurations and moves within legitimate play.
Furthermore, it is impossible to glean a complete picture of the progress of a
given game by simply adding up the values of the pieces left on the board.
How the pieces interact and support one another and their positions on the
board are just a few of the important factors that need to be taken into
consideration when assessing the status of a game (1997:32), and there can
be many more. This example is, of course, one of a comparatively simple
system, where there is no sign of factors like self-organisation, adaptation,
etc. What it does do is provide us with a picture that could amount to a broad
definition of emergence as an instance where: "a small number of rules can
generate a system of surprising complexity" (1998:3). What is generated is
not the complexity of random patterns: the resultant systems exhibit
recognisable structures that are dynamic - they change over time. The rules
that generate the system stay invariant, but the things that they govern are in
flux. In other words emergent phenomena are typically persistent patterns
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within a system with changing components. Relatively consistent rules (or
laws) generate complexity and the flux of patterns that follow lead to
"perpetual novelty" and emergence.
Another simple example to illustrate what is meant by emergence is
that of phenomena such as freezing and evaporation, or phase transitions,
which are some of the most familiar examples of emergent phenomena
exhibited by physical systems. Matter changes from one structure state to
another (for example water to ice) in a way that is not discernible from the
parts (water molecules). The example of the phase transitions of water
molecules is an example used by John Stuart Mill in his treatment of the
subject of emergent phenomena. He comes to the conclusion that through
studying the structures and properties of oxygen and hydrogen separately
would not enable a theorist to deductively infer that, together, they produce
water. Mill gives the following criteria for emergence to occur (Auyang
1998:173-174):
1. The emergent character of the whole is not the sum of its
parts
2. An emergent character is of a type completely different
from the character types of the constituents
3. Emergent characters are not deducible or predictable from
the constituents, investigated separately.
Emergence belongs to the structural aspect of the system. The system
does not need to have certain kinds of constituents or mechanics to have
emergent properties, hence many very different kinds of systems can exhibit
emergent properties. Again, these systems are not limited to physical systems
and can include social, cultural and biological systems as well. In fact, Auyang
warns that physical systems are relatively simple in comparison with social
systems, and that the social sciences should consequently take note of the
experiences in the physical sciences and be wary of simplistic connections
between micro- and macro-descriptions (193). She highlights the difficulties
involved in treating emergent phenomena theoretically: in systems that are
24
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
thoroughly interconnected, slight perturbations propagate through and affect
the entire system, which can result in a system with behaviour that can be
"multifarious, unstable and surprising" (1998:183).
In biology the concept of emergence is used by theorists like Kauffman
to explain the existence of life as we know it (1995:23).13 The main thrust of
this (although be it controversial)" argument is that the order that we perceive
in the living world is an expression of underlying, fundamental laws and rests
on the presupposition that a collection of sufficiently complex molecules can
aggregate into systems which we would call "alive". What we would call life
would not be a property of a single molecule, but an emergent property of a
system of interacting molecules (24).15 Here "alive" can be understood in the
sense of being a system that can sustain itself, evolve and reproduce.
Kauffman is sceptical about the prevailing evolutionary theory that sees
life as arising from a primordial soup and then evolving toward ever greater
complexity through a succession of hits and misses. He argues that metabolic
networks (and thus life) emerged from the primordial soup "full-grown" -
already containing the minimal requirements for life. He bases his hypothesis
on the premise that the simplest thing known to be alive, pleuromona, contain
the minimal set of genes for something to be what we would call alive, and
that this minimal complexity can be likened to a kind of "natural phase
transition in complex chemical systems" (1995: 33-48).
The possibilities of emergence are compounded when elements of the
system allow for some capacity for adaptation and learning. Some of the
fundamental aspects of this kind of agent-based emergence are aptly
captured in the metaphor of an ant colony. The individual agents (ants) have a
limited repertoire, but the colony as a whole exhibits remarkable flexibility in
its interaction with its environment and exhibits emergent behaviour which
13The same idea runs through "Emergence", an article in which Holland (1997)
asserts that: "we will not understand life and living organisms until we understand emergence"
(12).
14 Refer to Auyang 1998: 202-203.
15This view contrasts with that of Henri Bergson, and of a substantial chunk of the
Western philosophical tradition, which proposes an élan vital, an insubstantial essence
animates the inorganic molecules of cells and thus brings them to life.
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outstrips that of the individual agents (Holland1998:5). One of the most
important characteristics of such agent-based emergent behaviour is that
there is no direction by a central executive (something analogous to Dennett's
(1991:101-138) Cartesian Theatre16). The idea of ordered behaviour, without a
central executive agent, will be explored in greater detail when the concept of
self-organisation is discussed.
The example of the ant colony also serves to illustrate the limitations of
averaging when studying the behaviour of large numbers of agents, where
traditionally individuals are taken to exhibit typical or "average" behaviour. The
overall behaviour of a group of agents is then seen as the sum of the average
behaviour, but, as Holland argues, the interactive behaviours of the ants bring
a coherence to the colony that cannot be predicted through summation.
Consequently we have an illustration of the most important aspect of
emergent properties: they are the product of interactions between agents
(nodes) and dependent on context. The context in which an emergent pattern
arises determines its function (Holland1998: 121-226) - this characteristic will
be explored in greater detail later.
6. Framing and modelling
A recurrent theme when studying complexity is that of its dynamic
nature and the difficulties that this nature poses to studying and theoretically
encompassing complexity. Whereas closed systems can be systems with very
few variables and thus lend themselves to formal description, open systems
are often too large and too complex. In studying an open system we always
have to contend with successive states of the system, with numerous and
diverse possible historical processes that have led up to a certain state and
with numerous possible states of configuration in the future. Emergent
phenomena occur within a greater system with a myriad interacting
components and it is impossible to take all relevant components into
consideration and to keep track of all the effects of their interactions. At the
16 Cf. pp. 128-129 for a discussion on Dennett's Cartesian Theatre.
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same time it must be remembered that the system is dynamic, and that the
analyst has to deal with perpetual novelty in the system. If the basic
mechanism of the system allows for adaptation and learning, a further
dimension of difficulty is added to any attempt to model the entire system.
The fact that open systems do not lend themselves to complete formal
description is not due to practical constraints (like the lack of knowledge or
resources), open systems are not fully formalisabie in principle. The reason
for this is that open systems have no fixed boundaries. It is not possible to
determine with certainty which components belong solely to the system and
which do not. On top of that, we have seen that open systems change
continuously and in unpredictable ways. Components are added and
detracted and the relationships among various components change, which, in
turn, influence the rest of the system. Open systems do not operate according
to the dictates of a te/os - changes are unpredictable, irregular, and
contingent. Coupled with the characteristic of decentralised decision making,
where no specific component controls the system, and with changes that are
the result of many factors, including changes in the environment and in other
distant parts of the system, we end up with a mercurial, changing system that
cannot be pinned down long enough to be described. With the impossibility of
constructing a static model of the entire system and all its possible states and
configurations, it becomes necessary to determine the appropriate level of
detail at which the system will be scrutinised and the mechanisms of the
system which are relevant to that particular study. As mentioned earlier,
Cilliers calls this process "frarninq?".
A characteristic of the process of framing, which has important
implications for the study and modelling of complex systems, is that a frame is
an abstraction. Some aspects and characteristics of the system are
abstracted from the rest of the system and given a special status - they are
not natural entities and they are not part of the system. We impose frames on
entities in our descriptions of them (Cilliers 1989: 40). Not that the argument
17 Refer to Cilliers (1989: 36-43) for a brief discussion of framing as pertaining to the
analytical/empiricist domain and the applicability of this concept to complex phenomena.
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here criticises or calls for the abolition of the practice of framing - that is
impossible. Without framing communication would be impossible, we need to
frame in order to give a description of sornethinq." But, in the light of the
complex nature of most of the (open) systems that we encounter, complexity
theorists would argue that comprehensively framing these systems is, in
principle, impossible and that any frames that we do impose on the system
will necessarily have to be of a provisional nature. To quote Cilliers (1989:
42):
But we have to frame. It is the imposed frame that creates the
levels, the depth in which we can operate, can draw distinctions,
can make oppositions, can work... lt is the imposed frame that
creates the safe space where there can be talk of truth, rationality,
causality, purpose and constraints. As long as we remain well
inside the clearing, our work can continue, but as soon as we start
exploring the limits of our discourse, we are caught in the vortex of
the logic of the frame...to have a theory is to draw a frame."
To have a theory is to draw a frame - this statement calls forth all kinds
of implications that will be expanded upon throughout this study. Most notably
that of our active participation in our perception of the world, through
constructing models of it, and the necessity of recognising the nature of, as
well as the implications and limitations of these models.
Holland (1998:13), for instance, discusses the process of modelling a
complex system at some length and places great emphasis on the active
participation of the theorist in selecting detail that he/she considers to be
relevant, thus highlighting the provisional nature of our models of the world.
He insists that in constructing a model of a system we do not have the benefit
18 Refer to Cilliers (2001: 135-147) for a discussion of the necessity of the presence
of constraints, whether physical or informational, in complex systems. Also see (2000b: 40-
50) where similar ideas are developed in the context of rules.
19 Jacques Derrida extensively explores the ideas of the limit of discourse - aporia -
and the logic of the frame. Cf. Culler (1994:193-199) for a concise and insightful account of
the logic of the frame, as developed by Derrida in various works. Also see Drucilla Cornell
(1992) where she discusses these issues as they apply to law and justice.
28
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
of preceding study or hindsight to guide us - the relevant laws have to be
selected in the process of constructing a rule-based model of a complex
system and deduction and derivation play a limited part at the time of
selecting the rules and constructing a model. Our attention is attracted by a
recurring pattern in a particular system (Holland uses the example of the
orbits of the planets), and through a process of induction - moving from
particular observation to abstract description - we construct a model of the
selected phenomena. Only recurring patterns in a given system will lend
themselves to being observed and considered to be part of the mechanics of
the system. Knowing which details to ignore and which to include when
constructing a model is a matter of experience, rather than a matter of
deduction. If all goes well the end result will be a description of repeated
elements that suggest rules or mechanisms, according to which the system
operates. Not being able to reduce the behaviour of a complex system to a
set of basic laws does not mean that it cannot be modelled or studied: Holland
suggests that one can reduce the behaviour of the whole to the lawful
behaviour of the parts, if one takes the non-linearity of the interactions into
account (122).
7. Self-organisation
Part and parcel of the dynamic nature of complex systems is their
remarkable tendency to display organisation. We have already touched upon
this feature in our discussion of emergence: random patterns resulting from
the interaction between components in a system do not make for emergent
properties; emergent properties are ordered and recurring patterns that come
about through some kind of organisation among the components of that
particular system. Selt-orqanisation" is an emergent property of complex
systems, and is a result of the interaction between local components. We call
20 In much of the literature on complex systems one comes across the term
"autopoiesis." The phenomenon that the term usually denotes is akin to the phenomenon of
self-organisation. And for the purposes of this study and with the intention to avoid needlessly
multiplying terms we have elected to omit any reference to autopoiesis and to add its
denotation under that of self-organisation.
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to mind Holland's example of the ant colony. This agent-based model is useful
when trying to make sense of the ability to self-organise. The ants, despite
their limited individual capabilities, display remarkably coordinated behaviour,
which leads to emergent behaviour in the colony as a whole, with effects far
surpassing those that the individual might be thought to accomplish on its
own. What is distinctive about organised behaviour in a complex system is
that it is not directed by some central, executive agent. The individual
components or nodes of the system react to information available to them
locally, which translates into complex and organised behaviour on a systemic
level. Anyone node is not, and cannot be aware of the behaviour and
structure of the entire system at anyone time, which itself relies on coupled
behaviour, contingencies and is subject to continuous chanqe."
There are many advantages to not being directed by a single centre of
control, but a system must, by definition, display coordinated and interactive
behaviour. The idea in the complexity sciences is to explain how a complex
system, like that of the biosphere or language, can attain such a high degree
of order, without needing to postulate some external designing or directing
agent or some form of executive internal control. It is important to stress that
the phenomenon of self-organisation is a profoundly pragmatic - perhaps one
could even say prosaic - occurrence, which has to do with the optimal
functioning of a system and which does away with the need for recourse to
metaphysical explanations when trying to account for the morphologies of
phenomena.
Cilliers (1998:12) describes self-organisation as "a process whereby a
system can develop a complex structure from fairly unstructured beginnings."
In keeping with views raised in the last paragraph Cilliers sees the
significance of self-organisation in the idea that internal order can come about
21 Birute Regine and Roger Lewin (2000) from their article Leading at the Edge: How
leaders Influence Complex Systems, in which they apply the insights gained from complexity
theory to organisational and management theory, use the term "organizationally flat" where
they suggest that companies that are less hierarchical in the managerial approach will be
more flexible and adaptable and thus better suited to keep up with the fast-changing face of
business. This approach can be misleading in that it contains the implication that complex
systems do not contain hierarchies and are in some way flat. See Cilliers (2001 :142-145)
where he argues that complex systems do in fact (and necessarily) contain hierarchies.
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without the need for an external designer or an internal form of centralised
control (88). We will later return to what exactly the significance of these
characteristics would be. In a complex, adaptive system the relationship
between the components of the system is altered both by the system's
interaction with its environment and by the system's own history. These
provide limiting factors (constraints), which contribute to the order that a
system settles into.
Per Bak, one of the theorists that introduced the concept of "self-
organised criticality"(1996:1-3), aims to describe the tendency of large
systems with many components to evolve to an unbalanced, yet structured
state - a "poised" or "critical" - state, where minor disturbances may lead to
events of all sizes. To illustrate how most changes to the system take place
through catastrophic and unpredictable events, rather than gradual change
Bak uses the image of a person trickling sand through his/her fingers to form
a pile. As the pile grows, little sand-slides occur, which become bigger as
more sand is added to the pile. The pile reaches a critical point where no
more sand can be added to the pile without causing sand-slides, and where
the size, frequency, and the impact of the slides are inconsistent and
unpredictable. The same mechanisms that cause small slides (minor
changes) can cause major sand-avalanches. The behaviour of the sand pile
can no longer be understood in terms of the individual grains of sand and
develops a dynamic that relies on the configuration of the whole system. The
grains have collaborated to form an interacting system, which, when reaching
a certain critical point, undergoes unpredictable changes of inconsistent
magnitude and frequency."
We have already mentioned the evidently pragmatic nature of self-
organisation, in that the theory is that self-organisation ensures the optimal
functioning of the system. Cilliers (1998) explains what takes place in self-
organisation as the system organising itself to a critical point where single
22 This is of course a simple example that does not do away with an external agent
(the person trickling the sand). Its significance lies in its ability to illustrate a point of saturation
for a system, after which the system undergoes changes that are the result of a combination
of its own configuration and environmental factors.
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events will have the widest possible range of effects and where the system
can obtain optimum sensitivity to external inputs. These critical points are also
called "attractors" - states that a system eventually settles into, and which are
determined by the properties of the system (Lewin 1995: 17).
Cilliers (1998:97) provides us with an example with which to visualise
the behaviour of a system when it settles into an attractor state. Firstly we
need to visualise the state-space of the system. The state-space has a
separate dimension for every independent variable of the system. Thus a
system with three variables - temperature, volume and pressure - has a three
dimensional state-space. A system with a network of 1000 variables (or
nodes) has a state-space that is a thousand dimensional (97).23
Every possible state of the system is characterised by a unique point in
the state-space. The dynamics of the system (the way in which the system
unfolds through time) forms trajectories through the state-space. When a
number of trajectories converge on a certain point in the state-space that point
is called an attractor - a stable state of the system. A stable system has only a
few strong attractors, whereas an unstable system would have no strong
attractors (but can have many weaker ones) and would jump around
chaotically. A chaotic system has no structure and is useless, while a stable
system with too few attractors is very rigid and cannot readily adapt to
changing conditions. To return to the idea of self-organised criticality, it
postulates that a system will balance itself at a critical point between rigid
order and chaos. At this critical point single events in the system can have the
widest possible range of effects, without disrupting the system - the system
will be at its most sensitive to external input, without being unstable. The
system will also be able to change its state with the least amount of effort. The
23Auyang defines state-space as a "structured collection of all possible momentary
states of the individual" and argues that something changes substantively when its states
have different characteristics at different times (1998:215). Successive states taken as a
whole constitute an entity's history or the process that it undergoes to reach a certain state at
a certain time. In accordance with the idea of coarse-graining and framing, Auyang argues
that the impossibility to encompass an entire system (including its history) in state space, we
must resort to narrative explanations when describing the system.
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tendency that a system has to move to criticality leads to an increase of
complexity in the system (97-98).
As already mentioned, theorists contend that economy and flexibility
underlie this behaviour of complex systems (Kauffman 1995:26; Cilliers
1998:98). The ability to self-organise is an intrinsic characteristic of a complex
system, which ensures that the system is organised in such a way that it
functions at optimum capacity and to ensure that resources available to the
system are fully utilised. The absence of rigid hierarchy and central control
has the important effect of allowing the system to be extremely flexible and
adaptable.
A simple and useful example is that of Bénard cells as described in
Juarrero (1999:119-120). We start off with a pan of shallow water at room
temperature, where the identical water molecules randomly bump into one
another. As we uniformly heat the pan from below, the liquid initially stays a
uniform temperature and the system in thermodynamic equilibrium.
Eventually, however, the bottom of the pan grows hotter and a temperature
gradient occurs in the liquid, which increases thermal non-equilibrium within
the system; the system becomes unstable and is unable to maintain its
current "organisation". The independent water molecules reorganise
themselves into a system that is macroscopically orderly; patterned into
"rolling columns of hexagonal cells, called Bénard cells"(120). The dynamics
of the system switches from heat conduction to heat convection; the system
has undergone an abrupt transition from chaos to order, in order to facilitate
the critical temperature gradient (non-equilibrium state) that had built up. Now
context (the environment) plays a significant role in that the behaviour of
individual molecules becomes dependent on that of surrounding molecules
and on the temperature to which the water is heated. The control parameter
(increased heat) drives the system away from equilibrium to a phase transition
(bifurcation). In this example the heat is controlled from the outside and if it is
reduced the Bénard cells will disappear, if it is increased the water will
become more turbulent (turbulence being highly complex, ordered behaviour).
Systems that can adjust their own control parameters and thus reorganise
themselves are truly self-organising systems.
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It is the concept of self-organisation that enables Stuart Kauffman to
question existing theories on evolution. In a series of idealised experiments
with virtual networks Kauffman has demonstrated the seemingly uncanny
tendency for systems with many different interacting components to move to
certain attractors in the system and settling down into a recurring and
recognisable pattern of behaviour. As can be imagined, this kind of
experiment can hold some exciting implications for the biologist in as far as
the evolution of biological systems are concerned.
As a metaphor to explain how "autocatalytic metabolisms"- self-
organisation among molecular species in the primal waters - came about,
Kauffman uses the image of a network of light bulbs, wired together at
random with an electrical circuit - this serves as an apt example for all
manner of complex systems (1995:71-79). In this case, one molecule
catalysing another could be thought of as one light bulb switching on another
one. The aim is to demonstrate that, under the right conditions, this random
network will not, as might be expected behave in a random manner, but that,
with time, order will arise spontaneously from the interaction between the
bulbs. The bulbs settling into a coherent pattern of switching on and off will be
analogous to trajectories in a system converging on certain attractors in its
state-space.
Each bulb can have only two values, on and off, depending on input
from other bulbs. Nevertheless, the number of possible states in such a
network is vast; all the bulbs might be on or off, or any number of
configurations combining these two states in between. As we explained
earlier, this range of possible configurations is called the state-space of the
network. Assigning Boolean functions" to each light bulb - meaning that each
bulb will, in its next state re-act to the input from the current state of the other
bulbs that it is connected to - causes the bulbs to behave in an interactive
manner. As the network proceeds through a series of states each bulb (node;
gene; molecule) examines input from the other bulbs and then switches on or
off (becomes active or inactive) according to the rules assigned to it for
24 Named after the nineteenth century mathematical logician, Charles Baaie.
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reacting to other signals. The network then proceeds to the next state and the
process is repeated. A system, consisting of a finite number of bulbs will have
a finite number of possible states. Once started off, the system will run
through a sequence of states, or a trajectory. Since, with a limited amount of
bulbs, there are a finite number of possible states, the system will eventually
hit upon a state that it has previously encountered and will run through the
associated trajectory again. The system is deterministic, in the sense that the
behaviour of light bulbs is constrained by the behaviour of those that they are
connected to, and will eventually run around a recurrent loop of states - a
state cycle - where it will repeat its pattern of on/off bulbs again and again. A
smaller network will have a smaller number of possible states, which would
make it easier for an observer to detect a repeating pattern denoting a state-
cycle. A large network, with more elements and a vastly bigger amount of
possible states may have a number of possible states in its state-cycle so vast
that it could conceivably take so much time to run through its cycle that we
might be unable to detect a pattern, as the system will never repeat itself in
our lifetime. The behaviour of such a network will appear to be utterly random
to us. Networks that settle into small state-cycles exhibit, what seems to us to
be, repeatable behaviour.
We have already seen that attractors are a source of order in
dynamical systems in that different trajectories converge on this point in the
state-space where they are "trapped" in this sub-region of the state-space,
and that both Cilliers and Kauffman cite small attractors as a prerequisite for
order. Complex systems are often characterised by what has been named
strange-attractors. Strange attractors describe ordered patterns, which will still
allow individual behaviour to fluctuate. So even if trajectories in a system are
caught in an attractor basin, their behaviour is not so rigidly constrained so as
to cause the individual trajectories to repeat a phase exactly. Consequently,
even though the system is constrained in a state-cycle and does display
order, it is still hard to discern an overarching, repetitive pattern of order, as
individual trajectories are never exactly identical, but approximate. As
Juarrero has it: "The width and convoluted shape of strange attractors imply
that the overall pathway they describe is multiply realisable" (Juarrero 1999:
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155). Even though the trajectories in these systems appear to be random,
such intricate behaviour patterns are in fact an indication dynamic, complex
and context-dependent organisation (154-156).
Another prerequisite for order in a dynamical system is that of
homeostasis (Kauffman 1995:79): a system needs to be resistant to small
perturbations. If we arbitrarily choose a light bulb and switch it off and on
again, the system needs to be able, more often than not, to return to the state-
cycle from which it has been perturbed, in order to be stable. Not all systems
possess homeostatic stability - a system with too many attractors is unstable,
and any slight perturbation might send it into another basin of attraction, thus
changing its cycle and disrupting the system's "pattern". A system in which all
its attractors are unstable in this way would be a chaotic system, vulnerable to
all manner of fluctuations and never able to repeat its cycles through the
state-space, thus never able to retain its order.
Kauffman uses the insights gleaned from his experiments on Boolean
networks and especially his computerised experiments" to amend the theory
of evolution. As we have mentioned earlier in this chapter, Von Bertalanffy
criticises the Darwinian theory of evolution, where organisms appear to be the
random products of chance and haphazard mutations. It is this aspect of the
theory of evolution that Kauffman seeks to address. He is of the conviction
that different cell-types are equivalent to state-cycles in Boolean networks, the
later being an accurate, if idealised, model for the generation of cell types. In
his own words: "I suspect that the fate of all complex adapting systems in the
biosphere - from single cells to economies - is to evolve to a natural state
between order and chaos; a grand compromise between structure and
surprise" (1995:15). His aim is then to show that order arises naturally and
that much of the order in organisms is not the result of natural selection, but
the result of spontaneous self-organisation within systems.
Systems exhibit their most interesting behaviour when they operate at,
what is often called "the edge of chaos"- poised on the edge between order
25 Refer to Kauffman (1995), Lewin (1993: 48-139), Ayuang (1998) for extensive
discussions on these experiments.
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and disorder, akin to the point between phase transitions in physical systems
(26). At this point networks are best adapted to handle complex calculations,
yet are still controllable. Networks also maximise their capacity to evolve,
responding to minor changes without becoming chaotic. Most minor changes
in the system will have a minor effect on the system, with it still being able to
return to its attractor state. Some mutations may, however, have a greater
effect on the system, and will lead to evolutionary changes. Auyang
elaborates: "...networks at the edge of chaos are able to evolve both by
accumulation of small changes and by dramatic changes that in which
evolutionary novelties emerge. The emergent changes might be triggered by
a random mutation or by a change in the environment. The conditions under
which natural selection is most powerful are also those in which self-
organisation and historical contingency are most likely" (1998:202). Kauffman
claims that these theories of self-organisation and selection are the laws and
general regularities that underlie evolution generally. His views are not
uncontroversial and his idealisations and computerised models are accused
of being too far removed from empirical evidence and are found to be quite
alien to many mainstream biologists (see, for example, Auyang 1998: 202).
Yet, his ideas are compelling and may prove to have many interesting
philosophical implications.
8. Feedback, the environment, and adaptability
The bulk of the discussion on self-organisation so far has been to
indicate how complex systems acquire structure. We have said that one of the
most important characteristics of this structure is that it comes about as a
result of the dynamics and interaction between the components in a complex
system, and the system and its environment, no external designer or pre-
programmed "software" is required. The preceding section links to the first half
of Cilliers' definition of structure, while touching on a second characteristic
which needs to be taken into consideration for us to have a complete picture
of complex structure: "The notion of 'structure' pertains to the internal
mechanisms developed by the system to receive, encode, transform and
store information on the one hand, and to react to such information by some
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form of output on the other" (1998:89; my emphasis). Cilliers, more so than
the other theorists discussed thus far, places emphasis on the role of the
environment in the development of structure within a system. The
environment presents a number of constraints, which curtail and influence the
development of structure. The resulting structure is the product of a complex
interaction between the environment in which a system finds itself, the present
state of the system and the history of the system." In accordance with
Kauffman, Cilliers explicitly defines the capacity for self-organisation as a
property that enables a system to change its structure adaptively, which
allows it to "cope with, or manipulate its environment" (90). Here we touch
upon a further aspect of self-organisation: a self-organising system not only
reacts to and adapts itself to its environment, it also interacts with the
environment and has the ability to instigate changes in its environment.
There exist causal relations between the system, its environment and
the system's history, referred to as feedback, which explains how the system
is shaped by its environment, but also how the systems shapes its
environment. Open systems that exchange matter and energy with their
environment, receive feedback from that environment. As Juarrero would
have it: "feedback embeds them in that environment in such a way that they
are simultaneously context-dependent and initiators of behaviour" (1999:75).
In a non-equilibrium system any naturally occurring random fluctuation can
become amplified, with the same kind of effect as, in our earlier example, the
increased heat had on the Bénard cells." The system moves to dissipate the
26 "History" here refers to already actualised states of the system. A certain
configuration of the system - which is the result of previous states of the system and
environmental constraints - already precludes some possible states, while enhancing the
probability of the actualisation of others. History in this sense should not be understood as a
chronological series of major events. As Cilliers put it: "The history of the system is contained
in all the individual little interactions that take place all the time, distributed over the whole
system (2000a: 25).
27 A simple example by which to understand feedback is that used by Peak and
Frome (1994:5-6), namely: audio feedback:
Picture a speaker and a microphone connected to a stereo. If the microphone is
pointed towards the speaker and the volume on the stereo gradually increased, the speaker
will soon start making an electronic squealing noise, as sometimes happens at a public
speaking or at concerts. The reason this happens can be explained as the result of an
iterative process: feedback. The speaker is designed to convert an electrical signal into
vibrations in the air - sound. The microphone is designed to convert vibrations in the air into
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non-equilibrium that builds up and hence in each re-organisation becomes
better able to deal with the environment in which it finds itself. The system can
be driven into a new dynamical organisation. In this manner, self-organisation
can, by means of its own dynamics, cause the system to evolve (Juarrero
1999:122). The fluctuations in the system are random and contingent and
because they serve as the nucleus around which the re-organisation occurs,
"...the progression of those evolutionary processes also marks the trajectory
of an increasingly individuated system"(122). These self-organised systems
derive their identity from the organisation of the processes that constitute
them and not from the primary material of their components (124). The
system becomes context-dependent in that its constituent elements become
dependent on the behaviour of their neighbouring elements as well as what
happened previously in the system. Feedback loops incorporate time into the
system, by making the system dependent on its history - by incorporating the
system's past into its present structure, feedback adds the additional
constraint of already actualised states and past experiences influence the
system's subsequent behaviour (138).
Open systems do not passively serve as conduits for energy. Although
the open system imports energy from its environment, the energy, by virtue of
the systems dynamics, is diverted to maintain the system's internal
organisation. Self-organising systems are self-referential, and new
components are "accepted" into the system by virtue of their ability to
enhance the overall organisation of the system. The system's organisation
makes for what Juarrero calls "an internal selection process", which is
established by the system itself, and operates to preserve and enhance the
electrical currents. The microphone picks up background noise in the room and sends an
electrical signal to the amplifier, which amplifies the sound that is then emitted by the speaker.
This adds to the noise in the room that is subsequently picked up by the microphone. The
stronger sound is converted into a stronger signal to the amplifier and the speaker in turn;
inevitably the speaker emits an even louder noise. After additional passes through the loop,
the microphone squeals violently: this repeated loop in which the system causes itself to
increase the volume of its output is an example of feedback. (The same experiment can be
conducted with a camcorder and a video monitor, with intricate visual results.) This is of
course an example of a simple, linear system. Feedback in complex systems will inevitably be
a more complex affair.
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system (126). This ability is what we have in mind when we say that self-
organising processes are primarily informational. The components that are
imported into the system are selected through the internal dynamics of the
system, based on the system's internal requirements. Under pressure from its
environment, the system seeks to enhance its ability to process energy and
matter flows, and thus enhancing its cohesion and integration and functioning
capabilities as a whole. Again, the system does not organise itself in terms of
some kind of te/os, in the Aristotelian sense of a final cause, but in terms of
the interaction between dynamics of system and contingencies of its
environment. These contingencies make it impossible for the system to evolve
along some previously established path. In fact, it is the very contingencies
that systems have to contend with that make the capacity to self-organise an
essential tool of survival. Contextual constraints do not only hold for biological
and physical systems, but for informational systems as well. It is perhaps
prudent to explicitly state that contextual constraints are a necessary
precondition for the establishment and maintenance of complex systems. This
is an important concept to grasp and merits brief explication.
9. Information and enabling constraints
Complex systems must have the capacity to encode and remember
information about their environment, which enables them to cope with
changes in the environment. We have seen that time is brought back into the
equation when, dealing with complex systems, in the sense that a system's
history influences its present structure as much as its environment. In contrast
with thermodynamics - which we have seen discredits hypothesis that retro-
diction of the trajectory of a system is possible, but which still allows for
prediction of future states of the system (thermodynamic equilibrium) -
complexity sciences, in dealing with open systems, discredit both retrodiction
and prediction of the trajectories of such systems. The reason that both are
discredited lies in the fact that there are just too many relevant variables and
too many possible states of the system that are never actualised. The
possibilities that are actualised, the attractors that the system settles into, are
established partly by the environment (and the function of the system in that
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environment), and partly by the history of the system, by states that have
already been actualised." This interaction of the system with its environment
need not be physical; it can also be thought of as the transference of
information (Cilliers 1998:3).
Information, as it pertains to complex systems in general should not be
understood as meaning in an overtly anthropomorphic sense. Information has
its role to play in all instances of self-organisation in complex systems, and
what is meant by information depends to some extent on the system under
discussion. When we come to our discussion on information as it features in
neural networks and language, the link between information and meaning
becomes vitally important.
When we say that the system is constrained by its context, it is
important not to create the impression that these constraints are negative, in
the sense that their role is only that of inhibition and limitation. Constraints in
complex systems also play an enabling role; the term "system" implies
structure and constraint. Constraints also enable the system to maintain its
identity. Without these constraints there would be no system.
A useful analogy by means of which to explain the function of physical
constraints - which arise out of self-organisation in complex systems - is that
of information as depicted in communications theory (Juarrero 2000: 34). In
this contexts constraints are what make communication possible. Even
though, in utterly random signals where possible meanings are equiprobable,
the potential of possible meanings is at a maximum, these signals can have
no informational content. In a situation where possible meanings are
completely random (chaotic) one could say anything, but would in truth be
saying nothing - the unconstrained disorder makes it impossible to detect
patterns, which would equate with a message and one ends up with
28 Here again we call to mind the example of the Boolean networks of light bulbs
where each successive state of each bulb (node; element) - whether it switches on or off - is
determined by its previous state as well as the previous states of those bulbs that it is
connected to. The previous states of the light bulbs can be seen as analogous to the history
of the system, and the Boolean functions ascribed to each bulb can be seen as analogous to
the system's self-organised structure that arises as the result of its function in the
environment.
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undifferentiated white noise. In the words of Juarrero: 'When anything is as
possible as anything else, and nothing is connected to anything else...nothing
can signify or communicate anything" (Juarrero 2000: 35). By contrasting
significant signals with "background noise" and subjecting the way that the
signals can be arranged and encrypted to certain rules, one reduces the
randomness and allows patterns to emerge. The same principle applies in
language: contextual constraints that ensure the interdependence of words
and sentences - grammatical and syntactical rules - allow a structure that
lends itself to meaningful interpretation. If letters were random, if any letter
could show up at any time, how would it be possible to communicate
anything? Standardised language rules cause the number of ways in which
the components of language (letters, words, sentences, etc.) can be arranged
to be drastically reduced - instead of inhibiting the informational capacity of
language, however, these contextual constraints drastically increase it. The
synchronisation of the individual components (letters in this example) causes
number of possible arrangements to be reduced, but the possibility of
transferring encodable information to be greatly increased.
This (very brief) description of the mechanisms of language (a complex
system), as far as its capacity for informational content is concerned, is
analogous to the working of constraints within physical complex systems. We
have seen that, far from being in equilibrium, complex systems are
interdependent and context-dependent through being constrained by the
behaviour of neighbouring elements (molecules/agents/nodes), previously
realised states, and the influence of the environment. The dependence on
other elements etc. makes for a system, the behaviour of which is ordered or
determined by interaction of various factors. As is the case in our example,
where constraints reduce randomness and make communication possible,
these context-sensitive constraints, far from limiting complexity, make it
possible. Juarrero uses the phrase "enabling constraints" (2000:37) and
describes the emergence of self-organised systems as the "sudden closure of
context-sensitive constraints." The emergence of Bénard cells illustrates the
abrupt appearance of an open, interdependent system, far from equilibrium,
where the new relationship among the molecules establishes new boundary
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conditions for those molecules, which makes for cells with very different
properties than those of individual water molecules. An important effect of
context-sensitive constraints is that they restrict, or should we say regulate,
the flow of energy and matter between the system and the environment. The
organisation of the self-organised system determines the stimuli to which it
will respond (39). Because the elements are interdependent, the behavioural
variability they would have had as independent elements is constrained - this
enables the system to preserve its organisation and its identity as a whole.
Instead of some governing component determining and regulating the
behaviour of the system, the relational whole of the system, governs the
behaviour of the system.
10. Conclusion
This brief overview of complexity theory is inevitably simplified and
rudimentary. But hopefully it will prove to be adequate for our purpose in this
work, which is to model the self on the principles of complexity theory. "The
self' is a polymorphous concept that has undergone many metamorphoses in
the Western philosophical tradition, which means that such an enterprise is
anything but straightforward. In the interest of both orienting ourselves with
regard to the self and (relative) brevity the next chapter will trace the
development of the concept roughly as it parallels developments in the history
of science. Hopefully this will provide us with a conception of the self that will
be delineated and viable enough to serve as a basic understanding of what is
meant by "the self' in this work. In subsequent chapters the possibility of
applying the principles of complexity theory to the self, and possible
consequences of such an endeavour, will be explored.
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ChapterTwo
Landmarks in the History of Self:
The Legacyof the Enlightenment
It has become to seem that matter, like the Cheshire Cat, is
becoming gradually diaphanous until nothing of it is left but the grin,
caused, presumably, by the amusement at those who think it is still
there.
Bertrand Russell quoted in Popper (1977:151).
Minds are not bits of clockwork, they are just bits of not-
clockwork.
Gilbert Ryle (1960:20)
1. Soul, self, consciousness, ego, subject, mind, identity, self-
concept, personality
distinction?
semantic nitpicking or rigorous
Theories of the self, in one form or another, is one of the most
pervasive topics in Western philosophy", and yet the self seems to have
proved an elusive phenomenon. Not only does the entity which we mean to
encompass under the concept "self' seem mercurial, but in the vast literature
that covers this topic many different terms are used interchangeably and to
denote what would seem to be roughly the same thing. What should we
understand the terms self, consciousness, soul, ego, subject etc. to mean?
29 Due to my training and lack of knowledge with regard to other philosophical
traditions this work is restricted to the Western philosophical tradition and the reader should
read any mention of philosophy as referring to the Western tradition.
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Do these terms denote roughly the same thing or do they serve to highlight
the distinguishing characteristics of very different and very particular entities?
Does it make sense to speak of the ontology of the self, or are the logical
positivists right in viewing the concept of self as being a linguistic confusion?
Although there does not seem to be any rigour in the general application of
these terms, the aim, in this work at least, is to delineate clearly what is meant
here with the concept "self' (this being the concept that will be employed
throughout this work).
One reason for the hodgepodge of terms used to delineate the self is
the metamorphoses conceptions of the self have undergone throughout the
history of theorising on human being. In some cases the respective terms also
seem to be devisable in terms of their denoting a capacity for agency as
opposed to a passivity of sorts. Whether one construes the entity in question
to be an active and autonomous agent or as a passive epiphenomenon of
various processes would seem to partly determine the term one would want to
employ." What most of these concepts have in common is their reference to
that which "animates" the apparently inanimate matter of which our bodies are
comprised - in an attempt to explain that which makes us human; that which
allows the capacity for reflection and especially self-reflection, and
(apparently) willed action.
A sparse definition which could serve us at the outset of our discussion
could be something along the lines of describing the self as the "me as
subjecf', as opposed to the totality of objects that I am aware of and that are
"not-me". Our point of departure could then be that we are examining that
"something" that enables us to be aware of both ourselves and of the world,
and to actively orient ourselves with regard to that awareness. And which, for
all intents and purposes, remains a mystery.
This chapter is an attempt to sketch a brief outline of major
developments in theories on the self from antiquity to the present day, with
emphasis on those that contributed to prominent factors in some current
30 See Armstrong, (1998: 490-491) for a handy, and brief, overview of different
mentalist, physicalist and dualist theories on the mind-body problem.
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theories on self. As can be imagined, this is a momentous task and far
exceeds the scope of this chapter. Much detail and relevant theorists and
trends will be ignored, due to expediency, but also due, in part, to the aims of
and the rationale for this discussion. The discussion is primarily aimed at
orienting ourselves with regard to the origins of many of our conceptions of
self, and also to highlight just how much of those different conceptions are
based on preconceptions and assumptions that should lose some of their
influence as our knowledge of the physiology of the brain - and by implication,
the mind - expands and develops."
2. Introducing the self
There by no means exists consensus on the trajectory that theories on
the self have followed in the history of the Western philosophical tradition."
While some theorists regard the self as a ubiquitous philosophical
phenomenon, others believe it to be the result of overzealous seventeenth
century idealism." For example, both Popper and Rorty attribute the view that
the distinction between body and mind is a "new-fangled legend" to Ryle in
particular (Popper 1977:151; Rorty 1980:17).34 Popper believes the implication
of such a position to be that pre-Cartesian philosophy was, on the whole,
31 As we shall see, the ease with which this sentence presupposed the
interconnectivity of the brain and mind (in terms of the traditional distinction) is not at all
obvious to many philosophical positions.
32 It is interesting to note that dualism is not at all a universal, "naturally intuitive"
theoretical stance. As Hans Agren (1998:146) points out, in traditional Chinese philosophy
and science (as opposed to Chinese Buddhism) the psychological "was almost never
regarded separately from the physiological." Confucians, for example, disregarded
supernatural forces - gods were of no interest, because there was no way of gaining
knowledge about them. A dichotomy between body and soul was disregarded for is similar
reasons. At the same time the Chinese never developed a psychology of the unconscious.
33It is often asserted that the mind-body problem is a distinctly modern phenomenon,
a dualism that gained credibility subsequent to the Enlightenment and the works of Descartes
and his contemporaries. Conventional wisdom in some quarters has it that the self became
prominent in philosophical theorising in the time of the Enlightenment, and that, up until that
time it had not really featured as a topic of philosophical discussion.
34 In reading Ryle (1960) it would seem that his position is not as much that the very
concept of self is a post-Enlightenment phenomenon, but that the identification of the "mental"
(and hence the self) as belonging to a logical category other than the physical is a legacy of
the Cartesian myth and the "the three centuries of the epoch of natural science" (8). We will
discuss this position in greater detail in a following section.
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materialistic, which leads him to imply that someone who does not accept a
materialistic account of the self/mind has been brainwashed by post-
Cartesian, dualist philosophy (1977:151). Popper believes the conception of
the self as soul to be one of the oldest and most pervasive conceptions of
self, and to date back to antiquity (3). Here, the soul is that which is eternal,
and which transcends spatio-temporal constraints, something that is inborn,
cannot be obtained, and that may, but need not, have the capacity to survive
death".
As with Popper, Levin (1992:3-5) places the origin of the Western
conception of self with the ancient Greeks. He believes that both the
conception of the inborn soul and conception of the attained soul to have
been present from the start of our theoretical tradition. Levin sees Socrates'
introspection as his (Socrates') concept of self and likens it to the kinds of
theories that would postulate the self as something to be developed and
achieved.' For Levin Socrates' self is relational, in that it develops through
dialogue with others, whereas Plato's conception of self is that of an inborn
soul - self-conflicting, divided into reason, drive and appetites. Plato's soul is
trapped within the prison of the body."
Cast in these broad terms it would seem difficult not to believe, with
Popper and Levin on an intuitive level at least, that some sort of conception of
self is as old as our theoretical tradition. But, the question does arise whether
or not the soul-body distinction as conceived in the pre-modern era can be
equated with the mind-body distinction in the form it has taken subsequent to
the Enlightenment. Ryle, for instance, presents a materialist (read: non-
dualist) conception of the self as the natural or intuitive position that one
35 Levin (1992) contrasts this ancient Western view of the self as soul with that of
various Eastern conceptions, where self/soul has to be attained or achieved (3).
361n The Republic, for instance, Plato declares:
But if we want to see it [the soul] as it really is, we should look
at it, not as we do now, when it is deformed by its association with the
body and other evils, but in the pure state which reason reveals to us.
We shall then find that it is a thing of far greater beauty, and shall be
able to distinguish far more clearly justice and injustice and all the
other qualities we have talked about (1981 :444).
See Armstrong (1972:39-43) for a concise discussion of Plato's tripartite soul.
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would adopt if one were not influenced by modernist ideoloqy". While on the
other hand, theorists like Popper believe some kind of dualism to be the norm
throughout history and, perhaps even a natural or intuitive view", The
question arises, of course, if Popper's "dualism" is not compatible with Ryle's
"materialism".
3. An ancient self?
We shall briefly discuss the more remote origins of current notions of
soul/self/mind before moving on to the Enlightenment, where the question of
self as mind becomes explicit. Subsequently, the Modernist view of the self -
as pioneered by Descartes - would become an influential and contentious
issue, the reverberations of which can be felt up until the present day debates.
Popper does not discredit enquiry into "mind" in some form or another in any
way but does believe all philosophers that have a definite position on this
issue (pre- and post-Cartesian alike) to be "dualist interactionists". He defines
dualism, very broadly, as the tendency throughout history to speak of mind,
and soul, and spirit as opposed to the material body. As soon as thinkers like
Homer, Democritus and Socrates began speaking of the moral world, mind
began to take on a special character, which distinguished it from matter
(Popper 1977:153). These Dualists are faced with the difficulty of explaining
how the two distinct substances (mind and matter) interact - from there, the
term dualist interactionists."
37Although Ryle does call the dualist doctrine a myth (1960: 11-24), one is hesitant to
conclude that his position is an overtly materialistic one. Ryle's (1960:8) main criticism of
Descartes' position is that he perpetrated a category mistake in his conception of mind. In
Ryle's own words: "Descartes left as one of his main philosophical legacies a myth which
continues to distort the continental geography of the subject. .. A myth is, of course, not a fairy
story. It is the presentation of facts belonging to one category in the idioms appropriate to
another. To explode a myth is accordingly not to deny the facts, but to re-allocate them." More
about Ryle's criticism and about whether he succeeds in "re-allocating" the "facts," as he
deems possible, in a later section.
38 Popper relies on numerous Greek texts and other ancient writings to substantiate
his position (1977:149-170).
39 As we shall see Popper (1977: 153) believes that it is the intrinsic difficulties in
Descartes' elaborate dualist system that finally lead to alternatives to interactionism.
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Popper (1977: 156 -157) speculates that both the development of
language and the comprehension of mortality and certain death lead to the
conjecture of a ghostlike soul with properties different from that of the body -
including the ability to survive death in some or other form. He makes it very
clear that he does not imagine this kind of dualism to be a Cartesian dualism,
but proceeds to quote various passages from Homer as examples of pre-
historic and early historic instances of the mind-body problem." He goes so
far as to cast the conscious (read: self-conscious) self as a universal
experience of mankind (ibid.). Hence he rejects any attempt to characterise
Greek philosophy as being aware of the soul-body problem, as opposed to
the "more contemporary" mind-body problem, as a "verbal quibble"
(1977:159). He declares the Greek soul to be an entity or substance, which
sums up the experience of the conscious self, and thus fulfils a role similar to
that of the Cartesian and post-Cartesian mind."
Popper believes the source of this verbal quibble to lie in two different
views of scientific explanation in the Western theoretical tradition. In his
discussion of the history of the ancient self, and its influence on modern
conceptions of the self (159-171), Popper emphasises these two opposing
views, inherited from the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions. He names these
two approaches the "conjectural explanation " and the "ultimate explanation"
and emphasises that both Plato and Aristotle discussed and applied each of
the two methods. Conjectural explanation essentially consists of making an
assumption (perhaps based on intuition) and then testing the assumption by
exploring its consequences. Users of this method are perfectly aware that
they can only establish such an assumption provisionally. The method of
ultimate explanation, on the other hand, consists of the intuitive grasp of the
essence of something or another. Important for the purposes of our
discussion is that "intuition" here implies infallible insight, this being a method
40 Popper's argument is that tales of metamorphosis from classical antiquity, of which
there are legion, in which the body undergoes fantastic metamorphoses while the self-
conscious mind and self-identity stay intact, to be indicative of a conception of mind or
consciousness separate from the body.
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that guarantees Truth. What one grasps intuitively is the essence and a
definition of the essence allows one to explain the phenomenon deductively"
(Popper 1977:172).
What is missing, Popper argues, is a full awareness amongst those
caught up in this verbal quibble that these two methods differ fundamentally
and that conjectural explanation is valid, while ultimate explanation is "will-o'-
the-wisp" (173). Popper insists that only ultimate explanations make definite
knowledge claims," seeing that the conjectural method is self-consciously,
well, conjectural." To Popper it seems that Plato, and many subsequent
philosophers, "even Newton", regard conjectural explanation as tentative and
provisional, a stepping-stone to something better (174). Popper goes on to
argue that there are two corresponding methods of criticising claims made by
these two methods: scientific criticism, which criticises an assertion by
examining its logical consequences; and what Popper calls "philosophical
criticism", which criticises an assertion by showing that it is not demonstrable
"cannot be derived from intuitively certain premises" (173).
While Descartes and subsequent philosophers argued for (or against)
an essentialist explanation of mind, Popper argues that it does not make
sense to expect an essentialist answer to our enquiries as to the nature of the
mind. He believes that most of the difficulties encountered in theorising on the
mind is the expectation that we will discover what the mind is, in essence. He
points out that we do not know what matter is, in essence, even though we do
know quite a bit about its structure and concludes that it makes sense to
concentrate on broadening our knowledge on the structure of the mind,
41 Refer to Popper (1977: 159-171) for a comprehensive account of the history of the
soul in antiquity, moving from material soul of Democritus and Epicurus, to the dematerialised
mind of Plato and Aristotle.
42 Toulmin makes a similar distinction when he explores the influence that the revived
Platonic and Aristotelian theories had on modernity. He does not, however, insist on both
kinds of explanation to be present in the projects of both theorists. Throughout his book,
Cosmopolis (1990), Toulmin represents the Platonic approach to knowledge as essentialist
and the Aristotelian approach as conjectural.
43 As we shall see is the case with Descartes.
44 It is important to emphasise that Popper does insist that there are objective
reasons why some theories are to be taken as objectively more preferable than others.
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without insisting on taking the supposed essence of mind as our point of
departure (174). In short, Popper believes "contemporary" dualism to be the
norm when it comes to current conceptions of the relation between body and
mind, thanks to the theoretical turn taken in the Enlightenment. His criticism of
this essentialist turn is that it lost sight of the fact that the foundational
principles on which these theories were built, were, or at least should have
been considered to be, conjectural.
Richard Rorty (1990:17), although in agreement with Popper in his
criticism of some forms of dualism, is, on the other hand, suspicious of the
claims that assume "everyone has always known to divide the world into the
mental and the physical - that this distinction is common-sensical and
intuitive ..." 45 In his words he calls the division between the mental and
physical a division into "two sorts of 'stuff,' material and immaterial" (ibid)."
Rorty entertains the idea that this division, instead of being intuitive and
therefore relatively ubiquitous, is in actual fact the propensity and ability to
command a particular technical vocabulary, one that had its very origin in the
Enlightenment, and in the work of Descartes in particular (22). This
assumption leads Rorty to question just why it is that modern theorists
associate the phenomenal, or mind "stuff' with the immaterial and matter as
material. He finds his answer in Ryle's observation that we think in ocular
metaphors, and that we think of the phenomenal as a "funny kind of particular"
before thE:mind's eye (31).
With regard to contemporary dualism, Rorty asks why the latter day
neo-dualists, as inheritors of modernist dualism, are so sure that the different
vocabularies that are used (in philosophy of mind especially) to "describe
feelings" and to "describe neurones" are descriptions of two different thinqs",
45 His chapter heading is apt and suggestive: 'The Invention of Mind" - for Rorty, the
mind is a post-Cartesian invention.
46 Ryle (1960) uses this division of the world into two sorts of "stuff' to argue that
Descartes had, fundamentally, perpetrated a category mistake, and rejects Cartesian dualism
on those grounds.
47 Cf. Ayer (1998:478-489) for an instance of such a position.
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rather than two ways of describing the same thinq." He explicitly refers to
Nagel's 'What is it Like to be a Bat?" and questions whether speculations or
thought experiments like this one can prove the non-physicality, and implied
non-accessibility, of the mental in any way.49Rorty makes the salient point
that the neo-dualists end up talking, not about how people feel, but about
feelings as entities that can exist in veritable independence from their
48 Rorty (1990:70) makes the assumption that the mind and body are made of two
different kinds of "stuff' explicit in his chapter entitled ''The Antipodeans," beings who refer to
neural activity with the same ease and to the same effect as sensation and feeling are
normally referred to by human beings. To the Antipodeans, having mental activity that can be
regarded and named as wholly divorced from neuronal activity is as inconceivable as the
reverse situation would be for dualists.
49Essentially Nagel (1982:391) is very sceptical about our ability to say anything
meaningful about consciousness (about being). He is especially wary of attempts to describe
consciousness in material terms and presents a thought experiment to illustrate his point,
namely, he explores the possibility of knowing what it would be like to be a bat.
Nagel declares that most reductionist attempts to reduce mental phenomena to a
variant of materialism fail, because they do not appreciate the distinctive difference between
the mind-body problem and other problems that have successfully lent themselves to
reduction: consciousness. In an attempt to rectify the situation Nagel proceeds to discuss
consciousness, even though "it is difficult to say in general what provides evidence of it"
(392). These qualms aside, Nagel lights upon the distinguishing characteristic of
consciousness, no matter in what form: for an organism to be conscious, there must be
something it is like to be that organism, something it is like for that organism "to be" (392).
Any analysis of mental phenomena would, according to Nagel, need to take into account this
"subjective character" of experience. The problem being that for reduction to be successful,
"phenomenological features of the mind" must be given a physical account, which seems
impossible, given that they are subjective - they cannot be separated from their single point
of view.
Nagel illustrates his point with a thought experiment: can we know what it is like to be
a bat? The answer, predictably, is no. The argument seems to be that, seeing that conscious
experience is necessarily subjective, it is not possible to explain it in objective terms. We
cannot know what it is like for a bat to be a bat. But, so Nagel argues, ratifiable knowledge
needs to be objective. Mental states need to be known through the observation of
physiological processes, and the species-specific viewpoint must be eliminated. Essentially, if
mental processes are physical processes, Nagel argues that there must be something that it
is like to be a physical process. He cannot accept this as a possibility, and as a result he
concludes that, in order for us to have any legitimate knowledge of the mental, we need to
develop an "objective phenomenology," which does not rely on empathy or imagination.
Through this method we should be able to describe subjective experiences to those who
cannot experience them. See Hofstadter (1981 :403-414) for a convincing critique of the
assumptions embedded in Nagel's thought experiment. In essence he dismisses Nagel's as
an attempt to "subjectively know what it is objectively like" to be (409). Hofstadter believes
that Nagel's fundamental error is the assumption that justifiable knowledge is objective. He
emphasises the subjective element involved in knowledge and highlights the role that
language plays in our ability to exchange ideas and experiences - knowledge. (See chapter 5
for a lengthy discussion of the issues involved in this debate, as they are fundamental to how
one would construe the self and our ability to say anything meaningful about it.)
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particular instantiations (30).50 Rorty believes that we intuitively identify the
phenomenal with the immaterial, as the result of our particular tradition, and
hence give them a "non-spatio-temporal habitation" (31).
Rather than crediting these "intuitions", Rorty proposes that intuitions
are nothing but familiarity with a language-game, in the Wittgensteinian vein.
To discover the source of these intuitions, we need to turn to the history in
which this philosophical language game developed. Briefly, Rorty believes
that philosophy had its origin when it became necessary, in antiquity, for
something general to be said "about our knowledge of universals" (1980:38).
This question was answered in terms of the metaphor of knowing general
truths by internal ising universals, just as the eye of the body knows particulars
by internalising their individual colours and shapes. The answer, according to
Rorty, that Western philosophy eventually comes up with for the question as
to what makes man unique, is that man has an immaterial soul capable of
contemplating universals.
In what seems to contradict his earlier misgivings about the universality
of distinguishing between "two sorts of 'stuff" that constitutes the human
being (1990:17) Rorty asserts that throughout history of Western philosophy
human beings have been accorded two sides: the grossly material and what
Rorty calls our "Glassy Essence'?', the finer part of our being through which
we understand universals. The alternative, materialism, is disfavoured by
tradition because of its prosaic implications for the soul. As Rorty so vividly
puts it: "To suggest that the mind is the brain is to suggest that we secrete
theorems and symphonies as our spleen secretes dark humors" (44). He
concedes that some kind of conception of a "glassy essence" to have present
in ancient and subsequent philosophy, and contrary to his earlier
protestations, it would be safe to assert that Rorty does believe a vague kind
of dualism to have been present throughout the history of Western
50A· particularly problematic case is that of pain, which neo-dualism suggests cannot
be a physical entity, "because it is phenomenal" (Rorty 1990:30-31). Later we will discuss
Dennett's (justified) dismissal of "phenomenality".
51 Rorty defines this term as encompassing "all things which corpses do not have and
which are distinctively human" (1990:44).
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philosophy. But he insists that recent philosophy has lumped together the
traditional idea of our "glassy essence" with the very different post-Cartesian
notions of "consciousness" or "awareness" (45). And of importance to us is
that Rorty believes modern conceptions of self to stem from these post-
Cartesian notions. It seems that, although Rorty is sceptical of the claim that
the mind-body distinction is intuitive, he does believe that there had been a
separation between mind and body throughout Western philosophy, at least,
and that this distinction means different things and is argued for through
different philosophical theories both before and after Descartes (62).
For Rorty the mind-body distinction in its modern manifestation had its
origin with Descartes, when he changed the conception of mind-es-reesori" to
mind-as-inner-arena (61). Rorty sees the Cartesian change from mind-as-
reason to mind-as-inner-arena primarily as the triumph of "the quest for
certainty over the quest for wisdom" (ibid.) In other words, the quest to
establish certain philosophical knowledge, modelled on the newly developed
practises of the physical sciences. The task of the modern philosopher
became that of obtaining certain knowledge through mathematical rigour,
rather than to help people attain peace of mind. "Science, rather than living,
became philosophy's subject, and epistemology its centre"(61). With time,
conceptions of this glassy essence changed from soul as a vaporous breath
that permeates the body and survives the death of the body, to that of the
rational mind, which elevates human beings above the brutes.
According to Rorty, it was Descartes' work that allowed for the idea of
mind with an existence separate from that of the body." His analysis enabled
philosophy to draw a line between "the cramps in one's stomach and the
associated feeling in one's mind"(62). Descartes made use of the only
52 Reason here is coupled with what Rorty calls the "hylomorphic epistemology",
which, in keeping with Aristotle, thought of grasping universals as instancing in the mind what
the frog instances in its flesh (Rorty 1990: 45; 62). He contrasts the hylomorphic model of
mind with the Cartesian representative model (46). He sums up this position (which we
endorse) as follows: "But if we see that the two models - the hylomorphic and the
representative - are equally optional, perhaps we can see the inferences to mind-body
dualism which stem from each as just as optional" (46).
53 Toulmin (1990) takes up a similar position (37-40).
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criterion that Rorty believes makes this distinction possible: indubitabinty".
From there then the practice in contemporary philosophy to speak of "pains"
and "feels" as a thing independent from the body, "situated" in a non-spatial,
non-extended substance. The reason that the phenomenal and the immaterial
are lumped together as the mental is because Descartes bridged the gap
between the two with his notion of "incorrigibly known" (69). But, Rorty goes
on to argue that the dualism of contemporary (analytical) philosophy in its turn
is very different from Cartesian dualism" (63).
According to Rorty contemporary inheritors of the Cartesian distinction
between mind and matter have lost touch with the seventeenth-century guise
of "substance," (thanks in part to Kant). Such philosophers interpret
Descartes' distinction between mind and body as distinct entities "as a
recognition of the difference between parts of persons and the states of those
parts on the one hand and certain states of the whole person on the
other "(66). Mental entities become subject to a stream of consciousness
and a body - states of persons rather than "bits of ghostly stuff' (ibid.). The
contemporary mind becomes non-spatial in the sense that the states of a
person have a kind of adjectival status. The mind-body problem seems to
disappear in this interpretation, as Rorty flippantly explains: ".. .few people are
worried by an ontological gap between what is signified by names and what is
signified by adjectives" (ibid.). While he does believe this solution to the mind-
body problem fares well in terms of explaining beliefs and desires, he
maintains that some difficulty is encountered when trying to explain pain and
"raw feels." While it seems (to Rorty at least) relatively unproblematic to
accord non-spatiality to states (beliefs, desires, etc.), thoughts and mental
images tend to be thought of as things, with a separate existence from the
body. The ancients saw the "universal-grasping" substance as existing
separately from the body, while contemporary dualists see event-like mental
54 Rorty's position compares well with Popper's contention (discussed at the
beginning of this chapter) that that the emphasis on ultimate explanation is what sets
Cartesian theory apart from its predecessors.
55 Rorty (1990:67) distinguishes between four kinds of dualism: that between a
person and his ghost, that between a person and his Aristotelian passive intellect, that
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happenings as separately existing (67). It is clear from Rorty's discussion that
he believes that neither the pre- nor the post-Cartesians shared Descartes'
conception of the mind as "thinking substance," but that the trend that lead to
modern conceptions of mind was put in motion by Cartesian dualism. Rorty
declares Descartes' only improvement on the idea of the intangible man to be
his stripping it of its humanoid form (68).
For the purposes of this discussion, the controversy, which initially
seemed to centre round whether the idea of the self, as such, existed prior to
the Enlightenment, now seems in actual fact to centre around how a self-like
entity was perceived prior to and subsequent to the Enlightenment. The
significance of the Enlightenment lies, in its attempts to apply the newly
formulated principles of the physical sciences to all aspects and subject
matter of inquiry. All the theorists cited in this debate seem to agree to the
extent that they believe conceptions of the self to have taken a radical and
significant turn as a direct result of seventeenth century-theory." A turn that
has direct implications for current debates raging on self/mind and especially
our current discussion on issues regarding the self, mind, consciousness, etc.
In order to develop this argument we need to take an extensive look at
Descartes' theories and subsequent developments and critiques thereof.
4. Some modern metamorphoses of self
Modern theorising on the self saw the emergence of two major
opposing positions: rationalism, which saw the self, or more accurately
perhaps, the subject, as disembodied thought or pure a priori mind, and
empiricism which insisted that the subject was reliant on experience, and
denied the possibility of a priori knowledge.
between a Cartesian res cogitans and res extensa and finally, the contemporary dualism,
which allows for mental entities, without the soul.
56 Toulmin (1990) proposes the interesting, and convincing, argument that this
seventeenth century development was, in effect, a counter-movement to the gains that the
Renaissance had made over medieval theories on the nature of man and the world. Refer to
Cosmopolis (1990:5-80) for his extensively researched account of the origins and project of
seventeenth century philosophy.
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The dispute between the rationalist and empiricist positions basically
boils down to whether reason or experience ultimately justifies belief -
and by implication a dispute over how knowledge is acquired. Rationalist
theory holds that the mind has innate ideas and that these innate ideas
form the basis on which reason can form justifiable beliefs about the
world. Descartes, for example, sees beliefs deduced through reason as
the only possible justifiable beliefs and regards beliefs gained through
experience as deceptive and untrustworthy. Reason here can be
characterised as the mind's ability to discern the logical relations
between ideas, in complete independence from experience (Radcliffe
2000: 30).
4.1 Intimations of Rationality
The self enters the modern philosophical era in the guise of Descartes'
disembodied cogito. As legend has it, writing in the climate of the scientific
revolution of the seventeenth century, Descartes sat himself down in a large
Dutch oven, and proceeded to doubt everything that could possibly be
doubted." His aim was to attain the one sure premise on which knowledge
can be grounded. Descartes was disillusioned with philosophy, which, despite
being pursued by some of the most distinguished scholars in history, still, in
his view, had not managed to reach consensus on any of the great
philosophical questions. He declares his resolve to establish philosophy on a
firm scientific basis as follows: "...when I considered the number of conflicting
opinions touching a single matter that may be upheld by learned men, while
57 Refer to Toulmin (1990: 152-161), where Toulmin discusses what he calls the
"Standard Account" of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century. According to the
standard account, stagnancy and dogmatisms of medieval thought came to an end when
science took a rational turn. In the early seventeenth century Galileo proposed a science that
was grounded on experimental observation, rather than subject to the authority of traditional
philosophical speculation. In contrast to Aristotle, the Galilean world-view conceived of nature
as mechanical and subject to mathematical and geometrical laws. And Newton's
groundbreaking, Mathematical principles of Natural Philosophy would appear in 1687,
perpetuating the work of Galileo.
Toulmin argues that the early seventeenth century was not only characterised by a
scientific revolution, but also by the turmoil of the Thirty Years War and a backlash against the
Renaissance, which would influence in many ways the trajectory of both philosophical and
social developments of the Enlightenment (5-44).
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there can be but one true, I reckoned as well-nigh false all that was probable"
(1978:8).
In order to establish philosophical method on a firm foundation similar
to that recently established for the physical sciences, Descartes set about
finding certain knowledge: that which he could know to be "indubitable" seeing
as "we may doubt in general of all things" (1978:75). In his search for concrete
truth Descartes chose as his method that of rejecting all that he could
reasonably believe to be knowledge based on opinion, and thus not
indubitably true (1978:26). He defends his method of doubt as follows:
Now, although the utility of a doubt so general may not be
manifest at first sight, it is nevertheless of the greatest, since it
delivers us from all prejudice and affords the easiest pathway by
which the mind may withdraw itself from the senses; and, finally,
makes it impossible for us to doubt wherever we afterwards
discover truth (75).
The reason that the mind needs to withdraw from the senses is that
Descartes readily accepts the possibility that our senses may
comprehensively deceive us in all that we perceive. Furthermore he poses the
possibility of the existence of a malignant demon, who might present all that
we perceive as real, while in actual fact it all is a dream" (84). If this is the
case then all knowledge attained through the senses, or even the very idea of
our possessing senses would be an illusion and is therefore useless in the
acquisition of certain knowledge. Of course, if it were possible to acquire
knowledge that could not be doubted that certainty would form the first
principle on which other indubitable truths can be established.
As is attested in Discourse on Method (1978:27-32) and Meditations on
the First Philosophy (1978:85-86), the only thing that could withstand this
radical doubt was the very fact that Descartes doubted his own doubting. And
negating the act of doubting would be self-contradictory, for what else is
doubting but the act of thinking? Of course to be able to think one needed a
58 Refer to Dennett (1991:1-10) for the modern day version of this thought
experiment, featuring a brain in a vat and malignant neuroscientists.
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thinker, which lead Descartes to the conclusion that there, necessarily, had to
be a thinker, a cogito, whose existence could not be doubted without at the
same time affirming its very existence." It seemed, however, that this
disembodied thinker could not be certain of the reality of anything other than
itself, and seemed to be restricted to being a solitary and solipsistic entity.
After assuring himself that he exists, Descartes asks himself what
exactly "he" is, especially in light of his radical doubt, in terms of which he
could not even be sure of what he perceived through his senses (86).
Descartes sifts through his preceding beliefs about his own "self' and
attempts to reject all those beliefs that are not certain and indubitable:
What then did I formerly think I was? Undoubtedly I judged
that I was a man. But what is a man? Shall I say a rational animal?
Assuredly not; for it would be necessary forthwith to inquire into
what is meant by animal, and what by rational, and thus from a
single question, I should insensibly glide into others, and these
more difficult than the first; nor do I now possess enough of leisure
to warrant me in wasting my time amid subtleties of this sort. I
prefer here to attend to the thoughts that sprung up of themselves
in my mind, and were inspired by my own nature alone, when
applied myself to the consideration of what I was= (1978:86-87).
Upon retrospection Descartes discovers that he had previously vaguely
thought of himself as consisting of body and soul; attributing to body all those
aspects that a corpse would have (a countenance, arms, legs, ligaments etc.),
and to soul aspects such as being able to walk, perceive, act, think etc.
Descartes realises that he had never given much thought to what exactly soul
was, always thinking of it in vague terms of something akin to "flame, wind or
59 From there Descartes' famous declaration: "I think, hence I am", which he
propounds to be the first principle of a scientifically sound philosophy (1978:27).
60 From Hume onwards, criticism has been levelled at the very idea that thoughts can
spring up "by themselves" in the mind, and are thus "inspired by [human nature] alone." This
work throws its weight squarely behind those theorists who insist that knowledge (even
knowledge of oneself) ante- cedes experience and that one cannot circumvent the messy
business of insensibly gliding into a tangle of questions when discussing human being.
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ether", permeating his body (87).61 Given his radical doubt and the possible
existence of a deceiving and malignant being, Descartes is faced with the
problem of which, if any, of his earlier beliefs about what it means to be a
man, are still valid. He concludes that he cannot affirm any of the attributes of
the body with certainty, and proceeds to a discussion on the attributes of the
soul. Even though without a body it becomes impossible for the soul to have
attributes such as nourishment, walking and perception, one attribute of the
soul - thinking - proves to be indubitable, even in the absence of a body,
since, as we have already mentioned, any act of doubting the possibility of
thought, is in itself an act of thinking. Descartes declares that he has found
the one thing that properly belongs to himself - he is certain that he exits, and
that he exists as often as he thinks:
I am therefore, precisely speaking, only a thinking thing, that
is, a mind (mens sive animus), understanding, or reason, - terms
whose signification was before unknown to me (88).
Descartes is adamant that he "is" neither that which he had previously
believed to belong to the body, nor that which he had seen as belonging to
the soul (wind, flame, vapour, or breath). He is limited to being a "thinking
thing" - a thing that doubts, understands [conceives], affirms, denies, wills,
refuses, imagines, and perceives. Descartes initially expresses some doubt at
his conclusion, saying that corporeal things still seem to be known with much
greater distinctness than the "proper nature" he has persuaded himself that he
possesses (90). But he doesn't take this doubt to mean that his supposition of
what he is may be mistaken in any way - he declares his doubt to be the
result of a wilful mind, not willing to submit to the restraints of truth (ibid.) He
decides to "leave his mind" to its own devices, believing that it will inevitably
succumb to the truth of his reasoning.
61Descartes declares himself to have been absolutely certain of the attributes of the
body, and, if pressed, he would have explained the body as all that can be comprised in a
certain place and fill a certain space, to the exclusion of other bodies, and can be perceived
through the senses. A body does not have the ability to move itself, but can be moved by
another body. The abilities of self-motion and thought on the other hand, are not attributes of
the body (1978:87).
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Being certain of both the existence and the fundamental attribute of the
soul, Descartes turns his attention to the corporeal world that his senses
persist in presenting him with. Now that the incorporeal mind has been
established as a certain truth, what other truths can be derived from this first
principle? In his contemplation of a piece of wax (90-94) Descartes comes to
the conclusion that bodies are not properly perceived through the senses or
the faculty of the imagination, but only through the intellect, since they can
only be perceived by being understood. From this realisation, Descartes
concludes that nothing is more clearly apprehended or understood than one's
own mind (94). In a further effort to accustom himself to this new opinion on
mind, he undergoes a deliberate attempt to gain a more familiar and intimate
knowledge of "himself' (95).
Since he had postulated the idea of the deceitful demon, who might
cause him to perceive falsehoods through his senses, Descartes is not able to
consider any other perception or imagining as being true. Unless, that is, he
can prove the existence of God, seeing that God is the perfect being and a
perfect being would not be purposefully deceitful (97). The existence of God is
indispensable in Descartes' quest for indubitable knowledqe."
Descartes argues that: "we may validly infer the existence of God from
necessary existence being comprised in the concept we have of him" (170).
According to this argument, the chief idea among others ideas in the mind is
that of God - as an omniscient, all-powerful, and absolutely perfect being
(170). Whereas ideas of other things contain ideas of possible and contingent
existence, the idea of God contains the idea of absolutely necessary and
eternal existence. Since we have this idea of an omniscient being, we should
62 Even though Popper (1977:179) speculates that Descartes might have added God
to his argument to appease the church, in the light of what had happened to Galileo, it does
not seem possible that Descartes could have constructed his philosophy without recall to the
existence of God to guarantee certain knowledge, other than that of one's own mind. Toulmin
rightly points that Descartes' theory was still in danger of offending the church, because it
created the possibility of the world as a mechanical process, which might have been set up by
God, but which can function on its own after the initial act of creation (1990:78-79). Judging
from Descartes' own writing Popper's speculation seems unfounded, seeing that Descartes
appears to have been sincere in his attempt to explain how we differ from animals, the
answer that he came up with being that we possess a rational soul which is both immaterial
and immortal.
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enquire from where we could have acquired such a unique idea. Upon some
consideration Descartes concludes that an idea of the perfect being cannot
have its cause in anything less perfect than the perfect being itself, since the
more perfect cannot arise from the less perfect. Every idea that we have,
must have an original, which in itself possesses those perfections that we
perceive. Since we are not at all perfect, omniscient or all-powerful, and since
our less than perfect nature cannot give rise to the idea of something much
more perfect than itself, it follows that we must have acquired our idea of God
from an existent God (172-173).
He sums his argument up as follows:
But as we know that God alone is the true cause of all that is
or can be, we will doubtless follow the best way of philosophising,
if, from the knowledge we have of God himself, we pass to the
explication of the things he has created, and essay to deduce it
from the notions that are naturally in our minds, for we will thus
obtain the most perfect science, that is, the knowledge of effects
through their causes. But that we may be able to make this attempt
with sufficient security from error, we must use the precaution to
bear in mind as much as possible that God, who is the author of
things, is infinite, while we are wholly finite (174-175).
Hence, he concludes, proper philosophising will entail examining the
efficient causes of things, considered from natural light, (our faculty of
reason), which we receive from God and which is therefore immune to
deception. All that we perceive through our faculty of reason, and hence
perceive clearly, is true, and consequently we are delivered from doubt (176-
177). Descartes also distinguishes between two modes of thinking in us: the
perception of the understanding and the action of the will (177), which is what
distinguishes us from automata or animals.
The Cartesian reasoning mind is what makes us essentially human
through endowing us with the capacity to move our bodies and other physical
objects through willed and reasoned action. Descartes argues that if one is
presented with intricately constructed automata (in the manner of the then en
vogue hydraulic robots in the French Royal Gardens he would have been
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familiar with)" one would, in the case of animal automata, be unable to tell the
difference between sufficiently complex robots and real animals. With human
automata, on the other hand, there would be certain dead giveaways: first,
automata would never have the capacity for language sophisticated enough to
convince onlookers of their state of minds, and second, no matter how skilled
automata might be in the execution of the tasks that they were designed for,
they would never be able to demonstrate having acted from knowledge, rather
than in accordance with their design (1978: 44-45).64 Man's superiority over
animals and automata in this regard is not due to superior design on the part
of man, or the lack of ability (Le. the necessary organs etc.) on the part of
animals. Descartes explains this discrepancy by declaring that animals and
automata lack one important thing: reason. Descartes explicitly refers to man
as possessing a "rational soul''" and to animals as being devoid of "mind" and
as possessing a soul of a different nature from that of man (1978: 46)66.
Descartes' theories on the workings of the mind resulted in his mind-body
duality, which postulates a disembodied subject, uninfluenced by contingent
aspects of its corporeal body".
63 See Flanagan (1991:1).
64 This calls to mind Alan Turing's "Turing Test" as the best way of judging the
"intelligence" in a machine. If the human mind had been simulated adequately on the machine
the machine would, by way of typed responses to questions be able to convince its
interrogator that he/she is corresponding with a human being. Turing leaves it open whether
or not such a machine, if successful, should be considered conscious (Gregory 1998b:784).
65 Note that the terms soul/mind, as with many theorists are also used
interchangeably by Descartes.
66 Most notably, the souls of brutes lack immortality (1978:46).
67 One may question this extreme dualist position which is usually ascribed to
Descartes in the light of statements of his, such as the following: " ... [health], ... is without
doubt, of all the blessings of this life, the first and fundamental one; for the mind is so
intimately dependent upon the condition and relation of the organs of the body, that if any
means can ever be found to render men wiser and more ingenious than hitherto, I believe that
it is medicine that they must be sought for" (1978:49). Descartes makes it clear, though, that
the essence of man is not at all influenced by any aspects of the body: " And although I may,
or as I shall shortly say, although I certainly do possess a body with which I am very closely
conjoined; nevertheless, because, on the one hand, I have a clear and distinct idea of myself,
in as far as I am only a thinking and an unextended thing, and as, on the other hand, I
possess a distinct idea of body, only in as far it is an extended and an unthinking thing, it is
certain that I [that is my mind, by which I am when I am] am entirely and truly distinct from my
body, and may exist without it" (1978: 132-133).
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Descartes argues that he can distinctly perceive mind and body as two
separate things and he takes this to be sufficient evidence that they are
substantially different from one another and that they have been made (by
God) to exist separately from one another. He knows with certainty that he
exists as a mind, while he has no reason to believe that his nature
necessitates anything beyond being a thinking thing. In his certainty that his
mind is distinct from his body, he concludes that his mind" can exist without
his body (132-133).69
One of the important advantages of Descartes' dualism is that it
enables him to account for his belief that nature is mechanistic, while man is
free to will (see Levin 1992:28). From this then Descartes' conclusion that all
organisms, save human beings, are automata. The human body itself is an
automaton, except with regard to its ability to have voluntary movement,
which is made possible by the immaterial human mind." For all his musings
on possible ways that mind and body can co-exist, he never proposes a
satisfactory explanation of how mind and body, as two distinct substances,
can interact. (Descartes' speculation that such an interaction occurs in the
pineal gland has long since been discredited.)" It was this difficulty that lead
to the transformation of Cartesianism by subsequent theorists.
Descartes' approach was quintessentially essentialist in Popper's
sense of the word. Popper contends that his ideas rest upon an intuitive idea
as to what the essence of man is, as is attested to by his method of radical
doubt (1977:177). Popper also notes Descartes' "peculiar form of a
mechanistic theory of causality," i.e. the idea that all causation in the physical
world is caused by a mechanistic push (ibid.). Descartes applies this principle
68 Descartes does not believe the mind and the brain to be the same thing, while he
explicitly equates mind and soul (1978:139;140-141 ;218).
69Descartes does note that mind and body may interact, and even be, to an extent,
interdependent, and he concedes that nature does "teach him" that he has a body (1978:134-
135). But he insists that he cannot draw any conclusions with regard to external objects,
without consideration by the mind and that the mind alone can discern the truth in his
perceptions: " .. .for it is, as appears to me, the office of the mind alone, and not of the
composite whole of the mind and body, to discern truth in those matters" (136).
70 See footnote 36.
71 See Dennett (1991: 33-39).
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of mechanistic causation to the mind as well, even though he believes the
mind to be composed of a different substance altogether. This world-view is
summed up with an apt analogy by Owen Flanagan: human bodies act upon
the world in response to stimuli, in much the same mechanistic way as the
life-size, hydraulically-controlled robots that Descartes encountered in the
French Royal Gardens (Flanagan 1991:1).
In keeping with his distinction between ultimate and conjectural
explanation," Popper declares that it is only in terms of such an attempt at
ultimate explanation that the difficulty of their interacting would arise, because
such an ultimate explanation is derived from the intuited essences of the mind
and body with their apparently dissimilar constituting substances. In terms of
conjectural explanation there should be no reason to pre-empt the possibility
of their interaction (1977:182). Popper believes that it is in the attempt to
combine an incorporeal soul/mind and the mechanistic notion of physical
causation that Descartes encountered unnecessary difficulties and caused a
shift in the mind-body problem, which subsequently lead to a mind-body
parallelism and later to the identity thesis (177).
Popper's criticism hints at a certain arbitrariness on the part of
Descartes in his mind/body division. Such a view, although unfounded, seems
to be not all that uncommon. However, as Solomon and Higgins (1996:185)
point out, Descartes' move is neither arbitrary, nor isolated, and could even be
thought to be inevitable in the context of the history of philosophy:
We should not suppose, as is often charged, that Descartes
made some sort of stupid mistake, arbitrarily marking off the mind
from the body as different "substances" and then finding himself
unclear about how to get them together again. The dualism of the
mind and body was the product of several centuries of intellectual
development, the progress of science and the newfound respect for
individual autonomy. Distinguishing the mind and the body
provided a realm for science, concerned with the physical world, to
proceed unhampered by religion or moral concerns associated with
72 See above
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the peculiarities of the human mind, human freedom, the human
ability to "transcend" physical reality, and so on. The distinction
also provided a realm for religion and human freedom and
responsibility that would not be threatened by science. If the world
from Aristotle to Aquinas had been largely defined by a single set
of "natural laws, " whether provided by God or by nature, the new,
modern world would have to juggle two sets of concerns, one for
bodies, one for the mind (one for the facts, one for the values).
From Descartes to Sartre, getting these two together would not be
nearly as important as keeping them safely apart.
The problem of the mode of interaction between body and mind would
dog Cartesian theory and lead to much criticism and attempts at
modification." The Cartesian self is "a substance whose whole essence or
nature consist[s] only in thinking and, which, that it may exist has need of no
place, nor is dependent on any material thing... " (1978:27). This thinking
substance, or pure thought, detached and unaffected by any material
substance hardly lends itself to elaborate discussion. It does not develop nor
evolve, it remains pristine, untouched by the contingencies of life and remains
independent from any particular body. Descartes' cogito comes into the world
with knowledge already imprinted on it and by means of reason we can bring
these innate ideas to consciousness. One of the main tenets of the scientific
methodology that Descartes aims to employ is, of course, to postulate
universally valid knowledge. The assumption of universality makes it
unproblematic for him to start with his own existence as paradigm example.
And since he has found himself to be a thinking substance in essence, that
attribute is generalised and applied to all people.
73 A curious spin off, for instance, is the theory of occasionalism, a kind of
psychophisiological parallelism. The occasionalists used Descartes' own assertion that God is
a perfect being and would therefore not deceive us to conclude that all causation is
miraculous and the causation between body and mind was the result of the miraculous
intervention of God (Popper 1977: 182). Later forms of parallelism - be they Spinozean or
Leibnizean - would drop the call to miracles or God, but would still postulate a parallel
functioning of mind and body, with no form of facilitation between the two.
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Descartes' theories have received much criticism from many quarters,
and have become, rightly or wrongly, the embodiment of all that is to be
viewed with suspicion, or to be lauded - depending on one's position - in the
Enlightenment. Ryle rightly attributes the furore raging around the Cartesian
doctrine to the prevalence of the theory right up to the present day. Descartes'
theory on mind has become the touchstone for most subsequent theories on
the mind and related matters, and its influence on those theories - whether
they are in agreement or in absolute opposition to Descartes' principles -
cannot be overemphasised. Ryle (1960:11) believes that Descartes' legacy
has so powerful a hold on "latter-day" (Le. mid-twentieth century) theory that
he describes it as the "Official Doctrine." Ryle's position is mirrored by that of
Flanagan: "Descartes' theory remains the single most influential framework for
discussing the philosophy of psychology and mind" (Flanagan 1991: 1). For
many the difficulties with the theory are generally considered to be minor
theoretical difficulties that can be overcome with minor modifications.
4.2 Descartes criticised
A telling critique of Descartes' theory of mind is that of Gilbert Ryle. He
introduces his critique as follows. Ryle attempts to show that the central
principles of Descartes' theory are unsound (his work merits a much more
lengthy discussion than can be accorded to it here):
For certain purposes it is necessary to determine the logical
cross-bearings of the concepts which we know quite well how to
apply. The attempt to perform this operation upon the concepts of
the powers, operations and states of mind has always been a big
part of the task of philosophers. Theories of knowledge, logic,
ethics, political theory and aesthetics are the products of their
inquiries in this field ... but ... during the three centuries of the
epoch of natural science, the logical categories in terms of which
the concepts of mental powers and operations have been co-
ordinated have been wrongly selected. Descartes left as one of his
main philosophical legacies a myth which continues to distort the
continental geography of the subject (1960:8).
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In keeping with the tradition of language philosophy, Ryle criticises
Descartes on the grounds that he has committed a category mistake." Ryle
argues that Descartes perpetrated such a mistake in that he performed
certain operation with concepts of mind that are logically "improper" to apply
to mental concepts and hence are "breaches of logical rules" (8). And, as
noted earlier, he argues that the central principles of the Cartesian doctrine
are unsound. Ryle takes the central principles to be the doctrine that human
bodies are in space and subject to the mechanical laws that govern all
physical bodies, while minds are not in space and thus not subject to its laws
(11).
Ryle notes the Cartesian bifurcation where mind and body are said to
occupy two different "worlds," the physical and the mental (12). These two
worlds are metaphorically spoken of as "external" and "internal," although, as
Ryle notes, strictly speaking, minds cannot be inside anything, seeing that
they are not spatial at aW5• Even when the "inner" "outer" division is treated as
metaphorical, difficulties still abound in trying to explain how the mind and
body influence one another." But Ryle's criticism does not stop there. He
claims that there is a deeper, philosophical assumption that underlies the
Cartesian theory and gives rise to even more theoretical difficulties. Descartes
makes the fundamental assumption that there are two different kinds of
existence; two kinds of status when it comes to existing (13). As Ryle puts it:
"...some existing is physical existing, other existing is mental existing" (ibid).
Physical existing necessarily takes place in space and time, and consists of
matter, while mental existing is necessarily in time, but not in space, and
74 Ryle explains the perpetration of a category mistake in the following manner: "The
logical type or category to which a concept belongs is the set of ways in which it is logically
legitimate to operate with it ... certain sorts of operations with the concepts of mental powers
and processes [applied by Descartes] are breaches of the logical rules. I try to use reductio
ad absurdum arguments both to disallow operations implicitly implied by the Cartesian myth
and to indicate to what logical types the concepts under investigation are to be allocated"
(1960:8).
75 Here Ryle levels criticism against some Cartesian theorists who forget the
metaphoric nature of this division and speak of the mind as if were located in the skull
(1960:12)
76 Descartes clearly construed the two as influencing one another, and did not adhere
to parallelism: " ... the mind is [... ] intimately dependent on upon the condition and relation of
the organs of the body ... (1978:49).
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exists as consciousness. Furthermore physical objects are mechanically
connected and subject to the laws of cause and effect, while mental fields are
insular, impenetrable to one another. Despite this impenetrability to other
minds, a person has direct knowledge of the workings of his/her mind and has
privileged access to his/her mind through tntrospection". Ryle asserts that a
necessary consequence of this view is that it implicitly prescribes a special
way in which our concepts of mental operations are to be construed (15).
Ry!e famously calls the Cartesian doctrine "the dogma of the Ghost in
the Machine" (ibid.). He claims that the entire doctrine is false in principle,
because it rests on a category mistake, and he calls the doctrine a
"philosopher's myth". In Ryle's words: "It represents the facts of mental life as
if they belonged to one logical type or category (or range of types or
categories) when they actually belong to another''(tê)." And Ryle sets about
rectifying the "logic of mental-conduct concepts". It is nearly impossible to sum
Ryle's argument up more succinctly, or more eloquently than he does in the
following passage:
My destructive purpose is to show that a family of radical
category-mistakes is the source of the double-life theory. The
representation of a person as a ghost mysteriously enclosed in a
machine derives from this argument. Because, as is true, a
person's thinking, feeling, and purposive doing cannot be described
fully in the idioms of physics, chemistry, and physiology, therefore
they must be described as counterpart idioms. As the human body
is a complex organised unit, though one made of a different sort of
stuff with a different sort of structure. Or, again, as the human
77 Ryle suggests that this view has remained essentially unchanged by the theories of
Freud, which Ryle sums up as showing "that there exist channels tributary to this stream [of
consciousness], which run hidden from their owner" (1960: 14). According to Ryle the
adherents to the official doctrine, he does not specify who he has in mind, insist that under
normal circumstances a person must be directly and authentically aware of the state and
workings of his/her own mind. In the following chapter we shall discuss the importance of
Freud's theories on conceptions of the mind, and the subject, and how his insights make such
a position untenable.
78 Ryle does not offer a definition of a category mistake, but illustrates his
understanding of the concept with a series of illustrations (1960: 16-17). What his illustrations
basically boil down to is to indicate that certain concepts are applied to "logical types" to which
they do not belong.
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body, like any other parcel of matter, is a field of causes and
effects, so the mind must be another field of causes and effects,
though not, (heaven be praised), mechanical causes and effects
(1960:18).
Ryle traces the origin of the Cartesian category-mistake to Galileo and
his methods of scientific discovery, which were aimed at providing a
mechanical theory applicable to all objects in space, and proposes that
Descartes might have found himself embroiled in a conflict of motives. He
wanted to establish a philosophical methodology based on the methodology
of the physical sciences, yet he could not accept the inevitable conclusion
implied by such an assumption, namely that human nature is just a variety of
the mechanical clockwork of the universe, and that the mental is subject to the
same laws of cause and effect as physical bodies. In order to avoid this
conclusion, Descartes construed mental processes to be non-mechanical and
non-spacial processes. And, since mechanical laws explain the movements of
bodies in space, they cannot be applicable to the non-spatial workings of the
mind. These two realms of existence, the physical and the mental, are then
subject to different kinds of causation, and the human mind is not subject to
the mechanical laws of the physical universe.
Ryle insists that, although construed to be radically different, the
physical and mental were still considered within the common framework of the
categories of "thing", "stuff", "attribute", "state", "process", "change", "cause",
and "effect". Minds were subject to causes, effects, states, etc. different from
those of bodies. This assumption of a mental realm is what then leads to the
central theoretical difficulty in explaining how the minds and bodies can
influence one another. Ryle, as a language theorist, summarises his criticism
as follows: "Still unwittingly adhering to the grammar of mechanics, he tried to
avert disaster by describing minds in what was merely an obverse vocabulary"
(20). Mind was explained in the negatives of descriptions given to bodies.
Following this line of reasoning, it seems fair to infer that, if physical bodies
are subject to mechanical laws, minds, since they do not belong to the same
category as bodies, must be subject to different, non-mechanical, laws. And,
in order to allow for free will, non-mechanical laws cannot be deterministic in
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the sense that mechanical laws are. Essentially, Ryle believes that the
problem of free will arose from the question of how to reconcile the hypothesis
that minds and bodies belong to the same category of mechanics, with the
idea that "higher-order human conduct" is different from that of machines (20).
Ryle argues that the seeming contrast of mind and matter is illegitimate
- they are not polar opposites, because they are not of the same logical type.
He also argues that both idealism and materialism are answers to an
"improper question", and that mind and matter cannot be reduced to one
another, because such a move would presuppose the legitimacy of their
disjunction in the first place (32).
Ryle's argument up to this point is convincing. What remains
unconvincing is his conclusion that: "It is perfectly proper to say in one tone of
voice, that there exist minds and to say, in another logical tone of voice, that
there exist bodies"(23), because "existence" is not a generic word and this is
an example of two different senses of "exist". His implication seems to be that
mind and matter belong to different categories, and that what needs to be
done is to allocate the mental to its proper category and then to apply
concepts to it that are logically acceptable to that category. His argument
does not explain why mind and matter belong to different categories, or how
these categories are to be determined. Although Ryle (rightly) declares the
disjunction between mind and matter to be illegitimate, and therefore the
reduction of the one to the other as non-sensical, he does not offer a viable
alternative. We agree with the spirit of Ryle's criticism - the illegitimacy of the
distinction between mind and matter - but we will try and substantiate this
claim on different grounds.
Although Ryle contests that the three-hundred-years plus debate on
mind principally waged between idealism and materialism to be based on the
false assumption that mind and matter are indeed separable, some aspects of
this philosophical debate will prove informative with regard to the origin of
lingering perceptions on the subject. We will therefore proceed to discuss the
influence that the Cartesian doctrine would have on philosophy of mind for the
next three-hundred-odd years.
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4.3 Intimations of Empiricism
Descartes' influential view was not the only one handed down from the
Enlightenment. His rationalism already received contemporary critique in the
form of ernpiricisrn." The most well known of the empiricists, David Hume, is
not very taken with the Cartesian idea of identity as a given and eventually
concludes that identity is an illusion altogether. As with the Cartesian project
Hume wanted to put the humanistic sciences on as firm a basis as the
seventeenth century physicists had put the physical sciences on, by using a
similar methodology when contemplating general truths about human
existence." Hume's famous scepticism (and here he is diametrically opposed
to Descartes) lies in his belief that claims of reason claim more than is their
due, and he sets about exposing the limitations of human reason." Hume's
project was to establish how we come to have knowledge, based on
observation and reasonable inference, rather than through reason alone. In
keeping with his status as a staunch empiricist, Hume's approach was to
study the way that the mind functions, avoiding any a priori ideas about the
workings of the mind. By means of epistemological analysis, Hume sets about
79 The Empiricist Locke, for instance, insisted on the primacy of experience to
knowledge and described the mind as a kind of tabula rasa, which needs to be inscribed with
knowledge gained through experience. This knowledge consists of abstractions from
sensation. Locke muses on identity, also personal identity and so doing becomes one of the
first modern day philosophers to explicitly raise the problematic nature of personal identity, of
self (Levin 1992: 19).
Locke explains personal identity or the self as "the I that accompanies all
consciousness" (Levin 1992:21). We can have identity in several senses that include the
other three kinds of identity distinguished above. Self-consciousness necessarily
accompanies consciousness, but our sense of identity is not disturbed by breaks in
consciousness. This becomes possible through memory, as memory bridges the gaps
between breaks in consciousness. My memory of my past consciousness as well as my
experiencing the organisation of my body as enduring through time becomes the basis of
personal identity. Locke becomes one of the first modern philosophers to find a link between
a sense of self and the body with its sensations.
80 While Levin (1992:28-29), for example, explicitly refers to Newton when discussing
Hume's aim to apply the new scientific method of the seventeenth century to human studies,
some theorists like Radcliffe (2000) implicate Bacon. Be that as it may, Hume envisioned
humanistic studies based on the newly developed scientific method applied both observation
and reasoning, and which aimed to be objective - a project seemingly no different from that of
Descartes, but which would lead to radically different conclusions.
81 To quote Levin: "He wants to be reasonable rather than rational, and in the final
analysis relies on sentiment and custom to validate a great deal. .. [and to] determine human
action" (27).
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piecing together the structure of human thought. He explores the origins of
our beliefs and tries to evaluate their foundation in reason. Of this expected
foundation in logic he finds none and comes to the conclusion that our beliefs
are rooted in custom, habit and sentiment."
In order to establish how the mind functions and how knowledge is
acquired Hume sets about examining "mental contents". Hume calls what is
usually understood under mental contents perceptions, which are each of
them an entity in themselves and are essentially sensations - sounds, tastes,
odours, pressures, etc. Humean perceptions, or objects of mind, are atomistic
entities, which are further divided into ideas of sensation (which could be
simple or complex and entail thinking and reasoning) and impressions (which
are feelings and experiences). Moreover, the latter are divided into two kinds
of impressions: impressions of sensation - those that are the result of the
external world affecting the senses and; and impressions of reflection -
memories and fantasies (Hume 1969/1739: 49-56). Hume himself had
difficulty establishing a satisfying way of distinguishing between the two. He
took recourse to the vividness and intensity of impressions by means of which
one could supposedly distinguish between the more immediate impressions of
sensation, and the less vivid impressions of reflection:
ALL the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves
into two distinct kinds, which I shall call IMPRESSIONS and
IDEAS. The difference betwixt these consists in the degree of force
and liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind, and make their
way into our thought or consciousness (1969/1739: 49).
Hume, as a sceptic, wants to expose the limitations of reason. He
believes that feeling and sentiment determine human action, and relegates
reason to being a mere "slave to the passions":
"...all our reasonings concerning causes and effects are
deriv'd from nothing but custom; and that belief is more properly an
82 He is often criticised, though, for not accomplishing this goal and for mistaking
many a priori assumptions for observations (Levin 1992:26; Radcliffe 2000:14).
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act of the sensitive, than of the cognitive part of our nature" (Hume
1969/1739:234 ).
By distinguishing the contents of mind in terms of their "feel"
(vividness), Hume already sets us up to think of experience in terms of its
quality and not its cause (be it external, or through mental processes)
(Radcliffe 2000: 8). He argues that all our ideas can be traced to impressions,
and that one cannot entertain an idea in the absence of an accompanying
impression. A person cannot have the idea or the concept of a smell or a
colour without having experienced it. Experience tells us, Hume believes, that
the mind cannot have any innate ideas. Hume's expulsion of innate ideas
does not preclude the possibility of having ideas of the imagination. But, in
Hume's world, imagination is limited by previous sensory experience. No
matter how improbable one's flights of fancy, one cannot imagine something
that one has never come across in any context before. In short, one cannot
conjure up an original idea without any mental contents, and mental contents
are all subsequent to experience. Hume ultimately comes to the conclusion
that reason plays a very small role in determining our actions, and leaves us
with a conception of human nature that is almost as mechanistic as
Descartes' conception of nature independent of mind.
Hume's empiricism leads to an epistemological schema in terms of
which human knowledge consists of impressions of sensation, impressions of
reflection and, ideas - these are the only sources of knowledge. Hume's
contention that all ideas occur in the wake of impressions, and thus
experience, raises the question as to how abstract ideas (like those of
identity) are possible. We do not experience abstract ideas through our
senses, so how are they formulated? Hume must explain what prompts us to
adopt beliefs whose scope goes beyond the experiences on which they are
based. Hume is very aware of the necessity of accounting for this possibility,
but whether he addresses the possibility of abstract concepts successfully
debatable. His answer to this dilemma is that ideas are relational, by virtue of
a uniting principle. A bond between ideas will cause associations to arise in
the mind that will highlight possible connections between ideas. Hume
proceeds to elaborate on the nature of this relational bond:
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He begins by asserting that of all the kinds of "philosophical" relation
(1969/1739:117) that can exist by means of association in the mind (there are
seven in ali), only the principle of causation can allow us to make inferences
from present experience: "Here it then appears, that of those three relations,
which depend not upon mere ideas, the only one, that can be trac'd beyond
our senses, and inform us of existences and objects, which we do not see or
feel, is causation" (122).
If the experience of apparent causation in the mind is the only possible
origin of abstract concepts, how does this kind of causation arise? Hume
insists that nothing exists, internally or externally, that cannot be considered
either a cause or an effect at some time or another. At the same time he
argues that it is very clear that there is no universally existing quality common
to all of these instances, which allows them to be classified as causes or as
effects (123). Hume proceeds to distinguish between causality and
correlation. He asserts that our idea of causality has three component ideas:
1) contiguity: two experiences have to be conjoined in time and space in order
for us to experience them as being causally connected; 2) succession: cause
must seem to precede effect; 3) necessary connection: for two correlating
experiences to be causal there needs to lie a necessity in their causal relation,
a similar cause, under similar circumstances must produce a similar effect
(Hume1969/1739:123-126). So far so good, contiguity and succession are
sufficient for us to establish a correlation between two experiences. But,
according to the preceding schema, if we are looking for an instance of
causality we need to bring necessity into the equation - a particular cause
must ne~essarily cause a particular effect. Hume insists, however, that he
cannot find any experiential examples that imply such a necessity. This leads
him to conclude, famously and contentiously, that that causality is not an
attribute of the world, and there is no reason to believe that events which we
perceive as causally related will prove to be so again in the future (126-130).
Yet, he argues, we are still able to make accurate judgements of cause and
effect.
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For Hume, we establish an apparently necessary connection between
perceptions" through experience. But when we examine our external
experience we only experience a set of impressions, followed by a further set
of impressions, we do not find the impression of a connection between a set
of impressions. This leads him to conclude that causality is in fact the result of
a psychological process, where, because of experiencing certain events in
conjunction with one another, we form the habit of thinking of the one in
connection with the other, which leads us to posit a causal connection
between the two. When we experience this anticipating of one event upon
another, we experience an impression to which can be traced the idea of
necessary connection, and causality becomes non other than an anticipation
in the mind of cause and effect (Hume 1969/1739:126-135). Both memory
and experience are what allow us to make these inferences:
There is no single phenomenon, even the most simple,
which can be accounted for from the qualities of the objects, as
they appear to us; or which we cou'd foresee without the help of
our memory and experience (Hume 1969/1739:117-118).
If the objects of mind (impressions) originate externally, or in memory
and fantasy, and are related and ordered by means of association, we are left
with a theory of the working of the mind that is not rational, but based on habit
and custom which leads us to experience ideas as causally related
(1969/1739:152) .84
Given Hume's conceptual schema, and his conclusion with regard to
abstract concepts, a vexing question arises: how do we come to an idea of
the self or mind as a subject that experiences these objects? If all ideas are
traceable to impressions, there must either be an impression or a set of
83 Hume uses perception as a generic term that denotes both impressions and ideas.
84 Levin explicitly likens Hume's thesis on causality to Newton's Gravitation, where
the association of ideas is the force that relates atomistic impressions, as gravitation might do
in terms of physical bodies (1992:28). Economist Adam Smith, a contemporary and friend of
Hume's, presents us with a gravitational force of his own, which is also analogous to Hume's
causality and apparently influenced Hume's conception of it. Smith's "invisible hand" theory
postulates the market and its laws to be operating along the lines of the same principles as
the association of ideas in Hume (Levin1992: 29).
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impressions from which the idea of self is derived (299), or, the self, as with
other abstractions, might owe its existence to habit and custom.
As can be imagined, Hume does not balk at the idea that a concept of
the self is based on custom rather than on a perceivable phenomenon. In
short he concludes:
If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that
impression must continue invariably the same, thro' the whole
course of our lives; since self is supposed to exist after that
manner. But there is no impression constant and invariable... It
cannot therefore be from any of these impressions that the idea of
self is deriv'd; and consequently there is no such idea (Hume
1969/1739:300).
His argument runs as follows: Although our perceptions are in flux, we
always experience them as being the impressions of someone, of a self,
which means that we should have a continuous impression from which the
idea of the self is derived. But, search as we might, such an impression is not
forthcoming. Hume, as a sceptic, does not believe our experience of reality to
be continuous, but rather to be atomistic. Given that abstract concepts can
only be either impressions or relations of ideas, the self can only be known as
one of the two. The self, as an impression (an object of experience) or as
relational, or as unknowable, are the only options that Hume's epistemological
schema allows as conception of the self. Hume dismisses the notion that the
self is a relation of ideas off the cuff. He concedes that there is the logical
possibility that an object "self' from which we could derive the idea of self
might exist, but in keeping with his scepticism, he believes that it is impossible
for us to know (300).
Having dismissed the possibility of a relational self, Hume, in terms of
his epistemological scheme, is left with the possibility of having an impression
of self. Hume declares that whenever he tries to enter or capture his "most
intimate self' he inevitably comes upon an impression of some sort or
another, whether it be heat or cold, pain or pleasure, etc. (300). He cannot
catch himself without a perception of some sort. The absence of such
perceptions only occurs when he cannot be sensible to himself, when he is
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sleeping, for example. To quote Hume: 'When my perceptions are removed
for any time as by sound sleep; so long as I am insensible of myself, can I
truly be said not to exist" (ibid). Hume declares that upon introspection that he
always experiences a flow of impressions, but never an experiencer, as it
were, of those impressions. This leads Hume to conclude that man (or the
self) is nothing but a bundle or a collection of perceptions that are in rapid and
perpetual flux.
Hume chooses as his metaphor of mind a theatre, where perceptions
successively make their appearance and then pass off the stage -
perceptions can also "mingle in a variety of postures and situations" (301).
Hume warns us that the metaphor should not be stretched too far; mind is
constituted only by a succession of perceptions. We have no notion where in
the mind these scenes are represented nor of what they are made. It is only
the existence of memory that allows us to experience these successive
perceptions as continuous. Memory enables us to envision a chain of causes
and effects, which, in the end, constitute our self or personal identity. Memory
is not infallible, however, and the task falls on us to fill in the gaps in memory.
In postulating the self as succession of perceptions, Hume has left us with the
ability to experience perception, but not to experience the self that does the
experiencing. We have the ability to create a sense of a continuity that does
not exist externally to us, and which enables us to experience a sense of
personal identity. But we are unable to know the self as such.
Hume proceeds to ask why there exists "so great a propension to
ascribe an identity" to successive perceptions and to ascribe to ourselves an
invariable and uninterrupted existence throughout the course of our lives
(Hume 1969/1739:301). In answer to this question Hume distinguishes
between personal identity with regard to our thought and imagination; and
with regard to our passion or concern that we take with ourselves. He
proceeds to explain that it is by means of our imagination that we fill in the
"gaps" in our experience, and find grounds to link a succession of objects
experienced and thus render them, to our mind, an identical object through
time. The identity that we ascribe to "the mind of man" stems from a similar
operation of the imagination upon objects and hence our identical self is a
fictitious one. In principle this ascription of objects of mind to be related and
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belonging to a self identical through time occurs in the same manner as
causality does in the case of external objects, from a kind of habitual
association of ideas. "For from thence it evidently follows, that identity is
nothing really belonging to these different perceptions, and uniting them
together; but is merely a quality, which we attribute to them, because of the
union of their ideas in the imagination, when we reflect upon them (Hume
1969/1739:307). Memory acquaints us with the succession of perceptions and
is therefore the chief source of personal identity (309). Hume qualifies this
statement by asserting that memory does not so much produce personal
identity as discover it, by showing us the relation of cause and effect among
different perceptions. In this way he leaves the way open for identity to be
extended beyond the limitations of memory (310). Hume concludes his
argument by declaring that identity is a grammatical, rather than a
philosophical question: "All the disputes concerning the identity of connected
objects are merely verbal, except so far as the relation of parts gives rise to
some fiction or imaginary principle of union, as we have already observed"
(310).
In the appendix to the Treatise on Human Nature, Hume expresses his
own discomfort with his conclusions on personal identity and self, but
declares: "I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to
render them consistent (1969/1739:675). Hume still holds that that one cannot
perceive a self independent from perceptions, and that the composition of
perceptions form the self (676). Hence: "...we have no notion of [mind],
distinct from the particular perceptions" (677). What Hume finds problematic
with his own theory is how to explain the principle according to which these
perceptions are connected. We cannot perceive such connections, and Hume
believes that we only feel a connection or determination of a thought to pass
from one idea to another. He concludes that: "the thought alone finds personal
identity when reflecting on the train of past perceptions, that compose a mind,
the ideas of them are felt to be connected together and naturally introduce
each other" (ibid.). Hume cannot find a satisfactory theory to explain the
principle that connects our successive perceptions in thought, and his theory
runs into two contradictory principles: "that all our distinct perceptions are
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distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion
among distinct existences" (677).
In spite of his extreme scepticism, and his radical contribution to the
debate on knowledge that had raged since the commencement of the
Enlightenment, Hume, as Solomon and Higgins (1996:197) point out, readily
accepted the dualism of body and mind. They believe (as does Ryle) that the
dispute between rationalism and empiricism is better described as a "family
feud", rather than an ideological debate. Both positions embodied a closely
related sense of reason and other fundamental assumptions - the debate
largely raged around innate ideas, the scope of reason and the method
through which belief can be justified - finer detail, rather than fundamental
theoretical differences. Both positions presented a united front, as it were,
against dogma and superstition, which they believed could be countered with
the universal human capacity for reason. Solomon and Higgins make the
acute observation that modern philosophy is "not an extended debate about
ontology, epistemology, and metaphysics... Irrationality was their true target.
The enlightenment was not about the nature of knowledge so much as it was
a defence of knowledge and inquiry ...The debate between reason and
experience was a strategic technical distraction within the bounds of this
cosmopolitan movement" (1996:199).
To the empiricist reason has its limits, and Hume advocates the
importance of individual character - a good upbringing, cultivation of the
virtues, a respect for traditions. And, although reason has its limits, our
sentiments and our natural common sense, cultivated through our social
traditions, have power and virtue to address the limits of reason, and have, to
Hume's mind at least, been too long neglected in the overtly scientific
atmosphere of modern philosophy (19B).
Immanuel Kant, although an admirer of Hume, would not be able to
reconcile himself with Hume's scepticism and aims to save the Enlightenment
project by establishing the limits of what we can and cannot know. The work
of Immanuel Kant will make up the last chapter in this "family feud." The
Kantian self proves to be an amalgamation of both the rationalist and the
empiricist point of view and only in the twentieth century, with the work of
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Sigmund Freud, would the self take a radical turn and begin to shake off its
Kantian trappings.
4.4The self becomes transcendental
Hume believed that by empirically studying the mind he could achieve
knowledge about the characteristics and the limits of human cognition. Kant,
although an admirer of Hume, disagreed with his analysis of the limits of the
mind. With his transcendental metaphysics Kant sets about establishing the
conditions necessary for cognition, which need not rely on habit and custom
and which can be justified objectively. His project would also be one in terms
of which he aims to establish the limits of what can and cannot be known by
the mind, and to establish how one can know judgements to be certain and
universal. In keeping with the trend of the Enlightenment, Kant tries to
reconcile the new scientific knowledge as exemplified by the mathematical
world-view of Newton, with human freedom, and to explain the possibility of
both. Science would be shown to be rationally justified, while moral law would
be shown to be universal.
Kant inherited from his predecessors in the empiricist tradition a
conception of human freedom seen as subordinated to the workings of a
mechanistic universe. From his rationalist predecessors he inherited a picture
of human freedom as based on rational insight into an objective realm
inaccessible to the senses (Guyer 1995:2). One of Kant's invaluable
contributions to Western thought would be his recognition of our own input
into our perception of the world, presenting the human being as an active
agent in cognition. Kant's point of departure in his inquiry into cognition is not
to look for the self, but one the one hand to establish the conditions that are
necessary for us to have coherent experience, and on the other to formulate
his philosophy as a science with predicative and explanatory power. In short,
his eventual conclusion would be that a self-consciousness must necessarily
accompany every mental act, which follows that the self must exit.
Subsequent to Kant neither science, nor morality could be thought of as the
result of the passive reception on our part of objective truths or reality.
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As we have seen in this chapter so far, causality has played an
important part in the theories of self of both Descartes and Hume. Hume uses
the concept of causality to illustrate that concepts that we do not empirically
experience through the senses are validated on the grounds of habit, rather
than on the grounds of being universally certain. Kant is uncomfortable with
the Humean conclusion that causality is the result of habit and custom, rather
than having an ontological basis. He sets about proving that the concept of
causality is a priori, and therefore universal and certain (although, as we shall
see, it can still be relegated to the category of impure a priori knowledge).
This dispute reflects Kant's theoretical stance that there are, in the sphere of
human cognition, structures that enable and ensure strictly a priori knowledge.
Kant does not dispute the idea that "all our knowledge begins with
experience," but argues that conceding that all our knowledge begins with
experience, does not necessarily imply that all knowledge arises out of
experience (Kant 1781/1990: 1-3). He distinguishes between a priori and a
posteriori knowledge in the following manner:
By the term "knowledge a priori," therefore, we shall in the
sequel understand, not such as is independent of this or that kind
of experience, but such as is absolutely so of all experience.
Opposed to this is empirical knowledge or that which is possible
only a posteriori, that is, through experience. Knowledge a priori is
either pure or impure. Pure knowledge a priori is that with which no
empirical element is mixed up. For example, the proposition "Every
change has a cause," is a proposition a priori, but impure, because
change is a conception which can only be derived from experience
(1781/1990:2).
Kant explains why he still considers this proposition to be a priori in the
following manner:
Now, that in the sphere of human cognition, we have
judgements which are necessary, and in the strictest sense
universal, consequently pure a priori, it will be an easy matter to
show ... If we cast our eyes upon the commonest operations of the
understanding, the proposition "every change must have a cause,"
will amply serve our purpose. In the latter case, indeed, the
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conception of cause so plainly involves the conception of a
necessity of connection with an effect, and of a strict universality of
the law, that the very notion of a cause would entirely disappear,
were we to derive it, like Hume from a frequent association of what
happens with that which precedes, and the habit thence originating
of connecting representations - the necessity inherent in the
judgments therefore merely subjective (1781/1990:3).
As a criterion for determining empirical from pure cognition Kant calls
upon the ideas of necessity and universality. A proposition that contains the
idea of necessity in its very conception is, inevitably, an a priori judgement. A
judgement is absolutely or pure a priori when it derives from a proposition
which equally contains the idea of necessity. As far as universality is
concerned, empirical propositions are (as Hume had shown) never strictly or
absolutely universal, but are assumed to be universal (Le. comparatively
universal) by means of induction. A priori judgements, on the other hand, are
strictly and absolutely universal (2-3).
Kant, like Hume, is concerned with the conceptions that seem to
extend our judgements beyond their experiential bounds. Here, in the
transcendental" realm, where our knowledge does not arise from experience,
we encounter Kant's conception of Reason. Reason takes as its subject
matter those problems that cannot be addressed on the grounds of
experience - problems such as God, freedom (of will) and immortality (5). The
science by means of which these problems are usually approached is
Metaphysics. But Kant describes metaphysics as being dogmatic from the
outset, especially in that it does not even question whether reason is able to
deal with such questions. How do we arrive at such a priori judgements, and
how do we determine their validity? Some forms of pure a priori knowledge,
like mathematics, have long been established and Kant argues that the kind
of thinking that assumes this success can be translated onto all aspects or
85 Kant explicitly defines his concept of the transcendental as follows: "I apply the
term transcendental to all knowledge which is not so much occupied with objects as with the
mode of our cognition of these objects, so far as this mode of cognition is possible il priorI'
(1781/1990:15).
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pure knowledge, without allowing for the fact that such aspects may be of a
different nature, is deceptive. He stresses the necessity to examine the origin
of the cognitions on which we would build a metaphysics before we can
accept them as principles, and he cautions against complacency that would
disregard possible limits to reason (5). With his Critique of Pure Reason Kant
sets about determining these limits, in other words, a critique of the faculty of
reason.
In his critical assessment of Hume, Kant starts of by examining
Hume's categories of judgement, where all knowledge is either empirically
determined matters of fact, or logically determined relations of ideas. Abstract
concepts can by definition not be empirically experienced and are therefore
the result of the habitual relation (or synthesising) of certain ideas. Kant's
assessm~nt of judgement is much more intricate (1781/1990:1-15). He makes
use of basic categories of judgement, namely, a priori/a posteriori and
analytic/synthetic and as a result he presents us with four possible kinds of
judgement: analytic a priori, analytic a posteriori, synthetic a priori, and
synthetic a posteriori. Of theses four kinds analytic a posteriori is by definition
impossible - an analytical proposition does not rely on experience to be
verified, its conclusion is already implied in its premises. Analytic judgements
are by definition a priori, so the possibility of analytic a priori does not pose a
problem. Similarly, the idea of synthetic a posteriori poses no problem, one
cannot determine a synthetic state of affairs, without a posteriori experience."
What is at issue here for Kant and also for the purposes of our discussion is
the possibility of the synthetic a priori (Hume does not consider it a
possibility):
86 For absolute clarity on what Kant means by synthetic and analytic judgements I
quote at length from the Critique of Pure Reason: "Analytical judgements (affirmative) are
therefore those in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is cogitated through
identity; those in which this connection is cogitated without identity, are called synthetical
judgements. The former may be called explicative, the latter augmentative judgements,
because the former add in the predicate nothing to the conception of the subject, but only
analyse it into its constituent conceptions, which were thought already in the subject; the latter
add to our conceptions of the subject a predicate which was not contained in it, and which no
analysis could ever have discovered therein" (1781/1990:7). Predictably, judgements of
experience are always synthetical.
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Upon such synthetical, that is augmentative propositions
depends the whole aim of our speculative knowledge a priori; for
although analytical judgements are indeed highly important and
necessary, they are so only to arrive at that clearness of
conceptions which is requisite for a sure and extended synthesis,
and this alone is a real acquisition (1781/1990:9).
Kant believes that the theoretical sciences of reason - mathematics,
physics, and metaphysics - consist of synthetic il priori judgements as
principles, and rather than abandon these disciplines to habitual (and perhaps
arbitrary) experiences of relation, Kant seeks to ground such knowledge as
universally certain. For Kant, logically grounded knowledge of the world is
only possible through verifiable, synthetic a priori judgements, and one of
Kant's transcendental" conditions for synthetic a priori judgements is the
existence of a continuous self.
Kant believed that we process experiences derived from external
sources in one of two ways: aesthetic and categorical. Through his
Transcendental Aesthetic" Kant determines that we invariably order our
experiences of the world, our sensations, in terms of space and in time
(1781/1990:21-43). Kant concludes that the objects of our experience are
phenomena - "The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called a
phenomenon" (21). We experience the objects of empirical intuition invariably
as being in space and time. Furthermore, Kant argues, while we can conceive
of space and time devoid of objects, it is impossible for us to experience
objects independent of spatial and temporal location. From this Kant
concludes that space and time are logically prior to sensory representation
(therefore, a priori categories of understanding), where space is the intuition
87 Kant circumscribes his use of the term transcendental as follows: "I apply the term
transcendental to all knowledge which is not so much occupied with objects as with our mode
of cognition of these objects, so far as this mode of cognition is possible a priorI'
(1781/1990:15).
88 Defined as "the science of all the principles of sensibility a priori," while the principle
of pure thought is called transcendental logic (1781/1990:22).
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of the "outer senses", while time is the intuition of "inner sense.?" Space and
time become fundamental structures, the necessary conditions, in terms of
which we experience empirical subjects, but these structures are not of the
world, but rather of human perspective - a subjective mode of representation
of the mind or subject. Kant's is a universal subjectivity, common to every
mind. Phenomenal reality (spatial-temporal reality) is the only reality that is
accessible to us.
We now have completely before us one part of the solution
of the grand general problem of transcendental philosophy, namely
the question - How are synthetical propositions a priori possible?
That is to say, we have shown that we are in possession of pure a
priori intuitions, namely, space and time, in which we find, when in
a judgement a priori we pass out beyond the given conception,
something which is not discoverable in that conception, but is
certainly found a priori in the intuition which corresponds to the
conception, and can be united synthetically with it. But the
judgements which these pure intuitions enable us to make, never
reach farther than to the objects of the senses, and are valid only
for objects of possible experience (1781/1990:43).
Hence the possibility of the spatia-temporal framework of Newtonian
physics could be certain only in terms of its being the structure of our
experience of objects. Kant distinguished between phenomena, objects as we
experience them; and noumena, objects in themselves, as they might be
known by a pure intellect. Not having a pure intellect, our access to the world
is restricted to knowledge of the phenomenal world, mediated by the senses.
If we only have access to the phenomenal world, what would happen to our
conception of the self or subject? One possibility that Kant discusses is a
conception of the subject as phenomenon, experienced as an object
conforming to the to the properties of space and time (39-41).
89 This distinction is important in that it highlights a subtle difference in the scope of
these two structures: time is the formal condition, a priori, of all phenomena, while space is
limited as a condition a priori to external phenomena only (Kant 1781/1990:30).
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Kant explains the possibility of synthetic a priori judgements through
making this synthesis internal. He postulates internal categories of
Understanding, through which we filter perceptions that we encounter in the
external world. Human beings are given an active role in perception and the
acquisition of knowledge. These categories of understanding become the
transcendental conditions for knowledge - we cannot experience anything
independently from them. For Kant sensations are already experienced as
perceptions. To quote Levin (1992:36): "Kant moved the locus of knowing
from the world to the mind."
Kant presents us with a mind that has three aspects: the Senses,
Understanding and Reason. Kant subjects understanding to analyses in his
transcendental logic. Where the senses contribute to mind intuitions of space
and time, understanding contributes to mind general categories of conceptual
schemata, according to which experience is then organised. Reason
integrates knowledge and allows for self-awareness and self-criticism (Levin
1992:38). Kant proposes the existence of categories, which are the concepts
that are necessary conditions for us to organise intuitions and make them
accessible to judgement. He distinguishes between a number of categories of
judgement, which he explicates in tables in the Critique of Pure Reason
(1781/1990: 56; 62). The intellectual form of every judgement is characterised
by quantity, quality, relation, and modality, each of which, in turn, contain
three momenta. In all there are twelve categories or transcendental concepts
of objects in general: three categories of quantity, namely unity, plurality, and
totality; three categories of quality, namely, reality, negation, and limitation;
three categories of relation, namely substance or inherence and subsistence,
cause or causality and independence, and community or reciprocity between
agent and patient; and finally three categories of modality, namely possibility,
existence, and necessity. With these categories Kant tries to describe twelve
ways of conceiving of an object that are necessary to make the twelve logical
functions of judgement applicable to them. Through these categories it
becomes possible to conceive of objects as substances, as standing in
relations of cause and effect, and as parts of wholes in terms of which we can
make judgements. These categories are a priori in origin and can thus be
shown to be certain. The cost of this certainty is the realisation that
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noumenally (independent from human thought) things represented to us might
not obey the rules we attribute to them. On the positive side we now can be
assured of the universal validity of the foundational principles of the
Newtonian scientific world-view, in terms of the how things appear to us.
Seeing that causality is a phenomenal property, attributed to experiences
through Understanding, Kant concludes that noumena (including the self-in-
itself), being outside the categories of space and time, are free from causality.
By means of a transcendental deduction Kant aims to show that the
application of his categories of thought to all possible experience is justified.
As we will see, the existence of a continuous self becomes a precondition for
Kant for much of our knowledge about the world.
As indicated earlier, Kant could not abide by Hume's conclusion that to
render cognitions beyond the realm of experience he had to avail himself of
the idea of habit. Kant speculates that Hume's error lay in his failure to
consider that: "...the understanding itself might, perhaps by means of these
conceptions, be the author of the experience in which its objects were
presented to it (1781/1990:74). He argues that this empirical derivation cannot
be reconciled to the fact (as established by him) that we do possess scientific
il priori cognitions, namely pure mathematics and general physics. Kant
endeavours to avoid the inevitable scepticism of Hume, by establishing the
determinate limits, and the sphere of the legitimate activity of reason. Kant
argues that that the senses cannot provide the conjunction of the manifold
content of the representations they provide us with, and concludes that
conjunction needs to be an act performed by our faculty of representation, in
other words, the faculty of understandinq." In his own words: "Conjunction is
the representation of the synthetical unity of the manifold" (76). Kant argues
that the category of unity evidently presupposes conjunction, and he sets
about looking "still higher" for the ground of this unity of diverse conceptions in
judgment, therefore for the possibility of the existence of the understanding.
90 Here, again, Kant stresses with regard to conjunction or syntheses, that nothing
can be represented as a conjoined object that we (the subject) had not previously actively
conjoined (1781/1990: 75).
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Kant finds this unity in the I think, which must accompany all
representations in the mind. He bases this assertion on the fact that if the I
think did not accompany all representations, it would be possible for him to
have something represented in him, without him thinking it, which he deems
to be either impossible or at the very least, nothing in relation to him. Kant
calls that the representation, the I think, pure apperception (his word for
consciousness) and distinguishes it from primitive or empirical apperception."
No representation can exist for me independently of the apperception. He
calls the unity of the apperception the "transcendental unity of self-
consciousness" (77). To quote Kant:
This relation, then does not exist because I accompany
every representation with consciousness, but because I join one
representation to another, and am conscious of the synthesis of
them. Consequently, only because I connect a variety of given
representations in one consciousness, is it possible that I can
represent to myself the identity of consciousness in these
representations; in other words, the analytical unity of apperception
is possible only under the presupposition of a synthetical unity ...
[Flor the reason alone that I comprehend the variety of my
representations in one consciousness, do I call them my
representations, for otherwise I must have as many-coloured and
various a self as are the representations of which I am conscious
(78).
A priori synthetical unity is the foundation of the unity of consciousness,
and antecedes determinate thought a priori. But this conjunction or synthesis
does not belong to the objects of consciousness in themselves, but is the
result of the operation of the understanding. Kant calls this the highest
principle in all human cognition, where he is conscious of himself as a
necessary a priori synthesis of his representation. The unity of consciousness
constitutes the possibility of representations relating to an object, and the
91 The empirical consciousness that accompanies different representations is in itself
fragmentary and has no relation to the identity of the subject (Kant 1781/1990: 77)
89
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
possibility of their objective reality; ultimately the unity of consciousness
constitutes the possibility of the existence of the understanding itself, and
therefore the objective condition of all cognition.
Guyer (1995:141-144) sums up this lengthy argument as follows: 1) all
possible representations belong to a single, numerically identical self; (2) this
is a synthetic connection of representations, which (3) requires an a priori
synthesis among them, (4) the rules of which are non other than the
categories, which are therefore (5) necessary conditions for the
representation of any objects by means of the representations that
themselves belong to a numerically identical self. Kant's "I" is the ground of
the empirical unity of the self - not as a simple, spiritual being, but merely as
a permanent substratum in time (Hatfield 1995:219).
We have seen that Kant sees the existence of the self as an enduring
entity as a precondition for knowledge (Kant often equates self and
consciousness, and self and reason) Hence Kant's answer to the question of
the existence/ non-existence of the self is not, as with the empiricists, to look
for the empirical confirmation of the self, through introspection for example.
Empirically perceiving the self is impossible precisely because the self exists,
as a precondition for coherent experience and perception. Levin states that
the function of the self is synthetic, not in the Humean sense where habit and
memory give us a sense of personal continuity and therefore identity, but as
constitutive of experience - a sense of a unified self is logically prior to an
experience as mine, and there can be no other experience (1992:38). By
means of introspection it is also possible for one to experience the self as
object, and as subject to time Kant (1781/1990:89).
Kant recognises the "paradox" that his view entails, namely that our
intelligence provides us with a self as object, our self as phenomenon and not
"as we are in ourselves" (88). Kant therefore postulates two selves, in that he
distinguishes between a consciousness of self, and knowledge of self: the
phenomenal self that is sometimes perceived in introspection and the
noumenal self, which is inaccessible. The phenomenal self is knowable as the
temporal sequence that is me. The noumenal self is the I am that
transcendentally accompanies every thought, but of which we cannot have
any knowledge (90). Kant's noumenal self becomes the transcendental ego of
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nineteenth and twentieth century philosophy, which is a purely logical
condition of thought. By distinguishing between the noumenal and the
phenomenal self, Kant preserves the possibility of free will. He does believe in
two realms, a realm of necessity (the phenomenal realm) and a realm of
freedom (the noumenal realm). The noumenal realm is not subject to the
causality, which characterises the phenomenal realm, and it follows that the
noumenal self is free from causality. This enables man to stand outside the
causal chain events and exercise free will The noumenal self is seen as
outside of the realm of logical possibility and thus free and even potentially
immortal. Kant manages to reintroduce a conception of soul, but one that is
not derived from, what Levin calls, "the illegitimate use of reason" as has been
the case in metaphysics up to that point (Levin 1992:40).
Kant managed to change the project of modern philosophy. His
recognition that there was a connection between knowledge of the self and
knowledge of objects, he undermined the Cartesian idea that we could have
knowledge of our inner sense without any knowledge of the empirical world.
He also undermines Hume's project of grounding all knowledge in empirical
experience. Kant established knowledge as the result of judgement, which
necessarily involves empirical input and internal logical structures.
5. Fast forward to the twentieth century
The legacy of the Enlightenment would prove to be the entrenchment
of the mind-body split in Western philosophy. Over the subsequent three or so
centuries the mind would stay inextricably intertwined with reason, however
limited or qualified a given conception of reason might be. The self would
continue as something to be examined and understood through introspection
and self-examination. The conception of the rational mind as logical
precondition to thought would be modified in that time, but would essentially
go unchallenged until the end of the nineteenth centuries.
The turn of the twentieth century heralded a famous turning-point in the
conception of mind that would have dramatic implications for the reigning
conception of mind-body at all levels. This transformation carried the name of
Sigmund Freud. Freud played an pivotal role in dispersing the idea that the
mind and the body are two distinct, independent entities, as well as calling
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into question the idea of the rational mind that had held sway for so many
years, by postulating the idea of the unconscious. The implications of this
important development are so far-reaching that Freud merits being discussed
at length. The following chapter will aim to do just that, as well as to link
Freud's conception of the way that the mind operates with contemporary
models for the functioning of the brain.
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Chapter Three
A Neurological Basis for the "Higher Functions" of the Brain
It is easy to speculate, but hard to confirm, that Freud's
expansion of the bounds of the thinkable was a pre-condition for a
much more pervasive, and much less controversial, style of
theorizing in experimental, and especially cognitive, psychology in
recent years.
Dennett (1998: 162)
The new mentalism, combining tenets from previously
conflicting views, tends to reconcile polar opposites of the past such
as mind and matter, the physical and metaphysical, determinism and
free choice, as well as "is" and "ought" and fact and value, in a
unifying view of mind, brain, and man in nature.
Sperry (1998:165)
It is only by means of such complicated and far from
perspicuous hypotheses that I have hitherto succeeded in introducing
the phenomena of consciousness into the structure of quantitative
psychology.
Freud (1950: 311).
Whereas two or three centuries ago it seemed obvious that
the sensations and images, thoughts and voluntary impulses, were
kinds of "capacities", or immediate functions of specific brain organs -
thinking of the brain as a system of specialized "micro-organs"- such
a concept is no longer acceptable. It is better to suppose that mental
processes are complex information-processing activities, reflecting
reality. Instead mind is now considered to be a product of active
processing of the flow of information working through elementary
drives, or complex motives, set to single out important information
about reality, relating bits of information and synthesizing them, and
establishing plans and programmes of behaviour, and in conscious
control of actions.
Luria (1998:489)
1. Introduction
By proposing the existence of the unconscious Sigmund Freud turned
many received wisdoms about the mind on their head. The possibility arose
that the "higher functions" of the brain need not be conscious processes, and
that there was much more to the "mind" than met the introspective eye. Far
from being, clear, "certain, and indubitable" (to use Descartes' phraseology),
conscious (rational) thought processes became entangled in the intricacies of
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the physiological functioning of the body. Freud introduced a new way of
thinking about man and about mental functioning (Padel 1998:270). Many of
his concepts and ideas are commonplace today, but must have been
disconcerting to his contemporaries (Zangwill 1998a:268-270), think of
examples such as repression, transference, fantasy, fixation, Oedipus-
complex, free association. His theories had an enormous influence on
conceptions of personality, and its development. Much emphasis was paced
on understanding the present in terms of the past; experiences in infancy
would lay the foundation for the adult personality. Freud's theories allowed for
conflict within the psyche and incorporated a host of unconscious motivating
factors into the thought process. Influences on thought had everything to do
with primal drives, and very little to do with rational decision-making. For him
all mental life is originally unconscious, and only has the potential to become
conscious when one adapts to external reality, Le. when one develops one's
abilities of perception, learning and language. Freud was convinced that
eventually psychology would be based on organic, or bodily principles
(Zangwill 1998b:277).
Freud's ideas were groundbreaking, and as such encountered their fair
share of resistance. Although he seemed to lay the foundation of a theory of
mental processes that would overcome the difficulties posed by dualism,
Freud never explicitly addressed the issue. In fact, the conception of mind and
body as consisting of different "substances" and subject to different causal
laws would prove to be tenacious, and many current theorists still adhere to
dualist principles, although they would probably not call themselves "dualists".
In some circles, denying self/mind as a mystical, non-material entity is
received as an abrupt dismissal of the very existence of self/mind. Kenny
(1989) for example, dismisses the concept of "self' as nothing more than a
grammatical error. Kenny's position will be briefly discussed in the following
section. It will prove useful in serving as a counterpoint to Freud's ideas.
Freud's Project for a Scientific Psychology is of particular interest to this
study, in that it highlights some of the presuppositions inherent in dualist
theories of mind, and it provides an alternative approach to mind, which can
overcome some of the difficulties posed by dualism. The Project and its
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influence on later Freudian theories will be discussed in Sections 3 through 7.
First, however, we will give a brief overview of Kenny's dismissal of the
concept of self as the result of linguistic misunderstanding.
2. The self as a grammatical error
Kenny believes the self to be a "mythical entity" (1989:87). Describing it
as a piece of philosopher's nonsense, a misunderstanding of the reflexive
pronoun, nothing more than a grammatical error:
To ask what kind of substance my self is like asking what
the characteristic of my ownness is which my own property has
in addition to being mine. When, outside philosophy, I talk about
myself, I am simply talking about the human being, Anthony
Kenny, and my self is nothing other than myself. It is a
philosophical muddle to allow the space which differentiates
between "my self' and "myself' to generate the illusion of a
mysterious metaphysical entity, distinct from, but obscurely
linked to, the human being who is talking to you (87).
Kenny believes this grammatical error to be the erroneous belief that 'I'
is a referring expression (88), but he insists that the erroneous belief in the
self is not the result of grammatical error alone, but that it has two other roots:
one epistemological and one psychological. Predictably, the epistemological
error has its roots in Cartesian scepticism, for much the same reasons as
given by Ryle. How can the non-material ego act upon the material realm of
the body? What relation can be shown to exist between the mental substance
and its transient conscious thoughts? Kenny argues that what Descartes
describes as indubitable thought can at most be applied to one's own
imagination, and not with one's "intellectual" mind (90).
The psychological root of the deluded conception of a self lies with a
misconception in the empiricist tradition, most notably with Locke, where
again, according to Kenny, an illegitimate distinction is made between the
intellect and the imagination. The misconception here is the idea of the self as
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the subject of inner sensation (although Kenny does allow that Hume
concluded that the self was an illusion). Kenny argues that the self of modern
philosophy is a chimera, stemming from empiricist error. From here the
prevailing modern notion of the self as essentially a perspectiveless subject of
experiences where the self cannot easily be identified with particular bodies
(92).
Kenny's objection to the idea of a self becomes more understandable
when one gains clarity on what he believes the concept to denote: a self is
something different from oneself, it is something over and above human
being, something other than body and mind (93). He argues that it is possible
to think objectively about oneself, just as it is possible to make "impersonal,
centreless" scientific judgements (94) and argues that the possibility of
making objective scientific judgements about oneself negates the necessity
for postulating the concept of "self." How objective judgements about self are
to come about is not made clear.
Kenny is not at all convincing in his attempt to prove the concept of self
a philosopher's myth. What is striking in his essay is, once again, the
intellectual quagmire one is lead into when discussing a concept (entity?) as
ambiguous as the self. Kenny's blithe distinction between the mind and body,
and the self as something over and above those entities, something quite
mystical, speaks volumes about many different conceptions of self. Far from
undermining the rationalist and empiricist traditions, Kenny only seems to be
yet another player in a long-standing family dispute. One need not be caught
up in an either/or situation. Denying the mysticism of the self need not
necessarily imply that the self, in some or other form, does not exist at all.
Although he argues that objective judgements about oneself are
possible, Kenny is very sceptical about the possibility of orchestrating a
scientific study of the mind. Mainly because, he argues, we cannot identify
states of mind with physical states of the brain. This is a common objection
against the possibility of a "material" mind, among philosophers of mind."
Kenny's main objection seems to be the extension of the determinism of
92 See our discussion on Nagel's 'What is it like to be a bat?" pp. 177-181.
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science to the operation of the mind (140). A science of mind would then
presumably have the capacity of accounting for both the operation and the
origin of the mind in terms of the principle of determinism." Kenny
differentiates between psychological and non-psychological determinism, and
argues that psychological determinism incorporates "mentalistic" terms, Le.
terms for "mental events" and "states of mind". He argues that trying to
account for someone's actions in a psychological deterministic way is
illegitimate, because this approach erroneously equates reasons with causes.
In other words, the psychological determinist treats mental states, such as
wants and beliefs, as being causally connected to physiological processes
(143). And Kenny concludes that: "All psychological forms of determinism are
incoherent because they misconstrue that nature of the mental phenomena to
which they explicitly or tacitly appeal in their formulation" (145).
Kenny does consider the possibility of determinism as it pertains to the
neurophysiological states of the brain and the central nervous system.
Although he cannot find fault with this theory on grounds of internal
incoherence as with psychological determinism, Kenny rejects it on account of
its implications for our conceptions of human freedom." (Indeterminism or
randomness could not possibly amount to free will!) Contrary to what one
might expect, Kenny does allow that human freedom is possible, in spite of
physiological determinism (148). The reason he allows for this possibility is
that he does not see a reason to believe that physiological determinism
entails that a particular physiological event needs to be correlated with
particular psychological conditions in a regular and law-like manner. Kenny
argues that it is possible that a particular want may at different times be
correlated with different physiological processes. He concludes that
93 Kenny limits his understanding of determinism to the following general scheme:
'". .if determinism is true, it will be the case for any event E that there was an antecedent
event or state C such as there is a covering law to the effect that whenever a situation such
as C obtains there will follow an event such as E. Every event will fall under a description
such that there exists a law from which, in conjunction with a description of the antecedent
conditions, it can be deduced that an event of that description will occur" (1989:141).
94 Kenny (1989: 148) defines freedom as having the power to do otherwise: Freedom
undoubtedly involves the power to do otherwise. I do X freely only if I have the power not to
do X, and that means I have the opportunity not to do X, and the ability not to do X.
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conceding the existence of physiological determinism need not imply
predictability at a psychological level, which leaves the possibility of human
freedom intact.
Despite this conclusion Kenny declares himself to be agnostic on the
issue of determinism:
The issue of compatiblism [of determinism and free will]
is a strictly philosophical issue: it is a question about the logical
relationship between two sets of concepts. But on the
assumption that determinism can be coherently formulated, the
issue between the determinists and the indeterminists is not a
purely philosophical question. The question concerns the nature
of the system of laws governing the universe. If this question
can be answered it cannot be answered by the philosopher
alone. It is an issue on which the philosopher as such can and
should remain agnostic (150).
Ultimately, however, Kenny does reject the materialist idea that mental
states and structures are simply physical states and structures "described at a
certain level of abstraction" (151). He does not believe there to be a one-on-
one correlation between physical and psychological, or mental and physical,
states. He insists that "the physical object which is described by mentalistic
predicates is a human being, not a human brain."
If my brain were as deterministic as an electronic
computer, so that its entire output could be predicted from the
inputs it receives, that would not suffice for anyone be able to
predict the thoughts that I will have. For what gives meaning to
any kind of output of my brain - whether channelled through
action, speech, or writing - is something which is quite external
to it, just as what gives meaning to the output of the computer is
external to it (153).
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He also suggests that to see the mind as a purely physiological entity
implies that "contents" of the mind, like language, must have evolved through
a process of natural selection." In the end it does not strike one that Kenny
finds a science of mind a useful or even desirable enterprise. The main
reason seems to be the importance that he attaches to upholding the
distinction between the "mentalistic" and the physical. Undermine the
distinction, and the possibility of a science of mind seems all the more
plausible. If one does not see the need to ascribe a different status to states
of mind from that of possible neurological underpinnings, perhaps one can
postulate a coherent, materialistic theory of mind. Such a materialism need
not necessarily lead to an extreme form of determinism, or fatalism and leave
human beings without freedom of will. Equating the human being with the
human brain need not in any way detract anything from being human. A
materialist account of the mind might serve to demystify "mental" phenomena,
but such an event could only serve to enhance our understanding and
appreciation of the intricacies of the human mind - and that is precisely what
Freud sets out to do in his Project for a Scientific Psychology.
3. Freud's "new mind"
The Project for a Scientific Psychology (1950 [1895]) was one of
Freud's earliest works in which he, essentially, creates a model for the
neurological functioning of the brain. His aim was to establish psychology as a
natural science by representing "psychical processes as quantitatively
determinate sates of specifiable material particles" (1950 [1895]: 295).
Although this project was abandoned in frustration, hampered by a lack of
neurological information (Freud 1915c: 174-176) (neurology was then in its
infancy), the Preieete influence would be felt throughout Freud's
95 Although I do not discuss Kenny's view on language in detail, the kind of
arguments that he uses and assumptions that he makes, makes for very interesting
philosophical debate. See for example Cilliers (1989: 152-199) and (1998:37-47 and 123-126)
where he highlights some of the possible interactions between language and consciousness
and discusses post-structural language theories, which serves to undermine many of Kenny's
presuppositions.
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psychological works (Strachey 1986:290).96What concerns us here is not so
much the debate on whether or not Freud's speculations can indeed be
regarded as precursors to contemporary neurological theories, but rather the
revolution in thinking on psychological (mental) matters that Freud's work
personifies and doubtlessly instigated. Here we have a systematic model that
explains the "higher mental functions", like consciousness, as a result of
neuronal functioning. Even though Freud abandoned his attempt at modelling
the neuro-physiological characteristics if the mind, he never completely
abandoned the belief that psychology would one day be explained in terms of
physiological functions of the brain (ZangwiIl1998b: 277). Freud's analyses of
the conscious and the unconscious would also presage a radical departure
from conceptions of that most important of human traits as it has been
discussed up to this point: consciousness."
In the rationalist/empiricist debate, nothing is more central to the mind
than consciousness. All the activities of mind are accessible to itself, and by
means of introspection the mind is able to observe and speculate upon its
own attributes. This view was accepted as self-evident, a prima facie
necessity for the concept of mind. So much so that Sigmund Freud's
hypothesis that something like unconscious mental processes might exist was
rejected as a conceptual impossibility. Dennett (1998:162) suggests that
initially Freud was able to win converts to his theory, by allowing for the
possibility that unconscious mental processes could be described as
belonging to other "selves" within the psyche. In other words, the possibility of
splitting the subject into many subjects, one preserves the possibility that
every mental state is "sorneone's" conscious mental act. While Freud could
96See the editor's introduction to the Project for a Scientific Psychology (1950 [1895])
in the Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, pp. 283-293
for a brief discussion on both the similarities and differences between the Freudian and more
contemporary approaches to physiological explanation of mental processes. The editor also
voices his concern that latter-day theories may be over-hastily attributed to Freud's somewhat
obscure formulations.
97 Sternberg specifically links Freud's "revolutionary" ideas to the prominence of
thermodynamics in the physical sciences. Sternberg, like Prigogine, draws parallels between
the processmatie nature of thermodynamics and the emphasis placed by Freud on the
dynamic processes underlining the personality. This new psychodynamic approach would
place great emphasis on biological drives and processes, which rose to prominence thanks to
the work done by Darwin (1995: 597-598).
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claim that, given his clinical observations, he was able to override patient's
assertions about what was happening in their minds, he could also conclude
that sophisticated processes of reasoning were happening that where entirely
inaccessible to introspection on the part of the subject.
Dennett goes on to argue that the growing acceptance of the idea that
unconscious processes were in fact the non-conscious "information
processing" of organic machinery paved the way for the other extreme: calling
the very necessity and existence of consciousness into question.
Freud's concept of the unconscious as part of the structure of the mind
that operates outside of the awareness of the subject and can radically
influence conscious processes would completely alter our conception of the
mind. Since then, no examination of the mind could be complete without
taking the unconscious into account. The possibility of phenomena like
repression and resistance stemming from the unconscious, and having a
compelling influence no matter the will of the conscious subject, paved the
way for a dynamical theory mind, where mental forces can be in conflict with
one another (See Strachey 1986:19 and Sternberg 1995: 598). Freud would
famously obtain his subject matter by means of, among other things, self-
analysis and also through the interpretation of dreams.
4. The Project
Freud's intention with this work, as his title suggests, is to establish
psychology as a natural science. He aims to do this through representing
psychical processes as "quantitatively determinate states of specifiable
material particles, thus making those processes perspicuous and free from
contradiction" (1950 [1895]:295). Freud's point of departure for his
neurological model is based on two principles: i) the notion of quantity (Q)98
and ii) the nervous system consists of interconnected material particles called
98 Quantity is defined as "what distinguishes activity from the rest" (read: energy or
neuronal excitation) and is described as being subject to the general laws of motion (Freud
1950 [1895]: 296).
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"neurones." Freud envisions the nervous system to have the following
structure:
[T]he nervous system consists of distinct and similarly
constructed neurones, which have contact with one another
through the medium a of foreign substance, which terminate
upon one another as they do upon portions of foreign substance
[and] in which certain lines of conduction are laid down in so far
they [the neurones (sic.)] receive [excitations] through cell-
processes [dendrites] and [give them off] through an axis-
cylinder [axon](298).99
Freud conceives of "neuronal excitation" as quantity'?' (Q) in a state of
flow, and consequently the principle postulates the principle of neuronal
inertia: neurones tend to divest themselves of Q. This principle is then used to
explain the structure, functions and development of neurones (296). Neurones
are connected with one another through permeable contact-barriers, which
allows Quantity the ability to flow between neurones. Freud believes that
nature tends towards equilibrium; he calls this the principle of constancy. A
neurone "filled" with Q is in a state of tension and would, in accordance with
this natural tendency, "tend to divest [itself] of Q"(296).
Quantity (Q) is acquired through the sensory apparatus and discharged
by the neurones to the muscular mechanisms, in an attempt to keep
themselves free of the external stimulus and regain equilibrium, and hence
99Compare this account to a contemporary description of the basic structure
of the nervous system:
The nervous system is made of cells, like every animal
tissue. The essential cell is a nerve cell or neurone. The neurone is
considered to have three parts: the cell body, the dendrites and the
axon. The dendrites are thin prolongations of the cell body. Most sorts
have one prolongation far longer than the others; this is the axon, the
telegraph wire of the neurone, taking the message from one neurone
to another or else to the muscle or gland it supplies. The boundary of
the neurone is the membrane, having certain properties on which the
functioning of the nervous system depends ... (Nathan 1998:514).
100 Freud distinguishes between two "types" of Q:
Q = Quantity (in general, or in the order of magnitude in the external world),
hence where energy is received from the external world through the senses.
Qn = Quantity (of the intercellular order of magnitude); a kind of internal energy.
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not upset the principle of inertia (296). Crudely simplified, it is this quantity that
stimulates the nervous system, and the divestment of quantity through the
nervous system to the muscular system, which enables one to react to a state
of affairs in the external world. With this model Freud is able to explain
stimulus/ response and reflexive behaviour. Discharge of Q is seen as the
primary function of the nervous system.
There is, however, another source of energy, which also upsets the
principle of inertia and is not so easy to divest. Qn can be explained as a form
of endogenous enerqy.?' This energy has its origin in the cells of body itself,
especially in the basic needs of the body - hunger, respiration and sexuality
(297).102 Although Qn also obeys the principle of tending towards equilibrium,
it cannot be discharged without the body's needs being satisfied. If external
conditions are not conducive to meeting bodily needs, this energy cannot be
discharged and builds up in the nervous system. In unfavourable conditions,
the nervous system cannot meet the constancy principle by discharging Qn.
The nervous system is obliged to abandon its trend toward inertia, and must
accommodate this store of energy. A cathected neurone is one filled with Qn.
The trend does persist, however, in that it is "modified to keep Q as low as
possible and to guard against any increase of it," in other words, to keep
energy in the system constant (279). Accumulating and keeping constant Qn
is seen as the secondary function of the nervous system."?
The key to explaining how this flow and regulation of Q is possible lies
in the permeability of the contact barriers that exist between neurones. It must
be remembered that anyone neurone is connected to many other neurones
and there are therefore many possible routes that energy flowing through the
nervous system could take. Energy is more likely to pass through barriers that
101See footnote 100.
102See Freud's Instincts and their Vicissitudes (1915a: 117-140) where he elaborates
on this basic scheme and establishes instinctual stimuli as stimuli arising from the organism
itself, operating as constant forces.
103 In Section vii of the Interpretation of Dreams (1901) Freud elaborates on the
primary and secondary processes, especially linking their operation to that of the unpleasure
principle (later renamed the pleasure principle), wishing and repression (see 598-601).
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have lower resistance. Freud makes the fundamental observation that the
more energy passes through a barrier, the lower its resistance will become,
allowing pathways to form through the system of neurones. This forms the
basis for the formation of memory: such pathways, once formed, will tend to
remain constant in the system.'?'
Memory, in its turn, becomes the basic property of neurones and their
mterconnections.!" With the fixing of pathways in the neuronal system as a
result of the passage of quantity, Freud needs to be able to account for new
information being added to the system, without the system becoming
saturated. He does this by distinguishing between two types of neurones:
perceptual cells (~ neurones), and mnemic cells (\jl neurones). Perceptual
cells are permeable, in contact with the outside world and can transport
quantity without changing state, while mnemic cells are impermeable, in
contact with the body and only allow the passage of quantity with difficulty.
The latter neurones have the capacity of representing memory. Memory is
seen to be the result of "the facilitations existing between \jl neurones"(300).
Cilliers (1989: 112) emphasises the fact that Freud makes an important
realisation at this point, that is, if all contact barriers between all neurones
were to be equally well facilitated the neuronal structure would be completely
homogenous, making memory impossible. There would be no reason why
104 With this theory Freud has in actual fact proposed a way in which a mass of
undifferentiated neurones can acquire structure through self-organisation. The reader will
recall that the concept was discussed in Chapter 3, as a characteristic of an open, complex
system. Through self-organisation becomes possible to give a plausible explanation as to
how the mental apparatus can develop structure, without being pre-programmed, and by
taking environmental influences into account. Freud's basic explanation of how neuronal
pathways are established corresponds with contemporary theories, particularly Hebb's
famous use-principle. According to this principle the connection strength of a synapse
between two neurones should increase proportionally to how often it is used (Cilliers
1998:17). The stronger pathways' synapses become more effective and hence these
pathways are used more often, while unused pathways wither away (Young 1998:455). In this
way a mass of largely undifferentiated neurones can develop a structure that is based on the
information available to each neurone locally. In other words, the networks of neurones can
learn through experience.
These characteristics are essential to revised conception of the self as developing
and self-organising within a system of differences and will be returned to again when we
discuss both contemporary neurology and the self as an open system.
105 Freud defines memory as: "a capacity for being permanently altered by single
occurrences" (1950[1895]: 299).
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one neuronal pathway would be preferable to another. Freud takes the crucial
step of redefining memory as "represented by the differences in the
facilitations of \jl neurones" (1950 [1895]:300). As Cilliers puts it: "Memory
does not lie in the facilitated pathways themselves, but in the relationship
between them, and this relationship is one of differences" (1989:112).
Freud postulates memory as the basic component of the nervous
system and as prior to consciousness and cognition. The procedure of
forming memory traces is entirely unconscious, and with the following
statement Freud launches us into the realm of unconscious mental processes:
Hitherto, nothing whatever has been said of the fact that
every psychological theory, apart from what it achieves from the
point of view of natural science, must fulfil yet another major
requirement. It should explain to us what we are aware of, in the
most puzzling fashion, through our "consciousness" and, since
this consciousness knows nothing of what we have so far been
assuming - quantities and neurones - it should explain this lack
of knowledge to us as well.
We at once become clear about a postulate which has
been guiding us up to now. We have been treating psychical
processes as something that could dispense with this
awareness through consciousness, as something that exists
independently of such awareness. We are prepared to find that
some of our assumptions are not confirmed through
consciousness. If we do not let ourselves be confused on that
account, it follows, from the postulate of consciousness
providing neither complete nor trustworthy knowledge of the
neuronal processes, that these are in the first instance to be
regarded to their whole extent as unconscious and are to be
inferred like other natural things (Freud 1950 (1895): 307-308).
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5. Freud's differentiated neurons become conscious
Freud needs to make room for consciousness in his neuronal system.
He goes about this by first by claiming that we are not able to be conscious of
quantity (Q), but only of quality - sensations which are different in many ways,
and whose differences are distinguished according to their relation with the
external world, but are wholly independent of quantities (308). Qualities do not
originate in the external world, where there are "only masses in motion and
nothing else"(308). Nor do qualities originate in the ~, and \jf systems, which
perform processes that are without quality. Freud speculates that there must
be a third system of neurones - 0) neurones - whose states of excitation give
rise to various qualities, in other words, conscious sensations (309).
If we keep firmly to the fact that our consciousness
furnishes only qualities, whereas science recognizes only
quantities, a characteristic of the 0) neurones emerges, as
though by rule of three. For whereas science has set about the
task of tracing all the qualities of our sensations back to external
quantities, it is to be expected from the structure of the nervous
system that it consists of contrivances for transforming external
quantity into quality; and here the original trend to keep off
quantity seems to triumph once more (309).
Neither the primary, nor the secondary processes are under the control
of a conscious ego. Freud concludes that quality (conscious sensation) comes
about when quantity is as far as possible excluded. Although still cathected
with Qn and still striving towards discharge, the 0) neurones are moved by
minuscule quantities. However, Freud does not conclude that the 0) neurones
are therefore even more impermeable than the \jf neurones (given that
permeability depends on the effect of Qn. These "vehicles of consciousness"
(0) neurones) need to be completely permeable, and they have to be able to
return to their former state. In other words, these neurones require complete
facilitation and permeability if they are to accommodate the characteristics of
consciousness. Given that quantity is virtually absent in the 0) system, this
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permeability and facilitation must arise in a way other than the possessing of
Q.
Freud finds his way out of this difficulty by ascribing a temporal
characteristic to the flow of neuronal energy (over and above its spatial
arrangement) - ternporality'" (310). He refers to temporality as period. The
resistance of contact barriers now does not depend only on the transference
of Q, but also on the on the period of this neuronal motion, which is distributed
in all directions, without any hindrance. The fact that the ro neurones are
affected by period, rather than by Qn is then taken to be the fundamental
basis of consciousness.
As Cilliers (1989:116) points out, with this proposal Freud merely
manages to shift the question of what consciousness is to another level.
Consciousness is now a function of a specific system, instead of being
integrated with the rest of the nervous system. Freud himself seems
uncomfortable with this idea and proposes an alteration in a letter to his long-
time correspondent Fliess in 1896:
I now [in my new scheme] insert these ro neurones
between the ~ neurones and the \jl neurones, so that ~ transfers
its quality to co,and ro now transfers neither quality nor quantity
to \jl, but merely excites \jl - that is, indicates the pathways to be
taken by the free \jl energy (388).
Cilliers sees this move as vitally important in that it is the first step
towards dropping the ro system, and seeing consciousness not as the
property of a specific system, but as the result of interaction (Le. the
interaction between perception and memory) (116).107
106 Freud substantiates his inference on the grounds that the "mechanics of the
physicists have allowed this temporal characteristic to the other motions of mass in the
external world as well" (310).
107Cilliers (1989:116) contends that in Note on a "Mystic Writing Pad", Freud seems
to formulate a theory of consciousness, without recourse to Ol neurones, as we will discuss.
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Freud takes note of two other theories of consciousness: 1) the
mechanistic theory, which sees consciousness as a mere epi-phenomenon of
"physiologico-psychical processes" and 2) a subjectivism of sorts, where
consciousness is the subjective side of psychical events, and thus completely
reliant on specific physiological mental processes (311). Freud's theory falls
somewhere in the middle, where consciousness is partly subjective and partly
the result of external conditions (Freud 1950 [1895]: 311; Cilliers 1989: 117). If
consciousness is omitted, psychical events would be altered, specifically the
contribution from oo.10B
Having established the basic mechanism for generating
consciousness, Freud proceeds to explain a number of the "higher"
psychological functions. It will not serve the purpose of this chapter to
examine them all in detail, but the ones significant to our discussion will briefly
be examined.
Freud postulates that the accumulation of Qn will create an urgency in
lVto discharge this energy. The only way for the pressure to be relieved is to
affect an external change to get rid of the stimulus that causes the release of
Qn in the interior of the body. Initially (in infancy) the human organism is
incapable of bringing about the necessary action, and it has to take recourse
to external help, in the form of a caretaker. The child's internal state needs to
be communicated to the caretaker, which is accomplished "by discharge
along the path of internal change" (1950 [1895]:318). Freud believes that this
initial helplessness of human beings is the primal source of our moral
108 As far as the content of consciousness goes, Freud speculates that, besides the
sensory qualities that he has already attributed to consciousness, it also exhibits a series of
very different sensations: those of pleasure and unpleasure. Freud links the sensations of
pleasure and unpleasure to the increase (unpleasure) and discharge (pleasure) of Qn in w, as
influenced by the processes in lp:
The aptitude for perceiving sensory qualities which lie, so to
say, in the zone of indifference between pleasure and unpleasure
disappears with the [presence of the] feeling of pleasure and
unpleasure. This might be translated: the w neurones show an
optimum for the receiving the period of neuronal motion at a particular
[strength of] cathexis; when the cathexis is stronger, they produce
unpleasure, when it is weaker, pleasure - till, with a lack of cathexis,
their capacity for reception vanishes (Freud 1950 [1895]:312).
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rnotives.:" He does not elaborate on the relationship between the infant and
the caretaker, nor does he elaborate how this affects our subsequent moral
motives, but the meaning he attaches to this initial and inevitable encounter
seems to be that social interaction is a necessary precondition for the
development of consciousness.
Having had his needs met by the helpful external agent, the infant is
able to remove the endogenous stimuli and so experience satisfaction. Freud
declares that this process has a radical influence on the development of the
individual's functions."? The motor image generated in lV by sensory
excitation allows for reproductive remembering. Contact barriers are facilitated
between lVneurones when energy is discharged due to needs being met. Qn
passes more easily between facilitated neurones than between ones that are
not facilitated. These contact barriers ensure that consciousness would move
from a stimulated neurone to one remembered to previously have been at the
same time stimulated. When a certain urgency is experienced once again, the
relevant memories are triqqered."' As Cilliers (1989:118) points out a second
conclusion that can be drawn from Freud's proposed process is that the body
(and its needs) is a necessary precursor to consciousness. Bodily needs, or
endogenous stimuli, become one of the primary movers of the physical
systern.'"
The residues left by the experience of satisfaction or pain are what
Freud calls affects or wishful states, which, Freud suggests, leave behind
motives which are of a "compulsive kind" (1950[1895]:323). Wishful states are
encountered when a positive attraction is felt toward the mnemic image of a
wished-for object (primary wishful attraction), while an object which caused or
109 This should serve to refute the allegation of solipsism that is sometimes levelled at
Freudian theory.
110 See also section vii of The Interpretation of Dreams (1901).
111 Freud returns to this topic again in The Interpretation of Dreams (1901), Beyond
the Pleasure Principle (1920), and A Note on the "Mystic Writing-Pad" (1925).
112 In The Interpretation of Dreams Freud remarks on research done by Strumpell,
from which comes the conclusion that one falls asleep when alone's most important sensory
channels are closed. However, we cannot ward of the onslaught of stimuli completely and the
stimuli that are not of sufficient strength to wake us, are then likely to be instigators of dreams
(1901 :24).
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heralded pain will cause revulsion (primary defence) and the mnemic image is
abandoned as soon as possible (322).113
Freud then proceeds to link the mechanisms of both wishful attraction,
and repression to the existence of the ego. He argues that the existence of
both of these processes indicates that there exists an organisation in lV,which
can interfere with the passages of Qn. This organisation is called the ego. His
formal definition reads as follows:
Thus the ego is to be defined as the totality of the lIJ
cathexes, at a given time, in which a permanent component is
distinguished from a changing one. It is easy to see that the
facilitations between lIJ neurones are a part of the ego's
possessions, as representing possibilities, if the ego is altered,
for determining its extent in the next few moments
(1950[1895]:323).
The ego is responsible for the secondary processes in the mental
apparatus. The "endeavour" of the ego is to "give off its cathexes by method
of satisfaction" through means of inhibition, or influencing the repetition of
experiences.!" Where side-cathexis has taken place, in other words if a
neurone adjoining a cathected neurone is simultaneously cathected it acts to
modify the course of Qn, which would otherwise have been directed towards
an already facilitated contact-barrier. The ego, the existing cathexes in lIJ at a
given time, acts to inhibit the passage of Qn from a hostile mnemic image and
so suppress unpleasure. lIJ cannot distinguish between a wishful state and
reality and a further function of the ego is to distinguish between a perception
and memory. In his discussion on the properties of dreams Freud is careful to
113 Refer to Project for a Scientific Psychology (1950 [1895]:322) and The
Interpretation of Dreams (1901 :546) for a more comprehensive discussion on the
mechanisms that drive both wishful attraction and repression.
114Later on Freud would speculate that sleep can be explained by means of these
mechanisms (1950[1895]:336). After the satisfaction of demands bombarding the nervous
system from endogenous stimuli, the ego is unloaded and becomes temporarily superfluous
and the individual enters a state of inertia - sleep. Freud describes the will as "the discharge
of the total lV Qf!" (337). Sleep is characterised by an absence of will.
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emphasise that consciousness does not cling to the ego, but can be
associated with "any 4J process" (340).
In his Formulation on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning (1911)
Freud again takes up these themes, applying them to his clinical findings. His
discussion is not cast in neurological terms, however, and here primary and
secondary processes are discussed on a purely "psychological" level.
Nevertheless the influence of his fundamental neurological hypotheses is
unmistakable and his discussion here, as well as in The Interpretation of
Dreams (1901), serves to augment and develop many of the themes
conceived in the Project. He observes that neurosis alienates a patient from a
reality which the patient finds unbearable (1911:218). This alienation or
turning away from reality is accomplished by means of repression.
Freud seeks the origin of neuroses in the "unconscious mental
processes"- the primary processes which he describes here as "the residue
of a phase of development in which they were the only kind of mental
processes" (219). The governing principle behind these processes is the
pleasure-unpleasure principle (later abbreviated to the pleasure principle).
The psychical activity that draws us back from experiences that might cause
us unpleasure is called repression and the remnants of this principle explains
both dreams and our waking tendency to distance ourselves from
disagreeable irnpressions.!" In both the Project and On the Interpretation of
Dreams, Freud had developed his ideas on the wishful state, where
endogenous demands are originally met in a hallucinatory manner. On the
event of the disappointment that is encountered when internal needs are not
met by means of these wishful hallucinations, the psychical apparatus
develops a conception of what is really the case in the external world, rather
115 In Repression (1915b:147) Freud explains the essence of repression as: turning
something away, and keeping it at a distance from, the consciousness. What is primarily
repressed is not withheld from consciousness altogether, but makes its way into
consciousness if it has been sufficiently distorted and distanced from its original
representation.
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than forming a presentation that is merely agreeable. This mental function
which is introduced is the reality ptincipte?"
In the reality-detection game consciousness becomes a significant
role-player. The consciousness needs to develop a sense for sensory
qualities along with those of pleasure and unpleasure. Consciousness is
augmented with the function of attention for precisely this purpose. Attention,
on its part, depends on the existence of a faculty of memory. Consciousness
is then in a position to make impartial judgements on the truth or falsity of
given ideas, by comparing the idea to memory-traces of previously
encountered reality and deciding whether the given idea is in agreement with
reality or not. Motor discharge is now allotted with the function of action, in
other words with the task of altering reality.'" As we have already seen in our
discussion of the Project, thinking developed from the presentation of ideas,
and arose out of the need to allow the mental apparatus to tolerate the
increased strain put on it, while discharge is postponed.!"
6. In the realm of the unconscious
In the Project (1950 [1895]:374) Two Principles of Mental Functioning
(1911:221), The Unconscious (1915c:196-204) and The Interpretation of
Dreams (1901:7-21;48-65) Freud emphasises his conjecture that thinking was
originally an unconscious process and that it did not acquire qualities other
than the ability to compare the relation between impressions of objects until it
became connected with "verbal residues".
116 With the introduction of the reality principle one source of pleasure in our thought-
activity remained that still obeyed the pleasure principle and did not succumb to the reality
principle: fantasising (or phantasying, as Freud has it) and day-dreaming. The sexual instincts
also remain detached from this development and develops a unique relation to the pleasure
principle (cf. Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning 1911 :222).
117 Initially Freud attributed to motor discharge the function of relieving the neuronal
structure of accumulated stimuli through causing movement in the body to express the
"unpleasure" created (1911: 221).
118 Hallucination as a means of dealing with accumulating stimuli is no longer a viable
option for the mental apparatus, seeing as the body's needs are not satisfied through states
of wishful thinking.
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In the Interpretation of Dreams Freud adheres to the idea that a theory
of how memory behaves in dreams is of great importance for any theory of
rnernory.!" especially in the sense that it teaches us that nothing, once
"mentally possessed", can be entirely lost, but also insists that dreams do not
reproduce experiences (1901 :20): "Dreams yield no more than fragments of
reproductions; and this is so general a rule that theoretical conclusions may
be based on it" (21).120 He also comes to the conclusion that dreams are the
fulfilments of wishes (121) and that dreams often take the place of action
(124). The claim that all dreams are wish-fulfilment dreams, needs to be able
to account for the myriad dreams which do not seem to fulfil any wishes, but
in actual fact seem anxiety provoking and distressing. Freud accounts for this
nature of many dreams by means of an exposition on distortion in dreams,
distinguishing between the manifest and the latent content in dreams (135).
Accordingly, Freud argues that the manifest content in dreams is often the
result of repressed ideas.!" These undesirable or unacceptable ideas are
distorted in an attempt to disguise wish-fulfilment, to put up a defence against
a wish (141). Freud believes that censorship and dream-distortion are
similarly determined, which gives rise to the suggestion that two psychical
119 In A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams Freud places
emphasis on the benefit that the study of "normal prototypes" of pathological afflictions,
examples of such normal prototypes being sates of grief or being in love, dreaming, and sleep
(1917:222). He discusses the similarities and dissimilarities that can be detected when
comparing dreams with the pathological state of schizophrenia.
120 Freud's description of dream-thoughts has much in common with the post-
structuralist conception of the structure of language:
These usually emerge as a complex of thoughts and
memories of the most intricate possible structure, with all the attributes
of the trains of thought familiar to us in waking life. They are not
infrequently trains of thought starting out from more than one centre,
though having points of contact. Each train of thought is almost
invariably accompanied by its contradictory counterpart, linked with it
by antithetical association (1901 :312).
121Freud believes that similarities which one might experience between typical
dreams, fairy tales and other forms of creative writing are rife and not accidental, because the
"nature of man" has its origin in the impulses of the mind which are rooted in a childhood that
has, in a sense, become prehistoric (1901 :46). Elsewhere he explicitly states that symbolism
is not peculiar to dreams but "is characteristic of unconscious ideation ... and is to be found in
folklore, and in popular myths, legends and linguistic idioms, proverbial wisdom and current
jokes, to a more complete extent than in dreams (351).
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forces are at work in the dream process: one that constructs the wish and one
that censors this dream-wish (143-144). Freud speculates that the second
agency in this scenario most probably has the ability to determine what
becomes conscious and by modifying the material that "passes through" it to
consciousness. From this conjecture Freud reaches the conclusion that
something becoming conscious is a different act from an idea or
"presentation" being formed.!" Inevitably, in dreams with distressing content,
dream distortion has taken place in order to disguise something that is wished
for, but is unacceptable or undesirable in some way. This psychical
censorship is also evidenced by the fact that dreams are forgotten, in that the
forgetting serves the purpose of repression'" (1901:517). Here, as in the
Project, memories are in themselves unconscious and, although having the
capacity for becoming conscious, can be as influential while being in an
unconscious state (539). The extent of this influence is made explicit in the
following.paragraph:
What we describe as our 'character' is based on the
memory-traces of our impressions which have had the greatest
effect on us - those of our earliest youth - and are precisely the
ones which scarcely ever become conscious (540).
Freud believes that the analysis of dreams can illuminate an aspect of
the structure of the mental apparatus. In addition to the psychical agencies
thus far believed to be part of dream production - the constructor of the
dream wish (Ucs) and the censor of the wish (Pcs). Here the unconscious has
no way to access the conscious, except through the preconscious, which
inevitably subjects it to rnodifications.:" When we dream, a regression takes
place in the mental apparatus, in other words, excitation moves toward the
122 Here Freud describes consciousness as "a sense organ which perceives data that
arise elsewhere" (1901:144).
123 Freud is emphatic that dreams are not unique among mental processes and that
the retention of dreams in memory is comparable to that of other mental processes
(1901:521).
124 As we shall see, Freud adds slight alterations to this model of the mental
apparatus in Note upon the "Mystic Writing-Pad" (1925) and in Chapter VI of Beyond the
Pleasure Principle (1920).
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perceptual system instead of the motor end of the apparatus (or as Freud puts
it: "in a dream an idea is turned back into the sensory image from which it was
originally derived".125Regression can also occur in pathological waking states,
and particularly involves thoughts that are lined with memories that have been
suppressed or have remained completely unconscious (544).
In the Interpretation of Dreams Freud confirms the model of the mental
apparatus set out in the Project, and also concludes that nothing but a wish
can set the mental apparatus to work - whether it then leads to hallucinations,
dreams or motor action - seeing that the Ucs is exclusively aimed at wish-
fulfilment (567-568).126 He also concludes from his observations that the most
complicated thought processes are possible without being assisted by
consciousness (593). A train of thought that is "preconscious" might proceed
as such without attracting the attention of consciousness or might be
suppressed.
Here Freud once again returns to his distinction between the primary
and secondary mental processes and elaborates on the scheme (first
conceived in the Project) of how these processes affect our mental
functioning. The primary process (or the Unc) is present in the mental
apparatus from the beginning, while the secondary process (or the Pes)
125 The following scheme (1900:541) constructed by Freud can be useful to clarify his
conception of the structure of the mental apparatus:
126In the following section Freud explicitly defines a wish as "the accumulation of
excitation .. .felt as unpleasure and that.. .sets the apparatus in action with a view to repeating
the experience of satisfaction, which involved a diminution of excitation and was felt as
pleasure" (1901 :598).
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develops over the course of time and inhibits the primary process. Because of
this belated development of the secondary process, Freud believes that the
"core of our being", which would be the "unconscious wishful impulses",
exercises a compelling force over mental trends. Furthermore these wishful
impulses, which stem from infancy, can neither be destroyed nor inhibited, but
can be repressed. What the Interpretation of Dreams makes clear is that this
repressed material continues to exist and remains capable of psychical
functioning (608).
Freud is careful to caution his readers against assigning a
topographical locality to the mental apparatus. What he has in mind is a
dynamic process where a particular mental grouping receives a "cathexis of
energy" attached or withdrawn from it, and thus comes under the sway of an
agency (610). These systems are not physical entities and are described as
being virtual - existing between elements of the organic nervous system
"where resistances and facilitations provide the corresponding correlates"
(611).
Freud recognises the immense implication that his theories on the
unconscious would have on theories of rnind.!" Whereas, before the advent of
the unconscious, "psychical" was considered to be equivalent to "conscious",
complex psychical processes now become possible that do not rise to
consciousness and, in fact, the unconscious becomes the basis and the larger
sphere of mental life. As Freud insists: "It is essential to abandon the
overvaluation of the property of becoming conscious before it becomes
possible to form any correct view of the origin of what is mental" (612). In The
Ego and the Id (1923) Freud reiterates his claim in the strongest terms:
The division of the psychical into what is conscious and
what is unconscious is the fundamental principle of psycho-
analysis; and it alone makes it possible for psycho-analysis to
understand the pathological processes in metal life, which are
as common as they are important, and to find a place for them
127 See the Unconscious (Freud 1915c:166-171) where Freud defends his view that
the postulation of the unconscious is both necessary and legitimate.
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in science. To put it once more, in a different way: psycho-
analysis cannot situate the essence of the psychical in
consciousness, but is obliged to regard consciousness as a
quality of the psychical, which may be present in addition to
other qualities or may be absent (13).128
In actual fact Freud distinguishes between two kinds of unconscious:
the Ues (the content of which is inadmissible to consciousness) and the Pes
(the excitations of which, after undergoing censorship, can reach
consciousness). 129 The only role left for consciousness to play is that of "a
sense organ for the perception of psychical qualities" (615). The
consciousness (CS)130 is pictured as a system which is susceptible to
excitation by qualities but does not have any memory. The qualities that the
processes that enter Cs from the Pes have attached to them are those of
pleasure and unpleasure. Because of this qualitative aspect the Cs influences
the discharge of the cathexes, which might otherwise only be displaced on
grounds of quantities (Q). The Cs is also capable of creating a new series of
qualities, and of a process of regulation, presumably unique to humans:
thought-processes are associated with verbal memories, which draw the
attention of consciousness to themselves. This characteristic allows for a
mobility in the process of thinking.
128At this point Freud adds an admonishment to philosophers which concurs exactly
with the sentiments expounded on in this work:
To most people who would have been educated in philosophy
the idea of anything psychical which is not also conscious is so
inconceivable that it seems to them absurd and refutable by simple
logic. I believe this is only because they have not studied the relevant
phenomena of hypnosis and dreams, which - quite apart from
pathological manifestations - necessitate this view (1923:13).
129 Freud is careful to point out that there are two kinds of unconscious in a
"descriptive" sense, but that in a "dynamic" sense there is only one (see, for example,
1923:15).
130 Later the coherent organisation of mental processes, to which consciousness is
attached, will be named the ego. The ego would also be responsible for effecting censorship
and repression (1923:17). The Unc is later named the Id (23). The super-ego, which makes
up the third part of Freud's tripartite division of the mind results from two factors, one
biological and one historical. Shortly, the biological origin is that of one's lengthy state of
dependency and helplessness during infancy, and the historical being the gradual
suppression of the Oedipus complex under the influence and sanction of parents and society.
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Freud picks up this theme again in Unconscious (1915c). After
examining the evidence suggested by observing schizophrenic patients he
concludes that the difference between a conscious and an unconscious
presentation is not to do with locality in the brain, but is in fact that "conscious
presentation comprises the presentation of the thing plus the presentation of
the word belonging to it, while the unconscious presentation is the
presentation of the thing alone" (201). Freud explains the process of having a
word "added" to such a presentation as follows:
The system Ucs contains the thing-cathexes of the
objects, the first and true object cathexes; the system Pes
comes about by this thing-presentation being hypercathected
through being linked with the word-presentations corresponding
to it. It is these hypercathexes, we may suppose, that bring
about a higher psychical organisation and make it possible for
the primary process to be succeeded by the secondary process
which is dominant in the Pes (1915c: 202).131
Being linked with a word does not make a presentation conscious but
endows it with the capacity to become so. As Cilliers puts it, Freud presents
us with two preconditions for consciousness: language and the unconscious
(1989:127).132According to Freud pathological conditions are then the result of
the contents conscious and unconscious systems becoming confused or
"scrambled".133
As mentioned before, a major task of Cs is to orientate the individual
with regard to what is internal and what is external, what is "real" and what is
not. Thus Cs must have the capacity to do reality testing, which Freud
envisions as "having at its disposal a motor innervation which determines
whether the perception can be made to disappear or whether it proves
resistant" (1915c:233). As we have already seen, Cs needs a special faculty,
131Apresentation that is not put into words remains in a state of repression.
132 Freud himself does not elaborate on a theory of language or meaning to illustrate
or substantiate this claim.
133See Freud (1915c:201) for an extensive discussion of this phenomenon
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over and above that of detecting pleasure and unpleasure to carry out such
reality testing, namely attention. We have also seen that attention is
dependent on memory traces of previous experiences, according to which the
present sensation can be evaluated. Freud's theory of memory is best
illustrated in Note on the "Mystic Writing Pad" and the analogy that he
develops in this short piece is still compatible with current theories on the
development and functioning of rnernory.?'
7. A note on the "Mystic Writing-Pad"
Freud takes as his starting point the fact that all people - normal and
neurotic - have reason to distrust their memory, and can guarantee its
authenticity by some kind of supplement, such as a note (1925:227).135 Here
we have a permanent memory-trace and we are fairly certain of this
"materialised portion of [the] mnemic apparatus" remaining unaltered and
undistorted, which is not always the case with actual memory. While this
intransience surely appears to be an advantage when it comes to the
necessity to recall memories, Freud points out one distinct disadvantage of a
permanent record: the capacity for further recordings is rapidly depleted. Not
only that, the recorded memory might become obsolete, in which case its
indelibility is a distinct disadvantage, since it leads to clutter that will most
probably reach unmanageable proportions.
A procedure that will avoid both disadvantages and still provide a
material recording of a memory is to use a receptive surface, which can retain
its receptivity until one has no need of that particular recording. The ideal
would be to be able to remove the recording, without having to discard the
entire writing-surface, as when writing with chalk on a slate. The disadvantage
134 As stated earlier it is in Note on the "Mystic Writing-Pad" that Freud develops a
theory of mental functioning without, as Cilliers states it, recourse to w neurones (1989: 116).
Cilliers sees this move as vitally important in that it allows for a theory of consciousness as
the result of the interaction between memory and perception, rather than postulating
consciousness as the property of an ad hoc system (ibid.).
135See Dennett (1991 :101-138) for an interesting discussion on how the perspective
of the observer is inextricably linked with memories of relevant events, despite the inability of
the observer to guarantee the authenticity of these memories.
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of such a surface would be that it would be impossible to keep any permanent
traces, if one so wished. The slate would have to be wiped clean before any
fresh memories can be recorded. Freud concludes that unlimited receptive
capacity and the ability to retain permanent traces seem to be impossible in
the apparatus that we might use as substitutes to memory (ibid.). The central
point that Freud tries to make here is that the faculty of memory is capable of
precisely such a function. The memory is capable both of retaining permanent
(although alterable) memory traces and of discarding traces that have
become redundant. Such an ability is central to the way that memory
functions.
Freud finds an apt model for this ability of the mental apparatus in a
children's toy - the "MysticWriting-Pad". The toy is constructed as follows: the
bottom part of the pad consists of a wax-like substance, over this slab is laid a
piece of thin, transparent waxed paper, and thirdly a transparent piece of
celluloid covers the wax-paper. Both the celluloid and the wax paper are
secured to the pad along its top edge and can be lifted from the wax-like
substance. To make recording upon this writing-device make use of a pointed
stylus and writes on the sheet of celluloid. The stylus presses the surface of
the waxed paper onto the wax-like substance of the pad, grooves that are
visible as dark lines through the surface of the waxed paper (visible though
the celluloid). In order to remove the lines one need only lift the waxed paper
and celluloid layers from the wax, breaking the contact between the wax and
the layer covering it. The surface of the Mystic Pad is now clear and can
receive new recordings. The layer of celluloid acts as a protective sheath over
the thin waxed paper, which would be damaged by the stylus. The Mystic Pad
differs from paper and chalk in an important way: permanent traces of what
has been written are left on the surface of the wax slab and can be read in
certain lights (230).
Freud uses the Mystic Pad as an approximation of the structure of the
perceptual system of the mind (229).136 The celluloid layer is likened to the
136 In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) Freud contended that the perceptual
apparatus of the mind consists of two layers: an external protective shield to dampen the
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protective shield against stimuli that protects the Pcpt.-Cs. system (the waxed
paper) against strong excitations, and that forms no permanent traces. And of
course the perceptual system (the unconscious), like the wax pad, retains the
imprints or "traces" of preceding stimuli, even while being capable of receiving
fresh impressions. The problem posed by the two functions necessary for
receiving and retaining memory, without cluttering up the perceptual system,
is solved through dividing the functions between two separate, but interrelated
systems (230). A major difference between the perceptual system and the
Writing Pad is of course that with regard to the perceptual system, memory
can be reproduced (brought to consciousness).
On the strength of this analogy Freud returns to an idea that had
surfaced in both the Project and in Beyond the Pleasure Principle:
My theory was that cathectic innervations are sent out
and withdrawn in rapid periodic impulses from within into the
completely impervious system Pcpt-Cs So long as that system
is cathected in this manner, it receives perceptions (which are
accompanied by consciousness) and passes the excitations on
to the unconscious mnemic systems; but as soon as the
cathexis is withdrawn, consciousness is extinguished and the
function of the system comes to a standstill (231).
To Freud, the periodic break in contact between the wax pad and its
two covering layers when the layers are lifted from the pad and the writing
disappears, is analogous in the perceptual system to the withdrawal of the
cathexis from the unconscious when consciousness ceases to work and
becomes "extinguished". In earlier works Freud also hinted at this
discontinuous functioning of the Pcpt-Cs system is the origin of the concept of
time.!" Freud concludes his analogy as follows:
strength of the incoming stimuli, and the "surface" or system that receives the stimuli - the
Pcpt-Cs.
137 See, for example, the Unconscious (1915c:187-188).
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If we imagine one hand writing upon the surface of the
Mystic Writing-Pad while another periodically raises its covering-
sheet from the wax-slab, we shall have a concrete
representation of the way in which I try tried to picture the
functioning of the perceptual apparatus of our mind (232).
With the computer becoming commonplace in the second half of the
twentieth century, Freud has often been interpreted along cybernetic lines.
Cilliers (1989:134-136)138points out that this trend can in some measure be
attributed to the desire to link Freud to trends in cognitive science, ostensibly
a scientifically respectable successor to behaviourisrn.!" The neurological
theory of the Project can be described in terms of information theory,
cybernetics, feedback and control (134), and Freud is often represented in
these terms. Cilliers cautions against this practice and it is precisely here
where he sees the value of the Note on a "Mystic Writing-Pad", and Freud's
other metapsychological works.
Erdelyi (Cilliers1989:134) serves as an example of such an attempt to
render Freud's model of the mental apparatus in a way that would render it
more acceptable to cognitive science. As Cilliers points out, Erdelyi questions
Freud's use of the Mystic Writing-Pad as an apt metaphor for the way that
memory functions, and attributes Freud's choice of analogy to the fact that the
idea of the computer was not available to him. Erdelyi then suggests the
calculator as a more apt analogy than the writing-pad. The main advantage,
as he sees it, is that the calculator can reproduce its contents - something
that the writing-pad cannot do. Erdelyi sees this as an insurmountable
shortcoming in the analogy. Freud himself is not unaware of this shortcoming,
but would not necessarily have chosen the computer as metaphor, had the
idea of it been available to him.
138 Also see Dennett (1991:211).
139 This view is an apt illustration of contemporary disciplines as the inheritors of
many of the presuppositions of the Enlightenment theorists, as discussed in chapter 2.
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Cilliers points out a number of shortcomings in Erdelyi's analogy, which
take up some of the themes that have been central to this discussion hitherto.
The first shortcoming is that the metaphor of arithmetical relations between
numbers does not substitute for the metaphor of writing; it is simply not
complex enough. Secondly, the relationships between the memory buffers in
a computer are axiomatic, while the relationships between the contents of the
unconscious are non-rational and non-causal. The third shortcoming,
according to Cilliers and certainly one that would dismantle Feud's main
argument in the Mystic Writing-Pad, is that with the computer, the concept of
memory-traces is lost. Storage cells in the computer are isolated from one
another, and stored numbers can be recalled in their exact original form. This
analogy does not allow for the interaction between perception and memory
that Freud is at pains to illustrate. Freud wants a metaphor that illustrates that
memories are never completely lost, nor are they saved as complete icons in
some filing-system of the brain. Through the Mystic Pad he emphasises the
influence that traces of memories - the imprints on the wax slab - have on
subsequent memories. 140 Finally, the computer metaphor retains the idea of
some kind of external operator, a central and executive force that instigates
specific actions. This passivity does not reflect the dynamic nature of the
mental apparatus.!" In the end, Erdelyi's metaphor is even less successful
than the original, which it critiques. The computer metaphor pre-empts many
possibilities that may be attributed to the mental apparatus, simply by
identifying with specific formal processes (applicable to computers) too quickly
(Cilliers 1989:137).
Cilliers proceeds to draw some more links between Freud and
neuropsychology, as well as the relationship between the mental processes
and language (Cilliers 1989). These links lead us to assert the value of
Freud's work to contemporary theory. In fact, as we shall argue in the next
.
140 The necessity of his model mimicking the apparatus in that it remains an imprint of
what has passed over its surface, is precisely the reason that Freud rejects the chalk and
slate metaphor (1925:127-130).
141 See Dennett (1991:101-139) for his refutation of this kind of representation, which
he calls the idea of the Cartesian Theatre. Also see his reference to the misrepresentation of,
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chapter, between Freud and complexity theory we will be able to formulate an
extraordinarily viable model of the self. Such a theory might go a long way in
filling in some of the gaps left by the overwhelming emphasis placed on the
rational in Western theory for the last three-hundred-odd years. At the same
time we hope to avoid the threats posed by a reductionistic materialism.
8. Post-Freudian theory
Freud's initially materialist approach to the mind laid the foundation for
his dynamic and conflictual theories of the psyche. The mind could no longer
be thought of as consisting of all that is rational thought, open to introspection
and axiomatic.
Freud delegated what has traditionally been considered to be mind to
the realm of the ego. The ego is wholly conscious and is also and is
responsible for learning and adapting to the external world (physical or social
environment). While the ego is concerned with perception, memory, speech,
etc. it is not a self-contained entity. The mental apparatus also consists of the
id and the super-ego, both unconscious, but with a profound influence on the
ego. The super-ego as the instrument of conscience and suppression, and the
id, which operates according to the demands of the instincts and not those of
logic or external reality, make for a tumultuous mind. The mind/ego of theories
of mind up until this point has become a property of a much more intricate
system and process than had ever been conceived of before
(Zangwill1998b:278). After Freud, many presuppositions that had been taken
for granted in the rationalist/empiricist debate had to be re-evaluated, and an
lsolatlonist theory of mind became all the more implausible for it.
The dichotomy between mind and brain decreased in some circles, but
increased in others, especially due to the boom in the neurological sciences,
which on the whole steered clear of the issues of consciousness and the self.
Sperry (1998:164) asserts that as the apparent dichotomy between mind and
what he calls, Von Neumann machines (Le. computers) in the press, practically from their first
conception (1991 :214).
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brain became greater, the more successful the neurosciences became in
explaining brain activity in terms of its electrophysiology, chemistry and
anatomy. The idea that the subjective inner experiences of the subject, its
mental states, could influence brain function became more implausible than
ever. The 1960's saw extreme materialist positions, such as that of
Armstrong, where the mind is nothing but the brain, and less extreme versions
of materialism, where subjective (mental) phenomena could still have a causal
impact on activities of the brain.
Sperry adhered to the latter and summarises this theory in a paragraph
of such denseness and economy that it serves our purposes better to copy it
verbatim:
The neural infrastructure of any brain process mediating
conscious awareness is composed of elements within elements
and forces within forces, ranging from subnuclear and
subatomic particles at the lower levels upward through
molecular, cellular, and simple-to-complex neural systems. At
each level of the hierarchy, elements are bound and controlled
by the enveloping organizational properties of the larger
systems in which they are embedded. Holistic system properties
at each level of organization have their own causal regulatory
roles, interacting at their own level and also exerting downward
control over their components, as well as determining the
properties of the system in which they are embedded. It is
postulated that at higher levels in the brain these emergent
system properties include the phenomena of inner experience
as high-order emergents in the brain's hierarchy of
controls ... Interpreted as holistic high-level dynamic properties,
the mental phenomena are conceived to control their
biophysical, molecular, atomic, and other sub-elements in the
same way that the organism as a whole controls the course and
fate of its separate organs and cells, or just as the molecule as
an entity carries all its component atoms, electrons and other,
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subatomic and subouelear parts through a distinctive time-space
course in a chemical reaction (1998: 164-165).
This interactionist theory allows for interaction between
neurophysiology and mental events. These mental events are in part
determined by their neural components, but they are also determined by the
"spacing and timing" of these components. The space-time properties of the
neuronal infrastructure is added to causal accounts of the brain/mind's
activities. In discussions on interactionist models, much is made of the
conception of mental events as supeNening, rather than inteNening in the
physiological process. Mind directs neuronal events, without interacting with
the components of the brain, just as "an organism might move and govern the
space-time course of its atoms and tissues, without interacting with them
(165). Consciousness now has a causal role in brain function. This principle of
top-down emergent control, or emergent determinism, applies, according to
Sperry, to all hierarchic systems in all science (ibid.).
Here we are presented with a marriage between metaphysical and
material theories of mind - a third possible philosophical position, namely
mentalism. It will be our position that this is an uneasy marriage. Sperry
insists that mental factors142 retain the possibility of overriding the "subsidiary"
forces of the neural substructure of the brain (165). In a telling phrase he
declares that "the mind has been restored to the brain of experimental
science" (166). Sperry's approach is much closer to a theory of mind and self
that this study would endorse. What we will propose here as an amendment
to the approach of Sperry is dropping the idea of "mental events" altogether,
and to promulgate a moderate materialism.
142 Sperry (1998:165) gives as examples of mental events one's personal wishes,
feelings and willed choice.
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9. Dennett's materialism and the key to a demystified "mind"
In Consciousness Explained (1991) Dennett differentiates between
different phenomena, which make up what we call "consciousness", and
insists that all of these phenomena are the result of the physical activities of
the brain (16). He insists that the mind is the brain and that all instances of
"evidence" to the contrary are illusions created by the properties of these
processes. Dennett's materialism will underpin our effort to demystify the self,
and to present it as one of the said processes of consciousness. All that will
remain for us to do then will be to develop a theory of the self, based on the
principles of complexity theory.
Dennett situates the origin of the concept of self with a peculiarity
particular to conscious events: they are "witnessed" or experienced. An
experience has to be somebody's experience; someone must think it, or feel
it, or imagine it. And at first blush, brains do not seem to be anything akin to
what we would imagine such an experiencer to look like. Hence, the idea of a
self (or soul, or ego, or person) as distinct from a brain or a body. In contrast
to Kenny, though, Dennett does not put confusion over the self down to
grammatical error (29). He does, however, propose that a scientific study of
mental phenomena needs to be conducted in the third-person perspective.!"
The supposed impossibility of conducting studies on consciousness from a
third-person perspective is of course the main objection that theorists like
Nagel and Searle have against the possibility of a scientific study of
consclousness.!"
Dennett's method of heterophenomenology extracts texts from the
speaking subject and uses those texts to generate a theorist's fiction, the
"heterophenomonological" world of the given subject. This fiction is an
account of all that the subject sincerely believes to exist in his/her conscious
experience. Dennett insists that such a narrative is a portrayal of exactly what
143 See Dennett's discussion of his proposed method, namely heterophenomenology
(1991 :73-98).
144 Cf. 'What is it like to be a bat?" (Nagel 1982:391-403) and "Minds, Brains,
Programs" (Searle 1982:353-373).
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it is like to be that subject, and is an adequate basis from which to explore this
heterophenomenology:
The heterophenomenology exists just as
uncontroversially as novels and other fictions exist. People do
undoubtedly believe they have mental images, pains, perceptual
experiences and all the rest, and these facts - the facts about
what people believe, and report when they express their beliefs
- are phenomena any scientific theory of the mind must account
for. We organise our data regarding these phenomena into
theorist's fictions, "intentional objects" in
heterophenomenological worlds. Then the question of whether
items thus portrayed exist as real objects, events, and states in
the brain - or in the soul, for that matter - is an empirical matter
to investigate (1991:98).
It seems that Dennett has paved the way for an empirical theory of
mind.
Dennett would agree with both Nagel and Searle that a conscious mind
is an observer and that where there is a mind, there is a point of view (101).
The logical implications obvious to these theorists in this simple assumption
breaks down for Dennett, however, when he tries to pinpoint a point of
consciousness within a brain or an individual. Dennett insists (rightly in our
view) that the brain is "headquarters" of the perceived observer, and that there
is no other, deeper, headquarters in the brain, where consciousness is
seated. Dennett calls the view that some such central observer exists within
the brain as Cartesian metenetism.!" The Cartesian pineal gland would be a
candidate for such a "Cartesian Theatre" (107). Dennett's objection against
the Cartesian Theatre is concisely summed up in the following quote:
145 For absolute clarity on what Dennett means with this term we quote him verbatim:
Cartesian materialism is the view that there is a crucial finish
line or boundary somewhere in the brain, marking the place where the
order of arrival equals the order of "presentation" in experience
because what happens there is what you are conscious of (1991: 107).
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The Cartesian Theatre may be a comforting image
because it preserves the reality/appearance distinction at the
heart of human subjectivity, but as well as being scientifically
unmotivated, this is metaphysically dubious, because it creates
the bizarre category of the objectively subjective - the way
things actually, objectively seem to you even if they don't seem
that way to you! (Smullyan 1981, quoted in Dennett 1991:132).
A brain without a Cartesian Theatre significantly complicates the
concept of the point of view of the subject. The observer's subjective sense of
sequence must then be determined by something other than "order of arrival"
of experienced items to the locus of consciousness'" (ibid.). As already
discussed, Freud, by lighting upon the idea that a vast number of our "mental
states" or mental processes belong to the realm of the unconscious, threw the
proverbial cat among the pigeons in terms of established presuppositions of
what the mind is. As discussed in the previous section, not only are a vast
number of our mental processes not conscious, but it becomes possible for
the subject to deny the existence of mental states, which are unconscious, but
nevertheless active in his/her mental processes. Towards the end of the
twentieth century, and the beginning of the twenty-first, the existence of the
unconscious is not questioned, but how consciousness comes about is a
major point of contention'". Freud's theory did not dispose of the Cartesian
Theatre in Dennett's sense, for him, consciousness occurred when
presentations reached a certain part of the mental apparatus - the Cs.
Dennett proposes the Multiple Drafts version of how consciousness
comes about in the place of the concept of the Cartesian Theatre (101-170).
The Multiple Drafts model asserts that, in his words: "all varieties of
perception - indeed, all varieties of thought of mental activity - are
accomplished in the brain by parallel, multitrack processes of interpretation
146 See Dennett's discussions on the unfeasibility of theories of central or conscious
"observers" in the brain (1991:101-111 and 126-134).
147 Recall that Freud believed the possibility of consciousness to come about once a
mental presentation is put into words, or linked with language.
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and elaboration of sensory inputs" (111). Or, as he also has it, information
entering the nervous system is under continuous "editorial revision". 148In fact,
he argues that it is misleading to ask the question of when perceptions
become conscious. The information content gleaned from sensory inputs is
distributed throughout different systems of the brain. These, what he calls
"distributed content-discriminations" become something like a narrative
stream - a multiplicity subject to continual editing by many processes
distributed in the brain. "[Alt any point in time there are multiple "drafts" of
narrative fragments at various stages of editing in various places in the brain"
(113).149 There is no single, final narrative, which is delivered to
consciousness and can be considered to be the actual stream of
consciousness of the subject. In other words, there is no point in the brain
where it all comes together. As Dennett notes, some contentful (sic.) states
might die out completely, leaving no trace, while others do leave traces that
might later arise in some form or another, for example a verbal report, or an
emotional state (135).
Having done away with the Cartesian Theatre and expounding on the
merits of the Multiple Drafts model, Dennett is free to explore what
implications his model will have for our conceptions of mental functioning.
Many assumptions instituted in philosophy of mind now need to be re-
evaluated. One definite advantage of the Multiple Drafts model is that it lends
itself to a theory of the evolution of consciousness. Far from being a
metaphysical, non-bodily phenomenon, here we have a picture of
consciousness that developed with a species, presumably in accordance with
constraints and possibilities imposed by the environment and genetic
adaptations (171-226)150. Approaching consciousness from an evolutionary
148See Dennett 1991: 111-138 for discussions of different psychological experiments
that support such a conception of editorial revision.
149 See Dennett's discussion (1991:115-126) on whether these revisions are
"Stalinesque" or "Orwellian."
150 See Dawkins (1976:62-64) where he develops the idea that consciousness
evolved because having the capacity to simulate scenarios and experiment with possible
outcomes (Le. being conscious in the sense of factoring a model of oneself into perceptions of
the environment) gives an organism a competitive edge over organisms lacking this ability.
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perspective, also allows for the possibility that consciousness is not static, nor
is it necessarily optimal in its present state'".
Dennett presents the design of human conscious minds as the result of
three evolutionary processes (173). The need for self-preservation and control
through the ability to track and anticipate, gave rise to the nervous system in
successive guises. Systems proficient in information gathering, geared
towards information that is beneficial to the organism, develop. In other words,
these systems become part of the innate design of the nervous system.
These states are not necessarily conscious states.!" The development of
nervous systems that have an element of plasticity and therefore have the
ability to learn in the course of their lifetime provided other (other than genetic)
"mediums" for evolution of the nervous system to occur and hence speed up
the process hitherto driven by natural selection and genetic mutation (182).
Such a learning mechanism would operate along the same lines as "natural"
evolution, in other words, a process of evolution through selection.!" Dennett
refers to this process as post-natal design fixing (183) - hence, it could
roughly be characterised as a process of learning rather than development.:"
Plasticity allows the brain to reorganise itself in some ways, and so adapt to
its environment. A plastic, adaptable brain (the cortex) is the first "new"
medium in which the evolutionary process with regard to nervous systems can
be speeded up. In fact, Dennett attributes the radical transformation of human
society in the last 10,000 years (the development of agriculture, art, cooking,
etc.) to new ways our ancestors developed of harnessing mental capabilities.
He uses the metaphor of creating software, which could be run on the wired in
hardware of the homo sapiens brain (190).155
151As we shall see in the final chapter, the self also lends itself to evolutionary
approach, and we will attempt such an approach with the help of Richard Dawkins and his
theory of memes.
152See Dennett 1991 :171-193 for a more detailed discussion.
153 There are many and varied theories how such a process would work, but
constrained space does not allow a discussion of this interesting issue here.
154 This distinction is by no means clear, but for simplicity's sake we shall refer to
post-natal design fixing as "learning".
155The reader will remember that the computer-metaphor was discredited in an
earlier section of this chapter. Dennett's software-metaphor, however, will be exempt from the
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The second new type of evolution that Dennett discusses, is cultural
evolution, and the transmission of its products to others (193). This
evolutionary medium is the product of the plasticity of the brain, which makes
learning possible. Through cultural transmission we install developed
"programmes" of behaviour in developing (usually young) minds.!" Dennett
calls this process of relating information "software-sharing", which happens, of
course, through some or other form of language (194). Through honing the art
of software-sharing, culture develops into what Dennett calls "a repository and
transmission medium for innovations" (199).157And so, as with Freud, Dennett
progresses to the importance that culture has for the existence and
development of consciousness.:" One of the first steps in the process of self-
design that human engages in after birth, is to acquire language. One could
go so far as to say that, prior to language, the self, in any meaningful sense of
similar criticism, because of its usefulness for the present discussion. Dennett does allow for
the restrictions inherent in his metaphor, emphasising that the computer (or the "von
Neumann-machine", at least) consists of serial architecture while the brain is a parallel
processing machine (1991 :215-217 and 219-222). He elaborates on his metaphor as follows:
A computer has a basic fixed or hard-wired architecture, but
with huge amounts of plasticity thanks to memory, which can store
both programs (otherwise known as software) and data, the merely
transient patterns that are made to trace whatever it is that is to be
represented. Computers, like brains, are thus incompletely designed
at birth, with flexibility that can be used as a medium to create more
specifically disciplined architectures, special-purpose machines, each
with a striking individual way of taking in the environment's stimulation
(via the keyboard or other input devices) and eventually yielding
responses (via the CRT screen or other output devices) (1991 :211).
The plasticity within the computer makes "virtual machines" possible, thus different
patterns imposed on the hard-wired machine will lead it to perform different functions and
hence creates different possible virtual machines.
156 It is important to note that this type of "programming" is firmly rooted in the
material mechanisms of the brain, as is evidenced by the following statement by Colwyn
Trevarthen:
... there is increasing evidence that the self-organizing
processes of brain tissue formation continue to have a hand in even
the most specialized and culturally elaborated acquisitions of learning.
There are regions of the cerebral cortex in the foetus that appear to be
specially formed to engage in cultural life and acquire traditional skills
(1998:107).
157 Or, as Trevarthen has it: "Growing human brains require cultivation by intimate
communication with older human brains" (1998:108).
158 The final chapter will be devoted to the role that culture plays in the development
of the self, especially with reference to Dawkin's concept of memes.
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the word, does not exist'". The capacity for designing and developing a self
does, however, exists.
Dennett sums up his argument in the following paragraph, which will
also serve very well as bridge to the next chapter where discuss complexity
theory and its relevance to the process of developing a self:
Human consciousness is itself a huge complex of
memes160 (or more exactly, meme-effects in the brain) that can
best be understood as the operation of a "von Neumannesque"
virtual rnachine'", implemented in the parallel architecture of a
brain that was not designed for any such activities. The powers
of this virtual machine vastly enhance the underlying powers of
the organic hardware on which it runs, but at the same time
many of its most curious features and especially its limitations,
can be explained as byproducts of the kludges that make
possible this curious but effective re-use of an existing organ for
novel purposes (210) (cf. footnote 63 and 65).
This paragraph will guide the discussion of the final two chapters, at
the end of which its relevance to a complexity-theory approach to the same
questions will hopefully be clear. All that remains to be touched upon with
regard to the current discussion is the final conclusion that Dennett draws in
his discussion on the evolution of consciousness. He believes that
159 Dennett places much emphasis on the role that writing plays in structuring
consciousness:
... [N]ot just spoken language, but writing plays a major role, I
suspect, in the development and elaboration of the virtual machines
that most of us run most of the time in our brains ... the virtual
machine ... can only exist in the environment that has not just language
and social interaction, but writing and diagramming as well, simply
because the demands on memory and pattern recognition for its
implementation require the brain to "off-load" some of its memories
into buffers in the environment (1991 :220).
160 Memes are the cultural equivalent of genes. Dawkins's conception of memes will
be discussed in detail in the final chapter.
161 I.e. a computer with a fixed (hardware) structure that can run different kinds of
soft-ware, and as such can function as a series of different "machines" with divergent
capabilities.
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consciousness arose because the brain "[had] to become the object of its own
perceptual systems" (1991 :225). As we shall see in the following chapter, with
this assertion Dennett reinstates the qualitative, colourful and value-rich world
of inner experience, long excluded from the domain of science by the
behaviourist-materialist doctrine.
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Chapter Four
The Complex Self
Looking on the bright side, let us remind ourselves of what has
happened in the wake of earlier demystifications. We find no diminution of
wonder; on the contrary, we find deeper beauties and more dazzling
visions of the complexity of the universe than the protectors of mystery
ever conceived. The "magic" of earlier versions was, for the most part, a
cover-up for frank failures of imagination, a boring dodge enshrined in the
concept of a deus ex machina. Fiery gods driving golden chariots across
the skies are simpleminded comic-book fare compared to the ravishing
strangeness of contemporary cosmology, and the recursive intricacies of
the reproductive machinery of DNA make élan vital about as interesting as
Superman's dread kryptonite. When we understand consciousness -
when there is no more mystery - consciousness will be different, but there
will still be beauty, and more room than ever for awe
Dennett (1991 :25)
The importance placed on [the] relationship [of the brain to
language] should not lead to the conclusion that the brain is something
that operates on or with language like a kind of word processor. The
contents of the brain are not propositions, attitudes, beliefs, statements,
intentions, or whatever linguistic entities you wish. The brain is like
language, the structure and the functioning of language. "Language"
should also be seen in the general sense of a system of symbols that
enable communication, whether pictorial, hieroglyphic, graphic or auditory,
and not as any specific natural language. The detailed functioning of two
brains may be as different as the difference between Swedish and Swahili,
and as similar as the similarities.
Cilliers (1989:49)
1. Introduction
By way of recapitulation the following paragraph of Dennett's should
concisely sum up his conclusions on the evolution of consciousness as
discussed in the previous chapter:
In our brains there is a cobbled-together collection of
specialist brain circuits, which, thanks to a family of habits
inculcated partly by culture and partly by individual self-
exploration, conspire together to produce a more or less orderly,
more or less effective, more or less well-designed virtual
machine... By yoking these independently evolved specialist
organs together in common cause, and thereby giving their
union vastly enhanced powers, this virtual machine, this
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software of the brain, performs a sort of internal political miracle:
It creates a virtual captain of the crew, without elevating anyone
of them to long-term dictatorial power. Who's in charge? First
one coalition and then another, shifting in ways that are not
chaotic thanks to good meta-habits that tend to entrain
coherent, purposeful sequences rather than an interminable
helter-skelter power grab (1991:228)162.
In keeping with Dennett's materialist approach to the mind, and his
emphasis on how evolution, both cultural and genetic, contribute to the
structure and functioning of the brain, we move to Paul Cilliers's contention
that the brain can be considered to be a complex system. As with Dennett's
argument, this materialist approach will lead to the conclusion that the higher
functions of the brain are grounded in the physiology of the brain. More
specifically, that consciousness can be explained as an emergent property of
the brain. The basic tenets of complexity theory as discussed in chapter 3 can
readily be recognised in Cilliers's discussion of the physiology of the brain and
in his conclusion that the structure of the brain lends itself to be modelled as a
complex, distributed system (cf. Cilliers 1989:57-104). The brain is interesting
with regard to complexity theory, not only because of its complex structure,
but also because of its ability to deal with complexity - learning about and
performing complex tasks, for instance (1998:16). The brain is a complex
system functioning within a vastly complex environment. In fact, as we shall
see, differentiating between brain, as such, and its environment becomes all
the more difficult, the more we learn about the structure and the development
of the brain and brain-processes.
162Cf. Trevarthen (1998 :101-110) where he discusses the development of the brain
from the embryonic stage through to the mature brain. From his discussion it becomes clear
that the brain does have a certain "innate" structure that develops without the benefit of
experience (Le. in the womb). But, while the anatomy of the brain is remarkably complete at
birth (roughly a two-thirds-sized likeness of the adult structure), the brain is still far from
complete. Post-natally astronomical growth occurs where the nerve-cells form more (and
more effective) connections with other cells. This period of growth seems to largely rely on
stimuli, which are actively sought and taken up by the baby (103-104). See also Restak
(2001) where he discusses how brain growth continues over the entire life-time of the human
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Cilliers (1989:8-9) insists that theories of the workings of the brain
(whether it be on a neurological or a psychological level) cannot describe the
brain as a formal, closed, system. On the contrary, he would eventually
contend that, on an anatomical level, neuronal and subneuronal activities lend
themselves to be modelled as complex systems (1998:16-18). On a functional
level, the brain consists of a vast network of interconnected neurones. He
reiterates the importance of taking the available empirical information into
account, even when engaging in an ostensibly "philosophical" study of brain
and consciousness as follows:
An understanding of how the brain (and specifically the
cortex) goes about its task is more important than one would
think. To know how (and how accurately, if at all) the outside
world is represented in the cortex, how external impulses
interact with and cause certain behaviour, emotions, and the
notions of "will" and "self', how we acquire skills and habits,
what happens when the brain malfunctions, what memory could
be and how language works, we must have a better idea of how
the cortex actually works. The study of psychological
epiphenomena is certainly useful, but leaves a deeper layer of
relations covered. We know something about neurones and
something about psychology, and the gap in between is either
ignored (by behaviourists) or talked away (by linguistic dualists).
But in this very gap lies the enigma of consciousness and self-
consciousness (1989:72).163
The reader will recall that in the previous chapter Dennett made a
similar assertion and concentrated especially on the evolutionary aspect of
the cerebral cortex in order to explain the development of consciousness.
being. Crudely simplified, it seems that genes and stimuli interact and as a result cause rival,
possible adaptive alternatives to be realised, or not realised, whatever the case may be.
163Note how this assertion mirrors the sentiments of Freud, as discussed in the
previous paragraph. The belief that psychology can be grounded on neurological principles
(Zangwill 1998b:277) is what led Freud to write his Project on a Scientific Psychology. As has
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Cilliers does not study the origin or evolution of consciousness, but focuses
on the structure and functioning of the nervous system to explain the nature of
consciousness. The importance of his work to our discussion essentially lies
in taking it as an example of how a complexity theory-based model of the
physiological aspect of the brain can provide a plausible and useful account of
the "higher functions" of the brain, in this case consciousness. The aim is then
to use the same strategy to develop a similar model for the self.
2. Some of the complexities of brain structure in a nutshell
The central nervous systems of all organisms that possess one are
geared towards receiving and responding to information. The central nervous
system of vertebrates consists of the spinal cord and the brain (Nathan
1998:515) and possesses both inherited structure - genetically determined
ways of behaving (Dennett's hard-wired structure) - and the capability to
change some of this behaviour.!" As we shall see, environmental influences
playa decisive role in making changes to the inherent structure of the nervous
system.
The major divisions of the adult nervous system read as follows (from
top down): the cerebrum, the midbrain, the thalamus and hypothalamus, the
cerebellum and the spinal cord. The brain is divided into two hemispheres,
which are connected through the corpus callosum (Restak 2001 :2). The
development of the brain commences early on in the foetal stage, and one of
the last areas in the brain to develop is that of the cerebral hemispheres.
During the last two months of gestation and during the first few months of
infancy this development is at its peak (Trevarthen 1998:107; Restak 2001 :2-
34; 37-44). The most significant feature of the cerebrum is its thin outer layer,
the cerebral cortex, which makes up seven-tenths of the adult human nervous
system (Restak 2001 :5).
already been mentioned, Freud never relinquished the belief that psychology could become a
"science" comparable to the traditional physical sciences.
164 .The nervous system spontaneously becomes active early in utero (Nathan
1998:517):
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According to Trevarthen, this rapid development is due to neurones
branching out and forming connections that "integrate powerful cortical
integrating tissues with the rest of the brain to make conscious perception,
voluntary action, and intelligent learning possible" (1998:107). The youngest
cells that are situated towards the outside of the hemispheres will only reach
maturity towards adolescence. During the first few months of infancy
redundant axons are eliminated so that, in the mature brain, the cortex
consists of columnar territories (uniform in size), interconnections that link its
parts, and structures deeper within the brain. After four months the corpus
callosum gains in bulk, and fine-tunes communication between the two
hemispheres of the brain. In the mature brain information about perceptions,
memories and fine motor co-ordinations pass between the hemispheres
through the corpus callosum.
Trevarthen makes it very clear that the anatomy and function of the
cerebral cortices are variable and that patterns in mental abilities between
people are the result of their brains growing in different forms (109). As he so
vividly puts it: "Males tend to differ from females, left-handers from right-
handers and architects from psychologists" (ibid.). Some of the diversity of
human minds is genetically pre-programmed and is evidenced in brain-tissue
development, but, Trevarthen insists, the same processes will be influenced
by stimuli from the intrauterine and the external environments as well (ibid.)
The cerebral cortex is a late evolutionary development, and especially
well-developed in man. The cerebral hemispheres are concerned with the
activities usually categorised as mental: problem-solving, remembering,
planning, imagining, making judgements, forming opinions, etc. The cerebral
hemispheres are then also the regions of the brain that can differ overtly from
person to person (Nathan 1998:531). The temporal lobes in the cerebral
hemispheres are the main areas for memory, while the limbic system mainly
organises the essential drives, instigated by the emotions. The hypothalamus
has many functions, including: organising hormonal control, circadian
rhythms, food and drink intakes, excretion, organising sleep and wakefulness,
states of aggression or timidity. The rostral parts of the frontal lobes and their
connections to the thalamus, the hypothalamus, and the septal areas are the
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regions of the brain most concerned with social behaviour (ibid.), and the
maturation of these areas continues until puberty (Nathan 1998:531; Restak
2001:71-76). The frontal lobes play an important part in determining energy
and are concerned with mood, and inherited and acquired social behaviour.
The nervous system is essentially composed of nerve cells or
neurones.!" Neurones are single cells, and consist of a cell body,
the dendrites that convey impulses to the cell body and the axon
that relays impulses from the cell body.!" The axon with its
surrounding membrane is called the nerve fibre and the point
where it ends on another neurone is called the nerve end. The
nerve fibre connects to other neurones in the synapses. Neurones,
unlike other cells, cannot divide and reproduce, which means that
any neurones that are lost are irreplaceable. Receptors are
connected to the central nervous system and convert the energy
that they receive (from the senses, for example) into electric
current, which is then passed on to the neurones.:"
With regard to our discussion on consciousness it is interesting to note
that not all information recorded by the receptors is passed onto the higher
levels of the central nervous system; processing of the data already begins at
the sense organ (cf. Nathan 1998:515). In a similar vein, all the information
reported by receptors does not necessarily reach consciousness (ibid.).
The nerve fibres that connect neurones pass nerve impulses between
neurones. Each neurone can be likened to a "processor" (analogous to the
light-bulbs in the Boolean network discussed in Chapter 2) that calculates the
sum of its inputs, and then, if this sum succeeds a certain threshold,
generates an output (1989:61). As with the light-bulb example, the output of
165 The standard estimation of the number of neurones that comprise the human brain
is usually around 1012 (Gaze and Taylor 1998:543).
166
167 Receptors are classified as exteroreceptors that report events in the outside world,
and interoceptors, that report the internal states of the body. Again current theory was
foreshadowed by Freud's model of the nervous system (cf. pp. 101-105).
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this particular neurone in its turn becomes the input of all the neurones that
are connected to it. Not only can neurones be connected to a vast number of
other neurones at the same time (whether directly or indirectly), they can also
be connected to themselves, usually with other neurones as intermediaries.
The connections between neurones are mediated by synapses (a
minute gap between the nerve endings of one neuron and the cell body of the
next), which regulate the strength of incoming signals and can determine
whether the signal would excite or inhibit the neurone. This arrangement
allows for flexibility and is one of the keys behind the plasticity of the brain
(Restak 2001:9-10). A chemical substance, called a neurotransmitter, is put
out into the synaptic gap when an impulse reaches the end of a nerve fibre,
and allows the impulse to pass the gap (if this sum exceeds a certain
threshold) (Nathan 1998:518).168The connection between any two neurones
has a certain "weight" which determines the strength of the influence of these
neurons on one another (Cilliers 1998:16). The characteristics of the neuronal
network seem to be determined by the values of these weights.
In Chapter 2 much emphasis was placed on the ability of complex,
"living" systems to be able to self-organise. The brain is no exception. In order
to be able to give an adequate explanation of the workings of the brain,
without the help of some kind of external or internal controller that supervises
or programmes actions, the firing of the neurones and the value of the weights
between them need to be self-organising somehow. The organism needs to
be able to learn from experience and this acquired information has to be
incorporated into, and has to influence the workings of the brain.
To be able to learn, we need physical records in the brain - changes
need to be brought about in the structure of the brain.!" The problem of
memory is finding the mechanism that establishes this change. Young's
168This is inevitably a vastly simplified description. See Nathan 1998:514-534 for a
concise account of how the nervous system functions, in terms of its neuronal composition.
169 To quote Cilliers in this regard:
The way in which the brain carries and uses the traces of our personal
and cultural histories, integrates it with new experiences and maintains a balance
between the self and the not-self, the other, is not merely a way of coping with a
conscious world, it is the very basis of consciousness (1989).
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(1998:455) physiological account of the mechanisms of memory begins with
hereditary genetic dispositions. The initial basis of memory in the nervous
system is provided by "genetic memory", which establishes the neuronal
pathways of the foetus during gestation. After birth this original multiplicity of
possible actions is then "fine-tuned" through interactions with the environment,
and redundant neuronal pathways are pruned away, while others are
strengthened."? In accordance with Dennett's stipulation as discussed in the
previous chapter - that we should do away with the Cartesian idea of a
central executive agent within the nervous system - the workings of the
system of neurones must account for the formation and strengthening of
some pathways and not others. Cilliers discusses Donald Hebb's famous use-
principle in this regard (17). According to Hebb's principle the connection
strength of a synapse between two neurones should increase proportionally to
how often it is used (ibid.).171 The stronger pathways' synapses become more
effective and are used more often, while unused pathways wither away
(Young 1998:455). In this way the mass of largely undifferentiated neurones
can develop a structure that is based on the information available to each
neurone locally. In other words, the networks of neurones learn from inputs
available to them and accordingly develop a (genetically constrained)
structure.
Trevarthen (1998:102) places much emphasis on the interaction
between genetic predisposition and environmental stimuli in the development
of the brain, including the development of the "higher psychological
processes," and declares that after contemporary research done on this
subject, the way in which we think about consciousness and human
understanding can never be the same (Le. Cartesian). Although, the brain
lays the foundations of even these processes before birth, Trevarthen insists
170 As discussed in the preceding chapter, Freud had already developed this basic
scheme in his Project for a Scientific Psychology. He would later on develop this basic
mechanism of the brain to such an extent that internal and external stimuli and the primary
caretaker become central to the process of the infant's development of consciousness. Not
only does Freud foreshadow contemporary neurology, his work provides the first step in
linking consciousness (and the self) to the body: the unconscious.
171 To paraphrase Young: The majority of neuroscientists seem to believe that
memory depends on synaptic change (Young 1998:455).
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that viewing the brain as pre-wired, with the possibility of affecting changes to
the pre-wired system after birth through conditioninq.!" is no longer feasible.
Such theories, in his opinion, do not take the actual development of the brain
into account:" Evidence suggests that that interacting nerve cells make up
and co-ordinate basic rules of perception, prior to birth, in other words without
the benefit of experience. As has already been mentioned development in the
brain continues after birth, through infancy and into puberty and through into
adulthood. This development is dependent on both genes and stimuli:
After birth, stimuli are sought and actively taken up by a
baby, not just submitted to. Those stimuli which are assimilated
cause selections to be made from among rival adaptive
alternatives within general adaptive rules for brain formation.
These ground rules, including rules for recognizing other
persons and for detecting their emotions from their expressions,
are innate in the sense that they are formulated in earlier stages
when stimuli had no effect. The learning involved takes place as
part of a most elaborate developmental strategy that must be
ascribed to a continuous regulated unfolding of nerve-cell
interactions from the embryo to adult (104).
When the nervous system is formed, nerve-cells form into patterned
aggregates and make up patterned circuits. These then communicate
biochemically. Once the network of nerve-connections is formed,
communication can also take place through the conduction of nerve impulses.
These impulses can cause adjustments to be made in the biochemistry of the
nerve-cells (cf. Trevarthen 1998:104). A sort of editing process of connections
takes place and many connections formed in the embryonic period are
removed (Trevarthen 1998:106; Restak 2001:11-19).174After birth a whole
new array of stimuli become available to be experienced, and cause more
172 This is of course Pavlov's famous theory of conditioning.
173 Cf. Trevarthen (1998:102) for a lengthy exposition on this claim.
174 The process of selecting desirable connections and eliminating redundant ones is
also called pruning (Restak 2001 :18).
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changes in the cellular structure of the cortex than occurs at any other time.
Psychological representations and cognitive programmes are elaborated on.
Trevarthen notes that the mechanisms responsible for brain growth that
operate before birth and in infancy, are continuous with the mechanism for
learning from experience throughout life (107).175 After birth, brain
development depends on how stimuli from the outside world interact with the
inner states of the brain. In Trevarthen's apt phrasing: "Growing human brains
require cultivation by intimate communicationwith older human brains" (108).
The system of neurones, despite a very limited repertoire of possible
interactions, is capable of performing extremely complex tasks (Nathan
1998:518). This echoes our stipulation in chapter 1 that a complex system
consists of many components (nodes, neurones, etc.) that interact in such a
manner as to produce emergent properties (behaviour) that cannot be
reduced to the sum of the parts of the system.!" Or to quote Cilliers:
"Complex behaviour emerges from the interaction between many simple
processors that respond in a non-linear fashion to local information"
(1998:18). This is of course a very crude simplification of the extremely
complex structure and functioning of the brain. As Cilliers (1989:63) notes, not
only do the vast amounts of components involved, and the immensely
complex physical structure of neurones complicate modelling the functioning
of the brain, but we don't fully understand the way in which neurones work.
It seems that a paradox of the brain, is that it is a structurally highly
organised, but functionally highly dispersed - in fact, when it comes to the
functioning of the brain structure and function cannot be separated (Cilliers
1989:69; Luria 1998:489-490). Cilliers is careful to emphasise that we cannot
attribute sole responsibility for certain functions to certain areas of the brain.
This is because information is integrated and dispersed throughout the brain.
He does not deny that certain areas can be identified with certain primary
175 It seems that the prefrontal lobes do not reach full maturity until a person's 20's
(some speculate that maturity is reached even later) (Restak 2001 :76).
176 This calls to mind Holland's analogy of an ant colony that performs complex tasks
that individual ants would not be able to on their own (cf. chapter 1).
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specialisations, but he does deny that the brain is rigidly, functionally
structu red: 177
Lesions of the primary projection areas will of course
affect the related functions, not because these areas control the
functions, but rather because the relevant information is
prevented from entering and leaving the system. The primary
areas are not the place where things happen but rather, the
distribution points from where information is disseminated
throughout the brain (1989:69).
Cilliers substantiates this view through highlighting findings by
Mountcastle in the 1960's (1989:70-76): cells in the cortex are organised into
groups of cells that are heavily interconnected vertically and sparsely
interconnected horizontally. Structurally such a mini-column consists of target
neurones that receive impulses from the subcortical regions, target neurones
that receive impulses from other areas in the cortex, local circuit neurones
that integrate inputs, and output neurones that connect different columns and
project impulses back to subcortical regions (73). Groups of columns work
together to form a module. It is important to stipulate that modules do not work
in isolation. Modules work together in large systems, with projections that form
massive loops to the subcortical areas and back (73). Mountcastle found that
the basic structure of these columns are repeated throughout the cortex, and
he concludes that the brain functions as a distributed system, where
information can follow many different routes, and where information can be
cycled in loops. The dominance of one path or another in the flow of
information becomes a dynamic property of the system and changes as
properties of the system change. As a result, Mountcastle finds that
distributed systems display redundant possible loci of command, and that the
177 This study does not allow space for discussing some of the interesting
experiments with regard to the specialisation of areas in the brain. The case of "split-brain"
subjects is particularly interesting in the context of this study. Cf. (Trevarthen 1998b:7 40-7 46)
for a concise discussion and recommended further reading.
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command function changes between different loci within the system. 178 This
characteristic allows for the adaptive capacity displayed by the neuronal
apparatus, for example the possibility to regain and improve competence in
function after brain lesions (74).
Cilliers (1989:74-75) briefly discusses the similarities between
Mountcastle's contentions and Pribram's holographic model of the brain
(rnindj.!" Because, in a hologram, there is no one-ta-one correspondence
between spatial orientation of a piece of information on the original,
information is distributed all over the hologram. Each part of the hologram
contains information about the whole of the original object. The implication of
this is twofold: on the one hand a small segment of a hologram can be used to
recreate the original image (with the loss of detail and definition accordingly).
Secondly, when a piece of the hologram is damaged, there will not be a
corresponding hole in the image that it creates. Damage to the hologram
would cause the clarity of the image to deteriorate proportionately to the
damage (1989:75). The implication of the holographic theory of the brain with
regard to memory is that "the brain does not store information in terms of
simple space-time or causal relations" (95). Memory, here, is the result of
178 Cf. (Cilliers 1989:74-76) where he briefly discusses similarities between
Mountcastle's contentions and Karl Pribram's Holographic descriptions of the brain.
179 Cilliers gives the following, simplified, explanation of how holograms work:
If an object is illuminated by a coherent light (like a laser beam), and the
reflection is passed through a lens system, an image can be recorded (at the
appropriate place) that bears no resemblance to the original object. As a matter
of fact, it looks merely like a collection of finely curved lines and ripples, called
"interference fringes." This is what is called a hologram. A replica of the original
object can be recreated - in three dimensional space - by illuminating the
hologram with a light beam resembling that with which it was created in the first
place. The hologram is a transformation of the visual characteristics of the object
that can be reversed, that is, an image of the original can be regained by
transforming the transformation. The hologram contains all the optic information
present in the object, but transformed into another mathematical dimension by
means of the lenses. Because the transformation can be described fully in purely
mathematical terms, lenses are not a prerequisite any more. The original
information can be transformed into a hologram by calculation only. The massive
amount of information to be processed necessitates the use of computers and
results in what is known as computer generated holograms. This is mentioned
here for the following reasons: Because the process can be done by means of a
mathematical transformation only, the original information need not be visual
information, but can be sound, or pressure or heat, or any kind of information
that can be presented in the correct format to the mathematical transformer, and
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external patterns being transformed into wave-patterns or ("coded"
information), and the interaction of these wave-patterns resulting in
interference patterns.
All of this leads Cilliers to discredit the idea of strict localisation of brain
functions. A holographic theory on the other hand, would be:
... capable of explaining facts about the brain that
otherwise seem baffling. For example, how is it possible that
large parts of the brain can be destroyed, yet it does not seem
to affect the performance concerning specific instances
seriously. Lesions of the visual cortex for example, may impair
certain visual functions, like creating blind spots, but will not
make any specific object unrecognisable. This can be explained
if information and images are stored and processed in the brain,
not by means of pictures, or by some direct representation with
a one-to-one correspondence, but by a holographic-like
transformation that would involve the whole brain.
Cilliers is careful to emphasise that in lieu of rigid structure, he does not
imagine the brain to be an amorphous structure. He insists that the brain has
an architecture and that structure plays an important role in its functioning. His
point, however, is that given structures in the brain do not work on given
problems in isolation, and that in all probability there is a contingency, rather
than a necessity to some of this structure (88_89).180
although the result will not be a hologram in the strict sense, it will have the
properties of a hologram (1989:74).
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3. Where to from here?
Taking the preceding facts into account, it seems that Cilliers has a
strong case for viewing the brain as a distributed systern.!" In highly
distributed systems, information is dispersed over the whole of the system, as
information is highly dispersed throughout the structure of the brain (76). This,
coupled with the argument discussed earlier that neuronal functioning is
determined by the self-organising relationships between the components
(neurones and their interconnections) in a structure (the nervous system,
influenced by both genetic predispositions and by stimuli), serves as a
departure point for Cilliers's theory of the brain as a distributed, open (Le.
complex) system. 182 Such a distributed system's complex functioning provides
the physiological underpinning for certain emergent properties that are not
reducible to the components of the system as such, but results from the
interactions between the components of the system. In such a scenario it
becomes possible to propose a theory of the higher functions of the brain,
without having to incorporate fantastical entities or metaphysical assumptions
or having to be crudely reductionistic and try to localise these functions in
some specific area of the brain.!" Cilliers's attempt to give a materialistic
account of the higher functions of the brain leads him to conclude that:
"Consciousness is an emergent property of the brain" (Cilliers: private
comrnunicationj.!"
180 Cf. complimentary findings made in studies on both "split-brain" and "normal"
subjects (Trevarthen 1998b:740-746).
181 Also see Cilliers 1998:70-76.
182 The brain shares many of its structural characteristics with the post-structural take
on the structure of language, especially that that stems from Saussure's linguistic models and
their extension by the likes of Jacques Derrida. Seeing that both language and the brain can
be described as open systems of differences, in other words, systems that consist of
components that have no individual identity and derive function or meaning from their
relationships with the other components of the system, Cilliers believes that models of
language can inform models of the brain (1989:9; 86-98; 152-171; 189-191 ).See Freud and
the Scene of Writing (Derrida 1978: 196), where Derrida uses a post structural description of
language to interpret Freud's model of the mental apparatus (see also Cilliers 1989:172-177;
1998:37-47).
183 Cf. Gregory (1998b:217-218) for an short, but edifying discussion of the role
played by emergence and reduction in explanations.
184 Roger Sperry, famous for his experimental studies on how brain circuits are
formed, and his research on "split-brain" patients came to a similar conclusion. His research
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If one adheres to this conclusion, it is a very small step to take to
conclude that what we call "self', in its turn, is an emergent property of a
complex system. All that remains to be done is to consider what this system
might be, and to convincingly argue the case that self, as such, does indeed
lend itself to a similar, materialistic, description.
In a sense the step has already been taken in the previous chapter with
Dennett's materialistic theory of the self. What remains to be done in this
chapter is to present an argument establishing the self as the emergent
property of a complex system, and indicating why and how such a theory of
self would differ from that of Dennett. The final chapter will then be devoted to
bringing to light possible implications our new, revised theory of self might
have.
4. Dennett's material self
Dennett's recognises that his theory of consciousness holds important
implications for the self, which leads him to consider a revised (with respect to
the Cartesian position, especially) theory of self:
Without the Cartesian Theatre or Central Headquarters there is no
single, definitive stream of consciousness. Instead, Dennett envisions multiple
channels within the "virtual machine" in the brain, which create various
narrative drafts that mayor may not play functional roles in the activities of the
brain (254). It seems to him to be a remarkable fact of nature that each
member of the primate Homo sapiens constructs a self (416). Dennett refers
to the self as a web of words and deeds and likens the inclination to construct
a self on the part of human beings to the inclinations of spiders to spin webs
or bowerbirds to construct elaborate bowers - a self is crucial to our success
as human beings (416). Dennett also uses the image of the beaver
constructing a protective fortress through actively gathering the necessarily
convinced him that most cerebral functions are genetically determined by a kind of chemical
or physiochemical encoding of neuronal pathways and connections. Sperry's research took a
philosophical turn and he proposed a "monist theory of mind in which consciousness is
conceived as an emergent, self-regulatory property of neural networks, which enables them to
achieve certain built-in goals" (Trevarthen 1998:114-117).
149
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
material and sharing the labour among individuals of the species. In like
manner, humans appropriate all manner of "found-objects," with which,
among other things, to construct their own protective web of self. Dennett
insists that the self is as much a biological product as any of the other
constructions belonging to animals (ibid.). Human beings are constantly
engaged in presenting themselves to other human beings and to themselves,
through the ubiquitous medium of language. We tell stories of who we are,
where we come from and where we are going - the result is what Dennett
calls this our "narrative selfhood" (418).
Dennett's conception of self is above all an abstraction (368), an effect
rather than an internal boss, built up out of a myriad of attributions and
interpretations composed into a narrative. Dennett calls such a narrative the
"centre of gravity" of the agent. The active body is then in a position to include
a mental model of itself in its representation of its environment, which is
essential for long-term planning. By having a model of itself the body can also
keep track of its internal states, decisions, tendencies, etc. (427-428).
Dennett is very taken with Dawkins's theory of memes 185 and presents
these narrative selfhoods as being spun by selfish memes in a quest for
evolutionary advantage, and ultimately: survival. Such a stance leads him to
declare: "Our tales are spun, but for the most part we don't spin them; they
spin us" (418). Although Dennett's fundamental sentiment in making such an
assertion may be correct, he runs the risk of representing memes as if they
were executive agents with a teleological agenda and the ability to implement
such an agenda. Presenting some kind of hominuculi that act as miniature
agents within the mind is exactly what we are trying to avoid with this study. It
is to this extent that complexity theory could prove a useful tool to develop a
theory of self that is complimentary with that of Dennett, but hopefully avoids
delegating "agency" to any part of the system that makes up the self. The
argument would be that within a system of differences, order and structure
would develop that give rise to the self, purely as a result of the characteristics
185 Memes will be discussed in greater detail in the final chapter. Briefly, memes are
the cultural equivalent of genes in biology and follow the same basic evolutionary principles.
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and capacities of the system. At no point will it be necessary to introduce
either a further entity with an agenda of its own, or some kind of centre of
executive control that runs the operations of the brain in a top-down manner.
What remains to be done in the present chapter is to explore some of the
advantages to be had from modelling the self on the principles of complexity
theory.
5. The self as a complex system
So far in this chapter we have explored a theory that roots one of the
functions of the brain that is usually ascribed to mind, in the material aspects
of brain structure and operation. The conclusion was that consciousness is an
emergent property of the physiological workings of the brain as a complex,
distributed system. We also explored the implication of Dennett's attempt at
undermining mind-body dualism. Dennett's conclusions on consciousness, i.e.
as the effect of multiple narrative drafts within the "virtual machine" of the
brain, leads him to consider the implications that such a revised theory of
consciousness would have on conceptions of self. The self ceases to be a
fixed, coherent entity - the sentient headquarters that initiates and supervises
brain processes. The self becomes an abstraction, a narrative construct that a
human being creates in order to orientate him- or herself in the world.
Essentially Dennett's conception of self is very convincing. But, by combining
his material self with Cilliers's complex model of consciousness, a more
plausible and less problematic theory of self seems possible. It could prove to
be an especially useful way to comprehensively incorporate the environment
into our conceptions of the construction and maintenance of self.
The proposed conception of the self as a material construct certainly
coincides with all of the criteria necessary to be considered a complex,
distributed system. In chapter 1 complex systems where discussed in some
detail, and the following characteristics where identified as typical of complex
systems:
Complex systems are open systems that are made up of many
different components that are constituted by their interaction with one another
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and with their environment. Such a system possesses emergent properties -
in other words, the individual parts of the system do not aggregate into the
whole system. The characteristics of the system are the result of the non-
linear interactions between the components of the system amongst
themselves and with their environment. A complex system cannot exist in
isolation, it feeds off information and energy that flows into it from the external
world, and on its part contributes to the external world. The boundaries
between the system and its environment become difficult to determine
because of this dynamic interaction. Due to the dynamic character of the
system, only certain aspects of the system can be analysed at a time. Hence,
in order to facilitate analysis an artificial frame needs to be imposed on the
system, which creates the possibility that any analysis could cause significant
distortions in the system and that such a possibility should be taken into
account in the final analysis.
5.1 Cartesian conceptions of the self disqualified.
In light of the discussion up to this point it seems fair to assert that
Cartesian conceptions of the mind (and by implication the self) do not by any
stretch of the imagination present the mind as an open, interactive system.
The difficulties in coherently delineating precisely what the differences are
between the mind, self, ego, consciousness, etc. have already been
discussed. For the purposes of this discussion it is possible to use the terms
mind and self particularly, relatively interchangeably. Both concepts seem to
be subsidiaries of the same overall concept of the characteristics associated
with the higher functions, presumably unique to human beings, namely:
consciousness of ourselves as agents within a greater world and with the
ability to actively orient ourselves with regard to that awareness. To this end
we need to have a "mental" pictures of the entity that is "us" which we can
reflect upon and factor into our calculations regarding willed action.
The Cartesian picture of the mind, then, is a far cry from what we have
described as a complex, distributed system: Descartes' disembodied cogito
needs to withdraw from the senses, seeing that Descartes readily accepts the
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possibility that our senses, in cahoots with a malignant demon, may
comprehensively deceive us in all that we perceive. To avoid such deception
Descartes prefers to attend to those perceptions that have "sprung up of
themselves" in his mind (1978:86-87). As we have seen, Descartes concludes
that his cogito, his essential self is limited to being a "thinking thing" - a thing
that doubts, understands [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses, imagines,
and perceives, in complete isolation from the body and world in which it
resides. Descartes can distinctly perceive mind and body as two separate
things and he takes this to be sufficient evidence that they are substantially
different from one another and he knows with certainty that he exists as a
mind. He has no reason to believe that his essence necessitates anything
beyond being a thinking thing. He even concludes that his mind can exist
without his body (132-133). Descartes assumption that he can attain
universally valid knowledge makes it unproblematic for him to generalise
attributes found within himself and apply them to all people.
We have also seen that despite contemporary and subsequent
criticism, Cartesian dualism still pervasive in thought on the mind/self. Hence,
although Hume's project was to establish how we come to have knowledge,
based on observation and reasonable inference, rather than through reason
alone, his speculations are not all that different from Cartesian dualism. Hume
expels innate ideas, and in Hume's world perceptions, including those of the
imagination, are limited to previous sensory experience. One cannot conjure
up an original idea without any mental contents, and mental contents are all
subsequent to experience. As discussed in Chapter 3, this assumption causes
Hume to run into difficulty when it comes to conceiving of abstract concepts,
which leads him to conclude that the self is merely the product of habit and
custom. It suits us to conceive of a coherent self, because we have been
accustomed to do so; it simplifies our comprehension of impressions. But, the
self, as such, does not exist. As we have seen, Hume does not really escape
Cartesian dualism, in fact, that was not his aim. As already discussed the
dispute between the rationalist and empiricist positions basically boils down to
whether reason or experience ultimately justifies belief. The dispute is over
how knowledge is acquired and not about the merits of the underlying mind-
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body distinction. Rationalist theory holds that the mind has innate ideas that
form the basis on which reason can form justifiable beliefs about the world.
Empiricism disputes the possibility that innate ideas exist and explores the
limitations of reason in forming justifiable ideas about the world.
Hume does advocate the importance of individual character - a good
upbringing, cultivation of the virtues, a respect for traditions - and believes
that our sentiments and our natural common sense, cultivated through our
social traditions, have power and virtue to address the limits of reason. In this
sense Hume's theory moves more toward a conception of the "self' as a
constructed system, and even an open system in interaction with its
environment.
Kant continues the debate and finds unity in the I think, that must
accompany all representations in the mind. He bases this assertion on the
fact that if the I think did not accompany all representations, it would be
possible for him to have something represented in him, without him thinking it,
which he deems to be either impossible or at the very least, nothing in relation
to him. With such a formulation, Kant also seems to subscribe to the
Cartesian mind. The mind, the I that thinks, must be the author of
representations (This image puts one in mind of Dennett's image of the
Cartesian theatre). Non-"authorised" presentations are either illogical or
negligible. Although Kant sets about establishing the conditions necessary for
cognition, which need not rely on habit and custom and which can be justified
objectively, one of his invaluable contributions to Western thought would be
his recognition of our own input into our perception of the world. His
conclusion would be that a self-consciousness must necessarily accompany
every mental act, which follows that the self must exit. Essentially though,
Kant's self is an operation of understanding, a permanent substratum and not
a dynamic entity, subject to development. The open, dynamic and
decentralised system that we are looking for still seems a long wayoff.
As discussed in Chapter 3 Freud provides us with an example of a
decisive break with the Cartesian mind. He also makes a invaluable step
decisively towards a conception of mind/self as a complex, open, distributed
system (although, of course, he does not use this terminology). Freud's model
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of the mental apparatus in the Project is an example of a classic complex
systern.!"
We have seen that Freud suspected that, far from being, clear,
"certain, and indubitable" conscious, and by implication rational, thought
processes were the result of intricacies of the body's physiological functioning.
Consequently he set about modelling the mental apparatus, and providing a
physiological description of "mental" phenomena. He knew that the nervous
system consisted of distinct and similarly constructed neurones, which have
contact with one another through the medium a of foreign substance. He also
knew that certain lines of conduction were laid down between neurones and
that they receive and give off excitations.
Freud realised that in order to account for our ability to learn through
experience, somehow memories of experiences need to be stored and
available for a kind of mental cross-referencing in future situations. He
speculated, and as we have seen he was quite accurate, that certain
pathways in the nervous system are strengthened through use and thus
become more likely to be "fixed" within the neuronal structure. Memory (the
capacity to be permanently altered through experiences) becomes the basic
property of neurones and their interconnections. It becomes the basic
component of the nervous system and is prior to consciousness and
cognition. Note that Freud's description of how memory functions, is
(unbeknownst to him, of course) itself a description of a complex system. The
following quotation serves as a good example: "Memory does not lie in the
facilitated pathways themselves, but in the relationship between them, and
this relationship is one of differences" (Cilliers 1998: 112).
From here it is just a small step for Freud to launch us into the
realm of the unconscious. The procedure of forming memory traces
is entirely unconscious. Whereas "every psychological theory ...
should explain to us what we are aware of, in the most puzzling
fashion, through our "consciousness" and, since this
186 See Cilliers and Gouws (2001 :237-256) for an extended argument supporting a
similar conclusion.
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consciousness knows nothing of what we have so far been
assuming - quantities and neurones - it should explain this lack of
knowledge to us as well" (Freud 1950 [1895]:307-308).
It becomes clear to Freud that if one is prepared to find that some
assumptions are not confirmed through consciousness, and that
consciousness does not provide trustworthy knowledge of neuronal
processes, even though they seem to be the origin of consciousness, that
neuronal processes are in fact unconscious processes that can be
approached from a scientific angle, "and inferred like other natural things"
(1950 [1895]:307-308). And, if neuronal processes themselves are on the
whole unconscious processes, the likelihood arises that much of our thought
processes are in fact unconscious. Memories are in themselves unconscious
and, although having the capacity for becoming conscious, can be as
influential while being in an unconscious state as in a conscious state, which
is of course one of the premises that psychoanalysis is based upon.
As we have seen, Freud recognises the immense implication that his
theories on the unconscious would have on theories of mind and insists that
the only way in which to form "a correct view of the origin" of mental
phenomena, is to not place to great a stake in the property of "becoming
conscious" (612). The advent of the unconscious expanded the possible
spheres of mental life exponentially by doing away with the assumption that
the psychical is equivalent to the conscious.
Freud's consciousness is partly subjective and partly the result of
external conditions. Consciousness becomes, not the property of a specific
system, but the result of the interaction between perception and memory.
Having established the basic mechanism for generating consciousness, Freud
proceeds to explain a number of the "higher" psychological functions in terms
of the existence of the unconscious.
Freud's realisation provides us with the necessary conceptual tools that
seem to be wanting when studying phenomena like consciousness and the
self through introspection and speculation. His methods of studying dreams,
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slips of the tongue etc., and the idea that in some instances, an external
observer, like a psychologist, might have more insight into a person's
motivations than the person him/herself opened a wealth of opportunities to
rethink many received wisdoms about the mind. It becomes possible in this
study to speculate upon some of the possible internal processes that produce
the self, and to assert that these processes are unquestionably similar to the
processes typical to complex systems. Unconscious processes, consisting in
part of memories (external influences), which themselves are the result of
systemic differences, and processes that may under certain circumstances
become conscious, but need not have an enormous influence on mental
processes, lend themselves to being modelled as complex systems.
Furthermore, Freud also provides us with some clues as to the greater system
in which the self is likely to emerge.
5.2 Freud lays the foundation
We have seen that Freud speculates that the mental apparatus is set in
motion because the accumulation of quantity (Qn), as stimulus that arises as a
result of the needs of the body, will create an urgency in ui-systern to
discharge this energy. The only way for the pressure to be relieved is to effect
an external change to get rid of the stimulus that causes the release of Qn in
the interior of the body. The fact that the infant human organism is incapable
of bringing about the necessary action, and needs to take recourse to external
help, is a very important aspect of Freud's theory. In order to survive, and in
order to affect the necessary changes in its mental apparatus, the infant is
initially completely dependent on a caretaker. The child's internal states need
to be communicated to the caretaker, which is accomplished "by discharge
along the path of internal change" (1950 [1895]:318). The caretaker is, from
the first, the most important environmental influence on mental development.
We have seen that Freud believes that this initial helplessness of human
beings is the primal source of our moral motives. Freud does not elaborate on
the relationship between the infant and the caretaker, but the meaning he
attaches to this initial and inevitable encounter seems to indicate that he
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believes social interaction to be a necessary precondition for the development
of consciousness.
We have seen that Cilliers (1989:118) explicitly draws the conclusion
from Freud's proposed process that the body, as such, and its needs are
necessary precursors to consciousness. Bodily needs, or endogenous stimuli,
become one of the primary movers of the physical system.
Clearly Freud's mental apparatus is an instance of an open system - a
system in continual interaction with its environment. In fact, as stated in
chapter 1, open systems exist by virtue of their interaction with their
environment. Such systems exchange matter and energy (and information)
with the environment, to such an extent that it becomes almost impossible to
delineate between "system" and "environment".
According to Freud consciousness, as an emergent property of the
complex system of the human organism and its environment, serves an
important function in this context. Consciousness becomes a kind of reality
detector. As discussed, Freud speculates that initially the mental apparatus
might try to rid itself of accumulated stimuli when the body's needs are not
met by means of wishful hallucinations (see chapter 3). It seems logical that
the psychical apparatus needs to develop a conception of what really is the
case in the external world, rather than forming a presentation that is merely
agreeable, in order to have the needs of the body met. With hallucination as a
means of dealing with accumulating stimuli is no longer a viable option for the
mental apparatus there arises the necessity for a new mental function. This
mental function is introduced as Freud's famous reality principle.
In the reality-detection game consciousness becomes a key player.
Consciousness is augmented with the function of attention, and attention, on
its part, depends on the existence of the faculty of memory. Consciousness
would hopefully then be in a position to make impartial judgements on the
truth or falsity of given ideas, by comparing the ideas to memory-traces of
previously encountered reality and deciding whether the ideas are in
agreement with reality or not. After this judgement motor discharge can be
allotted with the function of action, in other words with the task of altering
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reality and thereby relieving the body of excess stimuli. As we have already
seen in our discussion of the Project, thinking developed from the
presentation of ideas, and arose out of the need to allow the mental apparatus
to tolerate the increased strain put on it, in the event that discharge is
postponed. Here we have an explanation for the basic mechanism of
adaptation and learning. And, as discussed in chapter 1, the possibilities for
emergence are compounded when elements of the system allow for some
capacity for adaptation and learning.
Here, already, we have a theory of a complex system, where certain
properties of the system, like consciousness, emerge from the interaction
between the components of the system (and the environment). These
processes are not mere epi-phenomena to the system. They feed back into
the system and in themselves become a significant part of the functioning of
the system. Freud's description accords very well with the broad definition of
emergence given in chapter 1 as an instance where: "a small number of rules
can generate a system of surprising complexity" (Cilliers1998:3). We know
that emergence belongs to the structural aspect of the system and that the
system does not need to have certain kinds of constituents or mechanics to
have emergent properties.We know that many very different kinds of systems
can exhibit emergent properties and that such systems are not limited to
physical systems and can include social, cultural and biological systems as
well.
Freud describes the self in the following way: 'What we describe as our
'character' is based on the memory-traces of our impressions which have had
the greatest effect on us - those of our earliest youth - are precisely the ones
which scarcely ever become conscious" (540). Not only does Freud raise the
possibility that much of what we regard as the self is, in fact, unconscious,
and hence not necessarily "known" to us, but he lays the foundation for
modelling the self as a complex system. The only shortcoming in Freud's
description seems to be that he envisions too narrow a sphere of influences
that can possibly contribute to make up "character". This study would contend
that there are many more factors than the memory-traces of the experiences
of our youth contribute to "what we describe as our "character".
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5.3 The material basis of the self revisited
Earlier in this chapter we discussed some of the similarities between
current neurological theory and the Freudian model. Especially in terms of
learning and adaptation we have seen that great emphasis is placed on the
role of environmental influences in forming the structure of the brain and its
processes. Trevarthen (1998:102), for example, places much emphasis on
the interaction between genetic predisposition and environmental stimuli in
the development of the brain, including the development of the "higher
psychological processes." We have also quoted him as declaring that after
contemporary research done on this subject, the way in which we think about
consciousness and human understanding can never be the same (i.e.
Cartesian). Trevarthen attributes some of the diversity of human minds to
genetic pre-programming but he insists that the same processes will be
influenced by stimuli from both the intrauterine and the external environments
as well (ibid.)
The discussion on current neurological theory also touched upon the
fact that the organism needs to be able to learn from experience. In order for
the human organism to have learned form experience information acquired
from experience needs to be incorporated into, and has to influence, the
workings of the brain. As with Freud, Young's discussion on learning hinges
around changes brought about in the mental apparatus when learning. Briefly,
he argues that to be able to learn, we need physical records in the brain -
changes need to be brought about in the structure of the brain, i.e. memories.
The problem of memory is finding the mechanism that establishes this
change. We have also seen that Young's (1998:455) physiological account of
the mechanisms of memory begins with hereditary genetic dispositions. The
initial basis of memory in the nervous system is provided by "genetic
memory", which establishes "pre-wired" neuronal pathways of the foetus
during gestation. After birth this original multiplicity of possible actions is then
"fine-tuned" through interactions with the environment: redundant neuronal
pathways are pruned away, while others are strengthened. An important
aspect of Freud's theory on memory is that he searches for a metaphor that
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illustrates that memories are never completely lost, nor are they saved as
complete icons in some filing-system of the brain. The metaphor that he
settles on is, of course, that of the Mystic Writing-Pad. We found a relatively
similar account of memory in our discussion of the holographic model of
memory. Here memory is the result of external patterns being transformed
into wave-patterns or ("coded" information), and the interaction of these wave-
patterns resulting in interference patterns. What both of these descriptions
have in common is a view of memory as non-iconic and distributed in the
brain.
As with Freud there is much emphasis on the role of the environment
(which includes the caretaker or caretakers) on brain development after birth,
in the neurological approach. After birth, brain development depends on how
stimuli from the outside world interact with the inner states of the brain. To
quote Trevarthen's evocative statement once again: "Growing human brains
require cultivation by intimate communication with older human brains" (108).
So much so that it seems that communication with older human brains is at
least partly, if not completely, necessary to the development of
consciousness.
When all of these ingredients are present (i.e. effective genetic pre-
programming, effective caretaking, learning and adaptation) it seems that the
system is in place for a conscious individual, with a sense of self to emerge.
We have seen that, far from being amorphous or chaotic, complex systems
have some structure, some steady-state where they are more or less
coherent and can do work. From the patterns of interaction of a system in flux
emerges a pattern (or perhaps patterns), which is relatively constant in its
composition, with a more or less coherent structure.
We have seen that part and parcel of the dynamic nature of complex
systems is their remarkable tendency to display organisation. The kind of
organisation typical to complex systems is ideal for explaining the
organisation that we can attribute to the self. Random patterns resulting from
the interaction between components in a system do not make for emergent
properties. Emergent properties are ordered and recurring patterns that come
about through some kind of organisation among the components of that
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particular system. We have also seen that the most probable state of
distribution within a system is that of complete disorder, or maximum entropy,
and that work needs to be done on the system to maintain structure within the
system.
Evidently paradoxically, the patterns that are generated in complex
systems are not the convolutions of random patterns. The resultant systems
exhibit, as they must to be labelled a "system", recognisable structures. These
recognisable structures are dynamic - they change over time. In chapter 2 we
saw that while the rules that generate the system stay invariant, the things
that they govern are in flux - such is the nature of a complex system. In other
words emergent phenomena are typically persistent patterns within a system
with changing components. Relatively consistent rules (or behavioural laws)
generate complexity and the flux of patterns that follow lead to "perpetual
novelty" and emergence.
This apparent paradoxical aspect of complex systems serves to
emphasise the importance of context-sensitive constraints on self-
organisation in a complex system. An important effect of context-sensitive
constraints is that they regulate the flow of energy, matter and information
between the system and its environment. The organisation of the self-
organised system determines the stimuli to which it will respond (as Freud's
model in the Project suggests with regard to the mental apparatus). The
elements in a complex system are interdependent, which means that the
behavioural variability they might have had as independent elements is
constrained - this aspect could be very useful in a theory of the self. Context-
sensitive constraints enable the system to preserve its organisation and its
identity as a whole. Instead of some governing component determining and
regulating the behaviour of the system, the relational whole of the system
governs the behaviour of the system. The self as an emergent property of the
genetic mental apparatus and external influences could well be said to be the
result of self-organisation within this complex system. This assertion ties in
very well with Dennett's discussion on both consciousness and the self. And
perhaps Dennett can also provide us with a clue as to how work is "done" on
the system and how recognisable patterns (order) usually stay constant
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enough for us to recognise a self as the "same" self at different instances and
in different contexts.
5.4 Dennett's self revisited
In chapter 3 we used Dennett's materialism to underpin our efforts to
demystify the self, and to present it as an aspect of consciousness, also
emergent from the complexity of the brain's structure and functioning. He
strongly criticises that Cartesian Theatre model of consciousness, which
poses some kind of homunculus as the executive commander of the mental
system. As an alternative he suggests his "Multiple Drafts" model. According
to the Multiple Drafts model all information entering the nervous system is
under continuous "editorial revision". Dennett insists that it is misleading to
ask the question when perceptions become conscious. The information
content gleaned from sensory inputs is distributed throughout different
systems of the brain. This distributed content becomes something like a
narrative stream - a multiplicity, subject to continual editing by many
processes distributed in the brain. Hence there are multiple "drafts" of
narrative fragments, based on sensory experience, at various stages of
"editing" in various places in the brain. There is no single, final narrative,
which is delivered to consciousness and can be considered to be the actual
stream of consciousness of the subject. There is no point in the brain where it
all comes together. The brain is the "headquarters" of the perceived observer,
but there is no other, deeper, headquarters in the brain, where consciousness
is seated.
Dennett's new model of the conscious processes within the brain
allows him to rethink and recast the self, which had mostly been conjectured
upon in context of the assumption of the Cartesian Theatre as model for the
"mental" aspects of the brain. We arrive at his conclusions on the self via a
somewhat circuitous route:
The Multiple Drafts model lends itself to a theory of the evolution of
consciousness. Far from being a metaphysical, non-bodily phenomenon
consciousness becomes a biological effect that developed with a species,
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presumably in accordance with constraints and possibilities imposed by the
environment and genetic adaptations on that species.
We saw that Dennett speculates that the need for self-preservation and
control through the ability to track and anticipate, were evolutionary
preconditions that gave rise to the nervous system in successive guises. The
ability to model the world, to learn from experience in order to adapt or
anticipate future occurrences seems to give an organism a distinctive
biological edge over species that do not have this capacity. Stating the matter
very simplistically, organisms that have systems proficient in information
gathering and geared towards information that is beneficial to the organism,
are likely to prosper. Eventually it would seem that these information-
gathering systems have become part of the innate design of the nervous
system. Information gathering and assessment need not necessarily be
conscious states.
Specifically with regard to the self, Dennett's discussion holds yet
another point of interest for us. He notes that the development of nervous
systems that have an element of plasticity and hence have the ability to learn
in the course of their lifetime seems to provide other "mediums" in which
evolution of the nervous system can occur. Such a learning mechanism would
operate along the same lines as "natural" evolution, in other words, a process
of evolution through selection. Dennett refers to this process as post-natal
design fixing. We have already discussed how the plasticity of the brain allows
it to reorganise itself in some ways, even if these ways are constrained (!),
and so adapt to its environment.
The process of the evolution of the nervous system, which has hitherto
been seen as been driven by natural selection and genetic mutation, might be
said to evolve in other ways as well. And Dennett goes on to suggest that
what makes the human nervous system unique is that it has developed the
ability to conceive of a quite sophisticated model of itself.
Dennett's speculation is strengthened in the light of the assertion on
the part of Nathan that the cerebral cortex is a late evolutionary development,
and especially well-developed in man. The cerebral hemispheres are the part
of the brain concerned with the activities usually categorised as mental:
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problem-solving, remembering, planning, imagining, making judgements,
forming opinions, etc. The cerebral hemispheres are also the regions of the
brain that can differ overtly from person to person (Nathan 1998:531).
According to Dennett then, a plastic, adaptable brain (the cortex) is the
first "new" medium in which the evolutionary process with regard to nervous
systems can be speeded up. We have seen that Dennett attributes the radical
transformation of human society in the last 10,000 years to the development
of new ways in harnessing mental capabilities.
The second new type of evolution that Dennett discusses, is cultural
evolution. This evolutionary medium is the product of both the plasticity of the
brain, which makes learning possible, and human beings' communicative
capabilities. Through cultural transmission we transfer behavioural patterns to
developing young minds, through some or other form of language. In fact, we
quoted Dennett as stating that through such programme or software-sharing,
culture develops into "a repository and transmission medium for innovations"
(199). And so, as with Freud, Dennett places great emphasis on the
importance that culture has for the existence and development of the mental
structure. Finally, the cultural equivalent of genes, memes, in themselves
undergo a process of evolution. They implement themselves in the human
nervous system through cultural transmission and so also affect changes
within this system. All of Dennett's proposed evolutionary processes to do
with the mental apparatus are important to our theory of the self.
Dennett's Multiple Draft model of the mental apparatus allows for the
self to be a sort of cumulative narrative draft, composed of myriad bits of
narrative fragments formed in the brain. Dennett does, to a certain extent,
attempt to account for the formation of such a self-like narrative draft. As
already noted he suggests that human beings are biologically given to a
process of self-design, which is as innate to their nature as it is to a beaver to
build a dam or a weaver to construct a nest. One of the first steps in this
process of self-design, after birth, is to acquire language. Dennett goes so far
as to suggest that prior to language the self, in any meaningful sense of the
word, does not exist, while the capacity for designing and developing a self
does exists. This is reminiscent of Freud's and Trevarthen's emphasis on the
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importance of language and communication in general for developing
consciousness. By incorporating the three processes of the evolution of
consciousness, and especially the role that Dawkin's memes may play in the
process Dennett has provided us with the last of the conceptual tools
necessary to construct a complex, materialistic model of the self. Dennett's
self is alive, were "alive" can be understood in the sense of being a system
that can sustain itself, evolve and reproduce.
5.5 The malerial and complex self
In terms of the criteria for identifying a system as a complex system we
now have all the ingredients necessary to propose that the self is an emergent
property of a complex system. We have the many components that are in
interaction - genetic predisposition to construct a self, the mental apparatus
itself, structured to learn and adapt, memories of experiences, other people,
language and memes. From our discussion up to this point it becomes clear
that these components are in interaction - the environment contributes to and
influences the development of the mental apparatus, etc. The individual parts
do not aggregate into the whole system - all of these parts can only lead to
the emergent phenomenon of the self when they interact effectively, as it
were. In the vernacular of complexity theory, the law of superposition does not
hold. In terms of Freudian theory it is easy to propose that causes and effects
within the mental apparatus are highly disproportionate, unstable and
unpredictable. In other words, slight perturbations propagate through and
affect the entire system, which can result in a system with behaviour that can
be what Auyang calls "multifarious, unstable and surprising" (1998:183).
As.we have seen in chapter 1 such non-linearity is a necessary, but not
sufficient precondition for complexity. Freud himself places much emphasis on
the impact that experiences in infancy, both conscious and unconscious
(especially of a sexual nature) might have on the grown person. Such effects
would of course vary from person to person, and vary in the same person at
different times, based on all manner of contingencies and systemic variations.
One does not need to be quite as fatalistic or as focussed on sexual
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experience as Freud seems to be, to appreciate that the same basic principle
can hold for most human experiences throughout their lifetimes.
The mental apparatus consists of various structures at various scales
within the brain. This makes the concept of coarse-graining particularly
applicable to the self-system - the distance we take from the system in
analysing it influences appearance of complexity/complicatedness that we
perceive the system to posses. The other side of this coin is that there are
more possibilities to the development of the self than can ever be actualised.
We have quoted Auyang as saying that the difference between the enormity
of the possibilities in a complex system and the scarcity of actualisations
underpins concepts like probability, contingency, temporal irreversibility and
uncertainty (18) - all concepts that seem to be tailor-made to be applied to the
self. It seems very easy to imagine that one's ownness, ones sense of self
could be very different given the possibility that one had made different
choices, or had different influences and exposure to different circumstances
than what had actually been the case. All of these factors have to do with
restrictions within the given system within which one constructs a self:
physical ability, genetic-predisposition, material circumstances, geographical
location, the list is endless. It is also quite unproblematic to state that many of
the possibilities that have been actualised, much of what has become part of
one's self are, for all intents and purposes, irreversible.
Given the enormity of the possibilities within the self as a complex
system, it begins to seem surprising that we seem to posses something that
seems like a coherent self, recognisable as belonging to the "same" person.
As we have seen of emergent properties, they are the product of interactions
between agents (nodes) within the system and dependent on context. In
chapter 1 we quoted Holland as proposing that the context in which an
emergent pattern arises determines its function (1998: 121-226). Could one
count on the constraints provided by the context in which a self develops to
provide the basis for a coherent self, recognisable as "the same" structure
over time and through various circumstances and experiences? In fact,
complexity theory seems to provide us with a very handy way of accounting
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for such identity of self, while still allowing for profound changes to occur in
the self, both diachronically and synchronically.
We have seen that open systems change continuously and in
unpredictable ways. Components are added and subtracted and the
relationships among various components change, which, in turn, influences
the rest of the system. Open systems do not operate according to the dictates
of a telos, changes are unpredictable, irregular, and contingent. The self does
not posses some Aristotelian formal cause or essence, which dictates its
development. We have also attributed the characteristic of decentralised
decision making to the self. No specific component controls the system, and
with changes that are the result of many factors, including changes in the
environment and in other distant parts of the system, we end up with a
mercurial and transient system.
As we have discussed, there are many advantages to not being
directed by a single centre of control, but a system must, by definition, display
coordinated and interactive behaviour. With the complexity sciences it
becomes possible to explain how a complex system can attain such a high
degree of order, without some external designing or directing agent. In
chapter 1 we introduced the phenomenon of self-organisation. Self-
organisation is a profoundly pragmatic, prosaic occurrence that has to do with
the optimal functioning of a system. It will also help us to do away with the
idea of self as essence or some such innate, non-physical entity.
In a self-organised system the individual components of the system
react to information available to them locally, which translates into complex
and organised behaviour on a systemic level. Anyone node is not "aware" of
the behaviour and structure of the entire system. The system itself relies on
interactive behaviour and is subject to continuous change. Self-organising
systems are also self-referential in that new components are "accepted" into
the system by virtue of their ability to enhance the overall organisation of the
system. We have seen that the system's organisation makes for an internal
selection process, established by the system itself, and operates to preserve
and enhance the system. In other words, self-organising processes are
primarily informational. The components that are imported into the system are
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selected through the internal dynamics of the system, based on the system's
requirements. Under pressure from its environment, the system seeks to
enhance its cohesion and integration and functioning capabilities.
We have also discussed the concept of self-organised criticality - the
tendency of large systems with many components to evolve to an
unbalanced, yet structured state - a "critical" - state, where minor
disturbances may lead to events of all sizes. Cilliers (1998) explains what
takes place in self-organisation as the system organising itself to a critical
point where single events will have the widest possible range of effects and
where the system can attain optimum sensitivity to external inputs. These
critical points are also called "attractors" - states that a system eventually
settles into, and which are determined by the properties of the system.
The state-space of a system is a "structured collection of all possible
momentary states of the individual" (Auyang 1998:215). A system's states
have different characteristics at different times. Successive states - or a
system's trajectory - taken as a whole, constitute a system's history or the
process that it undergoes to reach a certain state at a certain time. We have
seen that Auyang adds her voice to those of Cilliers and Dennett when she
argues for the impossibility to encompass an entire system (including its
history) in state space. And, she proposes the same solution: resorting to
narrative explanations when describing the system.
We have seen that every possible state of the system is characterised
by a unique point in the state-space. The unfolding of the dynamic system
through time forms trajectories through the state-space. When a number of
trajectories converge on a certain point in the state-space that point is called
an attractor - a stable state of the system. A characteristic that could be of
great relevance to our theory of the self is that a stable system has only a few
strong attractors, whereas an unstable system would have no strong
attractors and would jump around chaotically. A chaotic system has no
structure and is useless, while a stable system with too few attractors is very
rigid and cannot readily adapt to changing conditions. It seems that an
effective system will balance itself at a critical point between rigid order and
chaos. At this critical point single events in the system can have the widest
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possible range of effects, without disrupting the system. The system is able to
evolve both by accumulation of small changes and by dramatic changes, in
which evolutionary novelties can emerge, triggered by random mutations or
by changes in the environment.
A system with a few strong attractors will be at its most sensitive to
external input, without being unstable. The system will also be able to change
its state with the least amount of effort and the least amount of disruption. A
system with too many attractors is unstable, and any slight perturbation might
send it into another basin of attraction, thus changing its cycle and disrupting
the system's "pattern". A system in which all its attractors are unstable would
be a chaotic system, vulnerable to all manner of fluctuations and never able to
repeat its cycles through the state-space and not able to retain its order.
It becomes very tempting at this point to veer off and speculate on the
possibilities that the concept of attractor states could hold for the description
of healthy vs. pathological states within different individuals. This would,
however, overreach the boundaries of this paper and is therefore just held
forth as a possible, and interesting, implication that such a conception of self
might have. Instead we will content ourselves with the proposition that the self
seems to be an ideal candidate for being characterised as an attractor state,
or more likely a few attractor states, within a complex system. Even more
specifically, the self would be a strange attractor state within a complex
system.
We have seen that strange attractors are ordered patterns within a
system that will still allow individual behaviour to fluctuate. So even if
trajectories in a system are caught in an attractor basin, their behaviour is not
so rigidly constrained so as to cause the individual trajectories to repeat a
phase exactly. Consequently, even though the system is constrained in a
state-cycle and does display order, individual trajectories are never exactly
identical, but approximate. Even though the trajectories of a system in such a
state may appear to be relatively random, such intricate behaviour patterns
are in fact indicative of dynamic, complex and context-dependent
organisation.
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Seeing the self as an instance of a strange attractor that emerges
within the complex system consisting of components such as the hard-wired
structure of the brain, external influences in the form of physical stimuli and
communications made by other people through language, could explain a
seemingly paradoxical character of the self. On the one hand it seems that a
single person has many "selves" depending on social context, such as a
professional meeting versus meeting with friends in a pub, their state of health
- any manner of factors. At the same time one needs to account for the fact
that we consider a person to be the "same" person from infancy through
death, barring extremely traumatic experience such as serious injury or
extreme mental illness. Even when a person does an about-face in the
manner of Scrooge, one would usually assume that person to be the same,
only different in some specific aspects. Given the scope for strange-attractors
to allow for deviations from "normal" trajectories, these attractors can still be
recognised as the same basin of attraction, despite many differences. This
conjecture of course may fly somewhat in the face of the Freudian assertion
that experiences in infancy and childhood determine certain future
characteristics. According to a model of the self as strange attractor, the self
is open to influences, adaptations and changes until the system reaches a
state of equilibrium, Le. death.
The possibilities that are actualised, the attractors that the system
settles into, are established partly by the environment (and the function of the
system in that environment), and partly by the history of the system, Le. states
that have already been actualised. "History" here refers to already actualised
states of the system and should not be understood as a chronological series
of major events. The history of the system is contained in all the individual
little interactions that take place all the time and are distributed all over the
system as a whole. Future developments are of course constrained by
already actualised events in the system. As a self-organised system the self
derives its identity from its context - constituent elements become dependent
on the behaviour of their neighbouring elements as well as what happened
previously in the system.
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It almost seems a truism to assert that the self forms within the
constraints and influences that it encounters both within its environment, and
from what it has already been, its history. But this is hardly obvious to a
rationalist approach to the self, and even Freud's conception of the self is
somewhat deterministic and static. When we model the self as a complex
system it becomes possible to allow for both the innate aspects of the self -
the "hardware" of the brain that ensures the ability to construct a self,
presumably because it evolved as something that contributes to the survival
of the human organism - and for the external, experiential factors, such as
parentage, culture, education, geographical locality, or any external
information that could have contributed to the formation of the self. Such a
theory would also allow for, and be sensitive to, the extraordinarily complex
interactions of all of these factors, and many others, that contribute to a
person's identity. All of these factors and processes would of course be so
intricate and convoluted that it seems unlikely that one will ever be able to
account for every single aspect of a selfs history or even of its present state.
With the impossibility of constructing a static model of this entire
system of the self and all its possible states and configurations, it becomes
necessary to determine the appropriate level of detail at which the system will
be approached and the mechanisms of the system which are relevant to a
particular study. We discussed the inevitability of framing and its implication
that, not being able to reduce the behaviour of a complex system to a set of
basic laws does not mean that it cannot be modelled or studied. We can
reduce the behaviour of the whole to the lawful behaviour of the parts, if we
allow for the inevitable distortions in the system that will arise from this
practice.
When we practise framing our attention is attracted by a recurring
pattern in a particular system and through a process of induction we construct
a model of the selected phenomena. Only recurring patterns in a given
system will be noticed and considered to be part of the mechanics of the
system. Such a description of repeated elements will suggest rules or
mechanisms according to which the system operates. It is the imposed frame
that creates the safe space where there can be talk of truth, rationality, and
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identity (!) To have a theory about the self, for example, is inevitably to draw a
frame. As long as we remain well within the frame our work can continue.
Ambiguities arise at the limits of the discourse or frame.
Perhaps a process similar to framing is what we use to identify
someone else's self. We inevitably know the person within a specific context,
and will base our conception of that person on the recurring patterns that we
observe and also might exacerbate in accordance with our own experience.
Only certain aspects of the system of the self can be analysed at a time
and analyses could cause distortions in the system. Both Freud and Dennett
have it made clear that what is conscious, and self-like about human beings is
the tip of the ice-berg with regard to the unconscious goings on, all the
multiple narrative drafts within the brain. We have see that Dennett proposes
a method of heterophenomenology to extract bits of narrative fragments, or
texts from the speaking subject. Such texts are then used by the theorist to
generate a theorist's fiction: the "heterophenomonological" world of the given
subject. This fiction is an account of all that the subject sincerely believes to
exist in his/her conscious experience and is, Dennett insists, an accurate
portrayal of what it is like to be that subject. He also insists that such a fiction
is an adequate basis from which to explore the heterophenomenological world
of the subject. This is in opposition to theorists like Searle and Nagel who
assume the position that the self cannot really be a subject of scientific study,
because it does not lend itself to objective study in that a theorist has to rely
on the subjective account of the object of study itself. Their objection seems to
be nothing more than the objection that a theorists is likely to cause a
distortion in the system that he/she in analysing. Dennett refuses to concede
that such a distortion is an insurmountable impediment; he proposes drawing
up a frame - that of the heterophenomenological method - to allow for
inevitable distortions. Far from being prohibitive, the subject's narratives
enable a theorist to construct a surprisingly accurate, and we would argue
adequate, account of what it is like to be that subject.
Both Dennett and Freud place much emphasis on the role that
language, both spoken and written, plays in structuring consciousness.
Humans make use of not only language and social interaction, but writing and
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diagramming and other ways of storing information as well, for storing what
one can refer to as a sort of cumulative, collective, human consciousness.
Culture serves to augment memory, on the one hand simply because the
demands on memory and pattern recognition are so vast that the brain is
required to "off-load" some of its memories into buffers in the environment. On
the other hand, as Freud notes, all people - normal and neurotic - have
reason to distrust their memory, and can guarantee its authenticity by some
kind of supplement (1925:227). Culture provides us with permanent memory-
traces and we are fairly certain of these external "memory-traces" to remain
relatively unaltered and undistorted, which is not always the case with actual
memory.
The importance of other "mature human brains" as Trevarthen has it,
and the cultural entities through which different brains communicate with one
another will take up the bulk of the discussion in the final chapter. In his
discussion on Dawkin's memes Dennett has already pointed out the vital role
that the culture in which they manifest themselves plays in the evolution of
consciousness. In the final chapter we will argue, given our conception of the
self as an emergent property in a complex system, of which culture (as
environment) makes up a great part, we will discuss some of the implications
that culture might have on the structure of the self.
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Chapter Five
On the Subject of the Human Environment
We biologists have assimilated the idea of evolution so deeply that
we tend to forget that that it is only one of many possible kinds of
evolutions.
Dawkins (1976:208)
The claim to be a creator, a maker of things, passed from the
painter to the engineer - leaving to the artist only the small consolation of
being a maker of dreams.
Gombrich (1968:83)
Events in the past have to be interpreted in an imaginative way.
Story-telling is the most appropriate way of doing this. Stories about the
past enable us to create and share a common future. They contribute to the
production and consumption of an informed culture for it is through the art
of story-telling that a culture is enriched with intertextual significance
(Degenaar 1993: 54).
1. Introduction
In the preceding chapter we proposed that the self is an emergent
property of a complex system that consists of relevant elements of the mental
apparatus, and the environment in which it finds itself - broadly
conceptualised as culture. We have seen that both Freud and contemporary
neurology both place much emphasis on the influence of other brains on the
developing human brain. Other people are not only important in the formative
years, in fact, they can be argued to playa vital role in keeping a brain healthy
and active through regular interaction throughout a person's life-span. Both
Freud and Dennett have characterised the self as something akin to multiple
narrative drafts within the brain. We have also seen that Dennett proposes a
method of heterophenomenology to extract bits of narrative fragments, or
texts, from the speaking subject. Those texts are then used by the theorist,
and people in general, to generate a theorist's fiction - perhaps one could just
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say a fiction - as to "what it is like" for that subject to be. Far from seeing such
a mode of access to someone's thought-processes as an impediment to, what
Dennett would call, software-sharing between brains, Dennett sees his
heterophenomenological method as a perfectly adequate means of
understanding and communicating with "other minds". This is in opposition to
theorists like Nagel, for instance, who assume the position that the self cannot
really be a subject of scientific study, because it does not lend itself to the
objective study of objective facts.
Both Dennett and Freud place much emphasis on the role that
language, both spoken and written, plays in structuring consciousness.
Language in its various forms (culture?) serves as a medium through which
knowledge is transmitted between brains. We have even seen that Dennett
sees culture in itself as a relatively new evolutionary medium that contributes
another dimension to the evolution of consciousness. Culture provides us with
permanent memory-traces, which can remain relatively unaltered and
undistorted and serve as entities through which different brains communicate
with one another. Given our conception of the self as an emergent property in
a complex system, of which culture (as environment) makes up a great part,
we will discuss some of the implications that culture might have on the
structure of the self, and some of the forms that culture may assume.
A discussion on self/consciousness seems, inevitably, to transform into
a discussion on knowledge. Especially in a discussion such as this one,
where we present the self as something that is acquired - through
experience, through learning, through training, through acquiring culture, if
you will. But why should this be? How do our views on knowledge and our
views on selfhood/consciousness converge? The answer lies in what we
believe knowledge to be - how it is acquired, but also how it is verified,
justified, proven. A clear illustration some of the issues involved is a debate
which centres around Thomas Nagel's well-known thought experiment
entitled: What is it like to be a Bat? Nagel's reservations about our ability to
know anything about consciousness, and Hofstadter's dismissal of Nagel's
qualms highlight the way that ideas on consciousness/self and knowledge are
interwoven.
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2. Nagel's mysterianism and bats
Essentially Nagel (1982:391) is very sceptical about our ability to say
anything meaningful about consciousness (and by implication the self) and he
believes that current discussions on the subject get it "obviously wrong." He is
especially wary of attempts to describe consciousness in material terms. For
him material or physical descriptions involve reduction. And, although
reduction has proved to be successful in other attempts to explain the
physical world, Nagel insists that it cannot be used to describe mental
phenomena for exactly that reason, they are not physical. Nagel concludes
that we need to develop an "objective phenomenology" if we hope to ever give
a material account of mental events.
Nagel declares that most reductionist attempts to reduce mental
phenomena to a variant of materialism fail, because they do not appreciate
the distinctive difference between the mind-body problem and other problems
that successfully lend themselves to reduction - that of consciousness. Nagel
insists that mental events are subjective - inevitably connected to a particular
point of view - and hence do not lend themselves to reduction. If material
accounts of the mind hope to be successful, they need to account for this
subjective character of consciousness. They need to light upon a way to
describe subjective experience in objective terms. Why? Because legitimate
knowledge needs to be objectively verifiable.
Nagel proceeds to discuss consciousness, even though he admits that:
"it is difficult to say in general what provides evidence of it" (392). These
qualms aside, Nagel lights upon the distinguishing characteristic of
consciousness, no matter in what form: for an organism to have experience
and to be conscious, there must be something it is like to be that organism,
something it is like for that organism (392). Any analysis of mental
phenomena would need to take into account this subjective character of
experience. The problem being that for this reduction to be successful,
"phenomenological features of the mind" must be given a physical account,
which seems impossible, given that they are subjective - they cannot be
separated from their single point of view. He illustrates his point with a thought
experiment: can we (that is, human beings) know what it is like to be a bat?
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The answer, predictably, is no. Nagel illustrates that it is impossible for us to
know what it is like for a bat, to be a bat. It is structurally impossible for us to
know how a bat experiences the world; our sensory apparatus is radically
different from that of bats. Virtually experiencing the world-view of a bat or
imagining yourself as a winged creature hanging upside down from the roof of
a cave does not count. In such a case we will only know what it is like for us to
be a bat, which is still not an objective account of "batness."
With this Nagel comes to the crux of the matter: "the relation between
facts on the one hand and conceptual schemes or systems of representation
on the other" (396). Nagel declares his "realism about the subjective domain
in all its forms" to lead him to the belief that there are facts that exist beyond
the reach of human concepts (ibid.), for which we never will or could posses
the concepts to represent or comprehend them. Nagel's reflection on what it is
like to be a bat leads him to conclude that: "there are facts that do not consist
in the truth of propositions in the human language" (ibid.) For example, facts
about what it is like for organisms other than oneself (especially organisms
that are structurally very different from oneself) to be conscious.
The bearing of this on the mind-body problem is that the facts of
experience (the facts of experiencing consciousness) are necessarily
accessible from only one point of view. Given the subjective character of
experience, Nagel sees it as a mystery how the true character of experience
might be revealed in the physical operation of the organism (397). The reason
he gives for his scepticism is that the physical operation of the organism is
necessarily the domain of objective facts - objective facts being facts that can
be observed and understood from many different points of view, including
those of individuals with differing perceptual systems. Nagel's definition of
objective facts rests on the assumption that, the less our description depends
on a particularly human point of view, the more objective it is (398). It is
impossible to render an account of experience, without including the point of
view of the "experiencer." Because experience does not have an objective
character, Nagel finds it difficult to under stand how "a physiologist, or a
Martian", could study someone's or something's brain and observe their
mental processes "from another point of view" (398). If experience is
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essentially subjective, shifting to the objective viewpoint moves us away from
the nature of the phenomenon. How can we, in this case, reduce our
dependence on the individual, or species-specific point of view and direct our
attention to the mental, as an object? How can the mental be "reduced" to the
physical?
The argument is essentially that, seeing as conscious experience is
necessarily subjective, it is not possible to explain it in objective terms.
Ratifiable knowledge needs to be objective, and hence we cannot know what
it is like for a bat, to be a bat. Mental states need to be known through the
observation of physiological processes, and the species-specific viewpoint
must be eliminated. Essentially, if mental processes are physical processes,
Nagel argues that there must be something that it is like to be a physical
process. He cannot see how this is possible, and as a result he concludes
that, in order for us to have any legitimate knowledge of the mental, we need
to develop an "objective phenomenology," which does not rely on empathy or
imagination. Through this method we should be able to describe subjective
experiences to those who cannot experience them.
Hofstadter (1982:403-414) describes Nagel's as an attempt to
"subjectively know what it is objectively like" to be (409), and dismisses
Nagel's argument as an "over-facile thought experiment" (406). He argues
that Nagel wants to use the verb "to be" in such a way that it will not refer to a
particular subject, like a bat, but to that which is "subjectiess," referring to the
"batness" that all bats have in common. As he puts it: "There is a be-ee here,
without the be-er"(407).
Hofstadter believes that Nagel's fundamental error in this essay is the
assumption that to be justifiable, knowledge has to be objective. The
contradiction in this argument is that, in order to describe consciousness in a
legitimate way, we need to objectively describe what it is subjectively like to
be (409). Hence, if experience or consciousness cannot be described in
objective terms, any knowledge that we have thereof cannot be considered to
be valid knowledge. Hofstadter disagrees with Nagel's contention that we
cannot know what it is like to be a bat, because of bats' perceptual apparatus,
or their "minds" are so vastly different from ours. On the contrary, he argues
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"the modality of sensory input is quite interchangeable" .187 The difference in
"consciousness" between us and bats (or BATs) 188 has more to do with their
much more limited range of conceptual and perceptual categories, along with
the stress on things that are important in the life of a bat, than with the
essential impenetrability of "batness" to the human mind.
Hofstadter goes on to highlight the role that language plays in our
ability to exchange ideas and experiences. He argues (convincingly) that it is
highly unlikely that bats wonder about, or exchange ideas about, what it is like
to be a bat, or some other BAT. And the reason is, of course that bats do not,
as far as we can tell, have language, at least not as far as a medium in terms
of which ideas can be exchanged. While human beings do have the capacity
to communicate on a sophisticated level through language (by which
Hofstadter generally means some form of symbolic communication - he
explicitly includes spoken language, movies and gestures). Hofstadter argues
that humans have at their disposal various media that aid them in projecting,
and thus absorbing and understanding (to a greater or a lesser degree)
foreign points of view. To quote Hofstadter directly: "Through a universal
currency, points of view have become more modular, more transferable, less
personal and idiosyncratic" (413). The leap from our inability to penetrate the
"batness" of being a bat, to concluding that we cannot know what it is like to
be another person seems absurd. It stands to reason that the experiences of
being human have enough common ground for such experiences to be
transferable, to a significant degree at the very least, between different
individuals.
Hofstadter does not see the singularity of the subjectiveness of
consciousness, the inability to render an objective account of subjective
experience, as an insurmountable obstacle in our ability to acquire knowledge
about consciousness - even the consciousness of another subject. The
reason for this is that Hofstadter does not make the same fundamental
187 Consider the example (Hofstadter 1982:411) of the possibility of producing visual
experiences in the blind as a result of tactile stimulation.
188 Hofstadter names all sentient things, all things that it is something like to be, BATs
(Le. be-able things) (1982:409).
180
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
assumption that Nagel makes: he does not believe that knowledge is and
should necessarily be objective. In fact, Hofstadter argues that knowledge is
"a curious blend of subjective and objective" (413). It is in fact, the subjective
aspect of knowledge and the fact that the subject can verbalise his/her
subjective experiences in a medium of communication that enables us to
share knowledge in the first place. We can experience what it is like to be or
to do X, through a sequence of simulation processes, through language (414).
The fact that such a simulation can never be the "original experience" is not
an anomaly, but part of the structural precondition of the possibility to
communicate knowledge at all!
Hofstadter draws, in part, on the work of Richard Dawkins, and notably
on his concept of memes. Dawkin's theory of memes ties in well with the aim
of this chapter and we will briefly discuss his ideas before consolidating our
themes and drawing this discussion to a close. We have seen that Dennett
also draws upon Dawkins to develop his theory of heterophenomenology,
and, as we will discuss, comes to roughly the same conclusions as those held
forth by Hofstadter. By way of conclusion we will argue that the positions of
both Dennett and Hofstadter that we have discussed in this work can serve to
confirm and elaborate upon the implications of a compJexmodel of the self as
developed in the preceding chapter.
3. Culture red in tooth and claw?
Richard Dawkins devotes the last ten pages of his book The Selfish
Gene (1976) to his new concept: memes. Memes are Dawkin's cultural
answer to genes. The gist of Dawkin's biological argument is that all
organisms (animals, plants, bacteria, viruses, etc.) are survival machines. All
of these "machines" bear repllcators'": i.e. genes. Survival machines are
carriers of copies of the same replicator - DNA molecules (23). Dawkins aims
to explain the behaviour of organisms, particularly individual selfishness and
individual altruism in terms of gene selfishness. A (admittedly oversimplified)
189 Replicators are molecules that have the capacity to create copies of themselves
(Dawkins 1976: 16).
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version of his argument runs as follows: in all likelihood molecules that could
copy themselves - replicators - developed in the primordial soup by accident.
Inevitably the primordial soup was incapable of supporting an infinite amount
of replicators, and competition developed between the different replicators
(20). Over time, some replicator varieties must have gone extinct, while
surviving varieties had to struggle for existence. This struggle would have
favoured any mutations that ensured greater stability in replicator varieties.
Dawkins speculates that replicators had to construct containers for
themselves, vehicles with which to ensure their continued existence.
Consequently, he speculates, the first living cells developed. These primal
living cells would have been the first examples of survival machines. As can
be imagined, Dawkins envisions survival machines becoming bigger and
more elaborate by means of a cumulative and progressive process (21). Four
thousand million years later these ancient replicators:
... [S]warm in huge colonies, safe inside gigantic lumbering
robots, sealed off from the outside world, communicating with it by
tortuous indirect routes, manipulating it by remote control. They are
in you and in me, they created us, body and mind; and their
preservation is the ultimate rationale for our existence. They have
come a long way, those replicators. Now they go by the name of
genes, and we are their survival machines (1976:21).
An important point that Dawkins tries to bring across with this image is
that genes indirectly control the manufacture of bodies. In his own words:
"The body is the genes' way of preserving the body unaltered" (barring
mutations, of course)(25). Although essential to survival, an organism's
acquired characteristics are not inherited by its offspring. In other words,
knowledge and wisdom acquired by an organism through a lifetime cannot, by
any genetic means, be passed on to its offspring; each new generation starts
from scratch (25). Or does it?
Dawkins is careful to emphasise that genes do not have foresight.
They are not conscious entities, organising into structures in order to fulfil
some kind of teleological master plan. The process of replication happens
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blindly; a process of automatic selection between molecules, based on their
fecundity, longevity and copying-fidelity (25).
Dawkins notes that man is unusual with regard to this scenario in one
aspect: that of culture. He develops a theory of culture in which culture itself
can undergo a form of evolution, through a process of cultural transmission
instead of genetic transrnission.!" Furthermore, cultural evolution is orders of
magnitude faster than genetic evolution (203). Dawkins names instances of
cultural products that are transmitted and inevitably undergo transformation
such as language, dress, diet, ceremonies, art, customs, architecture, and
technology. All of these aspects of human life change over historical time, in
such a manner as to resemble a genetic evolution that has been speeded up
(204). Surprisingly though, Dawkins argues that, in order to understand the
evolution of modern man, one needs to discard the gene as the sole basis of
our ideas on evolution. In fact, he likens the current state of human culture to
the primeval soup and names a basic replicatory cultural entity: the meme. He
derives his new noun from the Greek root mimesis. A meme is a unit of
cultural transmission, a unit of imitation. Among the examples of memes that
Dawkins lists are the following: tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes fashions,
ways of fashioning pots or building arches (206). Memes do not propagate
themselves by perpetually leaping from parental body to offspring, but by
leaping from brain to brain. Dawkins considers memes to be living structures,
not just metaphorically, but technically as well (207). This image of memes
allows him to envision the brain as a vehicle that is "parasitised" by memes,
similar to the way in which a virus may parasitise a host cell.
The way that memes replicate themselves and achieve transmission
between "host brains" is through a process of imitation. An idea, like that of an
afterlife, for instance, is replicated "through the spoken and the written word,
aided by great music and art"(207). Dawkin's example of great music and art
is, of course, just a fraction of the imitative processes that can be used to
spread ideas. For a start, bad music and art are replicators that can be just as
190 Dawkins does concede that cultural transmission is not unique to man (Dawkins
1976:203). Presumably cultural transmission is at its most pronounced in the activities of
man.
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efficient in spreading ideas (have "survival value" in Dawkin's terms), if not
more so in some cases.
Dawkins attributes the survival value of a meme to its psychological
appeal in a given cultural environment. Memes that have psychological
appeal are copied through successive generations' brains, regardless of their
accuracy or effectiveness (Dawkins uses the example of the "god-me me" to
substantiate this position). In other words, just as with genetic evolution, some
memes are more effective than others when it comes to survival. Dawkins
believes that successful memes have the same attributes as successful
genes: longevity, fecundity, and copying-fidelity. In terms of fecundity and
longevity, the analogy between memes and genes seems relatively
unproblematic. Some memes spread like wildfire, but their popularity is short-
lived (think of the majority of songs on the pop-charts or the latest fitness fad),
while others have been around for thousands of years and are likely to be
around for some time to come (the various major world religions, for instance).
Dawkins does admit, however, that his analogy seems to break down
somewhat when it comes to copying-fidelity. Memes do not seem to be high-
fidelity replicators at all, especially when compared with the relative stability
found in genes when it comes to the copying process. Memes appear to be a
lot more mutable than genes, endowing them with a certain fluidity, with more
"licence", if you will, when it comes to imitation. In other words, that meme
transmission is subject to a kind of continuous mutation. Surprisingly perhaps,
in an attempt to address this apparent discrepancy, Dawkins revises some of
the assumptions that have been made about genes. He concludes that the
possibility does exist that the analogy does not break down, if genes are less
particulate than they have portrayed as thus far. In this respect, in the case of
genetically inherited characteristics there are so many genes involved that
genes seem to "blend." Dawkins does not mean that genes are not
particulate, but he does concede that it becomes very difficult to define what
constitutes a gene. Dawkins settles the question in the following manner:
The "gene" [is] defined, not in a rigid all-cr-one way, but as a
unit of convenience, a length of chromosome with just enough
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sufficient copying-fidelity to serve as a viable unit of natural
selection (210).
In a similar manner it is difficult to determine what a single, viable,
meme-unit might be. Dawkins settles for a single unit, or phrase, or word etc.
that is sufficiently distinctive and memorable to be abstracted from its context
and - while still being recognised as that particular, distinctive unit - be used
in another context (210).
Just as genes are not purposeful agents, memes do not operate with
any foresight or agenda (211). Meme selection is a blind process. As to the
competitive aspect of gene selection, Dawkins finds a way to stretch his
analogy to incorporate a form of "competitiveness" into mimetic evolution.
Instead of biological resources, time and storage space are the most
important limiting factors in the human brain. In order to survive a meme
needs to attract attention to itself, at the cost of its "rival" memes. Memes that
have a greater psychological impact have a better chance to receive attention
and be perpetuated. Dawkins also mentions other commodities for which
memes compete: television time, newspaper space, billboard space, etc. All
of these are means of transmission, ways of influencing other human beings
and effecting changes in their brains. And, just as genes evolve into
evolutionary stable sets of genes, memes evolve into evolutionary stable sets
of memes that reinforce one another - a particular culture, for example.
In short, Dawkins concludes that:
Once genes have provided their survival machines with
brains which are capable of rapid imitation, the memes will
automatically take over. We do not even have to posit a genetic
advantage in imitation, though that would certainly help. All that is
necessary is that the brain should be capable of imitation: memes
will then evolve which exploit the capacity to the full We are built
as gene-machines and cultured as meme-machines (215).
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A significant aspect of the culturing process is, of course, the structure
of the human brain, and consciousness in particular. Dennett is worth quoting
at length in this context:
Since this new machine [consciousness] created in us is
a highly replicated meme-complex, we may ask to what it owes
its replicative success. We should bear in mind, of course, that
that it might not be good for anything - except replicating. It
might be a software virus, which readily parasitises human
brains without actually giving the human beings whose brains it
infests any advantage over the competition. More plausibly,
certain features of the machine might be parasites, which exist
only because they can, and because it is not possible - or worth
the trouble - to get rid of them. William James thought it would
be absurd to suppose that the most astonishing thing we know
of in the universe - consciousness - is a mere artefact, playing
no essential role in how our brains work, but however unlikely it
might be, it is not entirely out of the question, and hence not
really absurd. There is plenty of evidence around about the
benefits consciousness apparently provides us, so we can no
doubt satisfy ourselves about its various reasons d'être, but we
are apt to misread that evidence if we think that a mystery
remains unless every single feature has - or once had - a
function (from our point of view as consciousness-"users")
(Dennett 1991 :221).
Dennett is careful to point out that evolution is not teleological.
Consciousness did not develop "for" anything. Most probably it endows the
organism that possesses it with certain evolutionary advantages. If not, it will
quite probably go the way of other failed evolutionary experiments. Important
to the current discussion is the idea of human consciousness as a complex of
memes, or as Dennett puts it, meme-effects on the brain (1991 :210). Also of
great importance is Dawkins's description of culture as a medium for
transferring memes between brains.
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Given that consciousness only arises as a result of interaction with
other human beings - as a result of culture - the question arises as to what
culture is. In the light of the preceding discussion "culture" seems to be the
collective of manifestations of existing memes. Any means of replicating
memes (communicating) hence becomes a cultural enterprise. In the previous
chapter we saw that culture takes the part of the environment when it comes
to seeing the self as developing in a complex system. We found that
consciousness and a sense of self are impossible without input from the
environment. In this respect, the view that Dawkins, Dennett and Hofstadter
take on culture accords very well our view of culture as part of a complex
system in which the self emerges. In this respect it seems likely that we have
to re-evaluate the role that culture has traditionally been accorded in
philosophical theory. The peripheral role that has traditionally been granted to
cultural activities in the past can explain Nagel's profound scepticism when it
comes to the possibility of people trading ratifiable knowledge about being.
The suspicion with which he views subjective accounts and the interpretation
of those accounts points to a profoundly sceptical approach to language and
culture that has been strongly rooted in the Western philosophical tradition
from the first.
3. Plato's view on "art"
The conception of cultural phenomena as peripheral to essential
activities - such as gathering food, perhaps? - that presumably do more to
contribute to the survival of the species, stems from conceptions of certain
aspects of culture, especially artistic activity, that are, in part, a legacy of
Plato's views on art.!" "Art" here should be understood as a shorthand term
for most cultural activities - all manifestations of meme-transference. When it
comes to discussing human culture it becomes exceptionally difficult to accord
different practises to different categories. For the purposes of this short
191 Gardener (1996:250), who cites art's "essential connections with pleasure, play
and imagination and its freedom from reason and practical purposes" as positive reasons for
scepticism about the value of art, sums up such a conception of art.
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chapter we will ignore these complexities, so as to make a general point about
culture, in a very broad sense of the word.
Crudely Plato's conception of art runs something as follows: artists
copy the world in various media, generally for their own amusement and the
entertainment of those who busy themselves with such matters. Artistic
activities are at best frivolous and at worst geared towards trying to undermine
the accepted moral and political practices of a given society (Plato 1981: 421-
439). Are cultural products, meme-complexes, activities that are not only
peripheral amusements but that also do not provide any practical contribution
to humanity's general welfare?192
To the ancient Greeks, especially Plato and Aristotle, art is not "real" in
the same way that the world is real (Eaton 1988:92).193With his "conception of
the hierarchical structure of reality" (Verdenius 1971 :268), Plato differentiates
between the visible realm and the intelligible realm. The visible realm is the
world, as we know it - the empirical reality that all people have access to. The
intelligible realm is the absolute form of Good and "responsible for everything
right and good" - it is the source of all light, being, reality and intelligence.
Empirical reality is a descent from the Divine realm, and consequently an
imperfect copy of the ideal.
There are different planes of being which each aspires to express the
values of the one superior to it, except for the Good, which is "absolutely real"
(Verdenius 1971 :268). Verdenius goes on to explain that the degree of reality
of a realm is dependent on its degree of approximation to the Ideal realm,
what he calls "eternal Being". The empirical world is not true reality, but an
192Nelson Goodman also asserts that the (mis)conception of art as frivolous, as
entertainment, has done a disservice to contemporary views on the arts and on art education:
"Serious study of education for the arts has also been stunted and
sidetracked by the prevalent notion that the arts are merely instruments of
entertainment. Some newspapers list plays, concerts, and exhibitions under
"amusements"; and among a week's amusements may be a Bach Mass, King Lear,
and an exhibition of Goya's Disasters of War. No real progress in attitudes toward
education can be hoped for when Cézanne's pictures are classed with cookouts, and
arts programmes with playgrounds. On the other hand, we encounter almost as often
the equally detrimental mistake of exalting the arts to a plane far above most human
activities, accessible only to an elite" (1984: 154).
193Where Plato sees this as reason enough to reject art, Aristotle ascribes a more
positive role to artworks: they are a source of knowledge (Eaton 1988:22).
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approximation to it, a copy that strives to the Good, but falls short. Art is yet
another plane removed from the Good. According to Plato an artistic
rendering of the empirical world is inevitably an imperfect copy. An artist
imperfectly copies an empirical world, which is in itself an imperfect copy of
"true" reality (Plato's Ideal realm), and thus renders a phenomenon which,
according to Plato's scheme, is "a third removed from reality" (Plat01981:
425). As far as degrees of reality go, Plato seems to regard works of art as
scraping the bottom of the barrel. Pictures and poems and such like are
secondary phenomena and tell us nothing about life. Consequently Plato
believes that art has no value, and not only that, it can be an undermining and
dangerous activity to boot.
As, so Plato's argument goes, an artist does not need knowledge of
reality to render a superficial representation of it, (s)he is capable of rendering
something without the correct opinion about the "goodness" or "badness" of
the thing (s)he is representing (430). Thus, not only does art not have any
serious value but, seeing that it is not a product of reason, it has a low degree
of truth and it appeals to "the lower elements in the mind," possessing the
threat of ruining the higher elements. Art carries the danger of obscuring or
even distorting the truth, and thereby having a negative influence on those
exposed to it. Plato gives poetry "the terrible power to corrupt even the best
characters", and concludes that art should not be allowed in his ideal state.
With the emergence of popular culture, mass communication and a
media literate global population, another realm is added to Plato's hierarchy.
Or, perhaps, it can be integrated into the realm of "art" to the extent that
increased technical ability to produce and distribute communicative signs has
exaggerated the "logic" that characterises Plato's artistic activity. Whereas
Plato believed that art (understood as manifestations of meme-complexes)
does not add to our knowledge of the world, the same cannot be said about
the media - without access to the divergent forms of the mass media, we
would have a vastly different picture of the world.
In the same vein, Plato's contention that art is at best a meaningless
activity, and at worst has the potential to corrupt characters contains a degree
of contradiction. How can an activity that has no value and adds nothing to the
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world have the ability to affect characters? It seems that, while Plato contends
that art has no value, he does not believe it to be without any consequence.
Artistic activity can have some very real effects. In the light of this Plato
makes a concession to the "telling of tales" that makes use of indirect speech,
in so far as tales have some pedagogical value (IJsseling 1997:12).
In more recent times increased technical capability has provided a
highly efficient means of reaching large numbers of people. The Nazi, Fascist
and a succession of totalitarian regimes, as well as advertising companies,
have all learned to harness a uniquely modern manifestation of Plato's "telling
of tales": mass communication. In Germany in the 1930's there was a
conscious and deliberate attempt by the Nazi party to establish official Nazi
ideology in all areas of culture and art and to eradicate alternative ideologies
(Strinati 1995:5). "The aim was to enlist the help of intellectuals, writers,
poets, painters, sculptors, musicians, academics, architects, etc., in order to
establish Nazi ideology as Nazi aesthetics" (7). Both the Nazi's and Plato
realised that "art" was by no means a neutral activity and that it has the very
real potential to shape public opinion and undermine prevailing political
ideology.
From Plato's criticism of art stems many of the subsequent views on,
and criticisms of, art/culture in the Western philosophical tradition. Some
contemporary theories on cultural products still rely on the basic
presupposition that leads Plato to ban artists from his ideal republic: that
artworks are representational or mimetic, and an imperfect representation at
that.!" Presumably there are better ways to render and communicate
knowledge. In copying reality, art/culture runs the risk of getting it wrong, of
not capturing and communicating the essence of the original on which it is
based. Nagel's criticism that we cannot rely on subjective accounts of
experience, because they might not capture the essence of a particular "be-
ee" (to use Hofstadter's term) and might be misinterpreted, seems to be a
variation on Plato's scepticism. Art/ language! human artefacts! meme-
194 Although a Neoplatonist, in turn, would attribute value to art in accordance with its
ability to "purify" the world of matter and render images as close to the ideal as possible
(Gombrich 1968: 133).
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manifestations run the risk of being corrupted by subjectivity and must
therefore be subjected to strict guidelines according to which they can be
ratified - scientific principles. Unfortunately some phenomena do not lend
themselves to be scientifically studied (consciousness, for example) and
should therefore be banned, or at least considered to be impenetrable.
We will briefly look at an attempt by Popper to disperse some of the
assumptions implicit in this position, with a view to render these
"impenetrable" subjects open to objective study. As we shall see, his attempt
is not at all convincing and we will argue that such a delineated approach to
the intricacies of mind, culture and the physical world is too simplified and
rigid to capture the interrelatedness that exists in the system world +
consciousness + memes. In the final analysis Popper fails to account for the
fundamental characteristic of consciousness and knowledge - what
Hofstadter calls its "curious blend of subjective and objective" (1982:413).
5. Popper's World 3
Popper's (1977) approach is that of a philosopher of science, trying to
account for the reality of "mental states" and their ability to affect the physical
world. To this end, Popper busies himself with the status of ideas, wishes and
thoughts as manifested in the empirical world through our representation of
them in diverse signs and symbols. Theorising against an intellectual
background where materialism is predominant and the physical sciences are
the standard measure for validating theories, Popper tries to account for the
"reality" of mental states and ideas, and in so doing to refute radical
materialist theories that relegate ideas and mental states to insignificant
epiphenomena of chemical and physical processes in the brain. He also
opposes the idea that there is something unique to consciousness that makes
it a somehow impenetrable and mysterious phenomenon. Popper supports his
contention that mental states are real in the same way that physical states are
real through recourse to interaction, where mental states are as real as
physical states, because of their ability to interact with the physical world and
cause tangible effects in that world. He also introduces interactionism as
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answer to the mind-body problem through a tripartite division of the world into:
a universe of physical entities - World 1; the world of mental states - World 2,
and the products of the human mind - World 3.195 As examples of World 3
. objects he cites stories, explanatory myths, tools, scientific theories (whether
true or false), scientific problems, social institutions and works of art'" (38).
These are all objects of our own making, but not necessarily the creations of
individual people. Objects from World 3 are manifested in World 1 in the form
of material objects (sculptures, paintings, books - whether scientific or
literary).
But World 3 objects are not only "real" in their World 1 manifestations,
but also in World 3 aspects by virtue of their interaction with World 1. For
example, a particular sculpture can influence other sculptors on a World 2
level and then find new manifestations in subsequent World 1 products. In an
attempt to pre-empt criticism that he is just reformulating a case of imitation,
Popper uses the example of the production of a scientific theory: the scientist
starts from a problem - a demanding intellectual task - which finds its origin in
other theories. encountered in the subject literature of his/her field (World 3
objects - theories - manifested in World 1 objects). The scientist then
proceeds with a creative effort: that of trying to grasp and formulate an
abstract problem. If successful, (s)he produces a solution (a new theory)
which is then put into linguistic form and subjected to literary discussion and
modification, and accepted or rejected. An important aspect of theories,
according to Popper, is that despite their being products of human thought
they have a measure of autonomy - they may have consequences that had
195 Although this division can be criticised in many aspects, especially from the point
of view of complexity theory, it is useful for the purposes of the current argument, in that it not
only highlights the effects of human ideas on the physical world, it also places the various
human disciplines of thought on an equal footing, with regard to their ability to interact with
and influence the empirical world.
196 Popper believes world 3 to be contingent, but insists that his is not a plea for
relativism: "Human thought in general, and science in particular, are products of human
history. They are, therefore, dependent on many accidents: "had our history been different,
our present thinking and our present science (if any) would be different" (148). But, Popper
continues, we can learn from our mistakes and science can progress, our theories are not
arbitrary: 'What is important is that there is no self-contradiction whatever in describing
scientific knowledge or, say, historical knowledge, as consisting largely or wholly of
hypotheses or conjectures, rather than as a body of known and well-established truths"(123).
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not been foreseen when they were being created, and in this sense aspects of
these theories can be said to have been discovered and objective. Thus
World 3 can be said to be man-made in its origin and mimetic to the extent
that new theories, etc. rely on theories, insights and accepted formulae
preceding them. But, once theories exist, they take on a life of their own,
producing new consequences and new problems.
From this, and the creative aspect of producing new scientific theories,
Popper deduces the objectivity of World 3 Furthermore he deduces the World
3 status of science, and the influence of scientific theories on the world, which
establishes the reality of objects in World 3 - including ideas, thoughts and
wlshes.!" Important for our discussion is that Popper places artworks and
scientific theories on a par as objects that make up World 3 - objects that
both shape and are shaped by human thought, and which accord us access
to Worlds 1 and 2. Both disciplines rely on a combination of the constraints
and insights provided by their tradition and on creativity.
Language is a World 3 object, and can accordingly be endowed with
objective status, as well as being considered to be "real.!" To Popper, the
social character of language, and the fact that we can speak about other
people and understand them when they speak about themselves, ensures
that we are not only subjects, or centres of action, but can also be objects of
our own critical thought and judgement - one cannot be fully human without
mastering language (144) - we owe our humanity, our rationality to language,
and thus to other people. We are products of World 3, which is in itself a
product of countless human minds. Popper explicitly equates the process of
acquiring World 3 objects with the process of acquiring a self: "One learns not
197 Popper consigns artworks to World 3. Their world 1 manifestations have their
origin in World 3 ideas and theories. World 3 objects do not lie in some ideal realm,
independent of human thought and waiting to be discovered, but are the product of, and
produce in their own right, a dynamic interaction between "ideas" and "reality".
198 Popper argues that the most fundamental of the World 3 learning processes is that
of acquiring language. Language is what enables us to see and interact with the world. The
physicist might primarily be interested in World 1, but in order to learn about World 1 (s)he
needs to theorise, and for that (s)he needs to use objects from World 3 - primarily language-
as tools. The physical scientist who studies World 1 has a vested interest in World 3 tools and
their logical consequences, which are a prerequisite for doing "applied science" and using
World 3 insights to affect World 1.
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only to perceive and to interpret one's perceptions, but also to be a person
and to be a self'(49). Without social interaction, Popper contends, we cannot
develop a sense of self (111). And, of course, language in its various forms
enables social interaction.
It might be tempting to conclude that, if we establish the "reality" of
phenomena in terms of their ability to influence the empirical world (World 1),
then, in terms of Popper's scheme, Plato already gives us reason enough to
postulate art/culture as a "real" entity by admitting that it has the potential to
corrupt characters and subvert prevailing moral standards. If art is the
concrete manifestation of ideas, thoughts and wishes and this concrete
manifestation has the ability to affect the world artistic activities become
primary rather than secondary activities, in that they serve establish ideas
about the world that would not have been accessible in any other way. It is
doubtful, however, that Popper's attempt to establish the objective nature of
language is what Nagel has in mind when he argues that we need to
formulate an objective phenomenology in terms of which we can theorise on
consciousness. Presumably Nagel would argue that even language as an
"objective medium" does not guarantee that one can gain insight into what it is
like to be another person, or a bat for that matter, because consciousness is
necessarily subjective. Is it possible that Hofstadter is right in asserting that
knowledge is a blend of objectivity and subjectivity, and that it is the subjective
aspect of knowledge and the fact that the subject can verbalise his/her
subjective experiences in a medium of communication, that enables us to
share knowledge at all?
At this juncture it seems that Dennett's theories holds the potential
solution to the problem of the "mysterious" aspect of consciousness.
Dennett's proposed heterophenomenology seems to be the most viable
suggestion of those that we have discussed on how to conduct an objective
study of what seems to be an inherently subjective phenomenon. Such a
heterophenomenology could be a successful tool in terms of which to explore
consciousness, because it applies to one's own consciousness as well. In
chapter 3 we have seen that Dennett argues that even one's own
consciousness of self is a narrative fiction: the result of streams of multiple
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possible narrative drafts of self and consciousness that are to be found in the
unconscious. This fiction is an account of all that the subject sincerely
believes to exist in his/her conscious experience. Dennett insists that such a
narrative is a portrayal of exactly what it is like to be that subject - that
subject's experience - and is an adequate basis from which to explore this
heterophenomenology. Dennett's approach has much in common with that of
Popper. Consider, for example the following quotation, already discussed in
chapter 4, but which merits repetition here:
The heterophenomenology exists - just as uncontroversially
as novels and other fictions exist. People do undoubtedly believe
they have mental images, pains, perceptual experiences and all the
rest, and these facts - the facts about what people believe, and
report when they express their beliefs - are phenomena any
scientific theory of the mind must account for. We organise our
data regarding these phenomena into theorist's fictions, "intentional
objects" in heterophenomenological worlds. Then the question of
whether items thus portrayed exist as real objects, events, and
states in the brain - or in the soul, for that matter - is an empirical
matter to investigate (1991:98).
Dennett does not, however, try to account for the "reality" of mental
states. Nor does he create a phenomenological gap between mental states
and the physical world, endowing the former with the ability to affect the latter.
Dennett recognises the reality of "mental states" as a matter of some
complexity. He emphasises that a conscious mind is an observer, and that
where there is a mind, there is a point of view. He also provides us (with the
help of Dawkins) with a much more dynamic picture of how
consciousness/self is formed and maintained, and of the potential that it has
to evolve over time within a single individual, and from generation to
generation. Dennett insists on the material character of consciousness and
the self, but refrains from creating the impression that distinct mental units
exist that are somehow represented in the brain. Dennett's description of the
"distributed content-discriminations" within the brain, with the possibility to
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become something like a narrative stream, subject to continual "editing" by
many processes distributed in the brain, is an ideal accompaniment to a
complex theory of self. Especially given the emphasis that is placed on the
role of the environment in structuring the self, and the need it creates to
describe the structure of such an environment. With the following statement
Dennett provides us with the last of the tools necessary to compile a model of
the uniquely human environment in which the self emerges:
Human consciousness is itself a huge complex of memes
(or more exactly, meme-effects in the brain) that can best be
understood as the operation of a "von Neumannesque" virtual
rnachine'", implemented in the parallel architecture of a brain
that was not designed for any such activities (210).200
The idea that a narrative fiction is as real as story-telling, for example,
novels and other forms of language manifestation (or meme-manifestations, if
you will), coupled with the idea of consciousness being a complex of meme-
effects in the brain creates a unique role for culture, as environment, in the
development and structure of the self, as well as the unique character of the
human environment.
6. The complex self and the changing role of a uniquely human
environment
In the previous chapter we argued that culture provides us with
permanent memory-traces. We also emphasised the importance of other
"mature human brains" to use Trevarthen's phrase, and the cultural entities
through which different brains communicate with one another. In his
discussion on Dawkin's memes Dennett has already pointed out the vital role
that the culture in which they manifest themselves plays in the evolution of
199 I.e. a computer with a fixed (hardware) structure that can run different kinds of
soft-ware, and as such can function as a series of different "machines" with divergent
capabilities (see Chapter 2).
200See footnote 155.
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consciousness. And we proposed to argue that given our conception of the
self as an emergent property in a complex system, of which culture (as
environment) makes up a great part, that we should rethink many of our
presuppositions about the cultural phenomena that we create and endorse.
The complex self is an emergent property of the complex system
composed by human genetic predisposition to acquire or rather manufacture
a self, and the environment from which the elements with which a self is
constructed can be gathered. Another important factor in the development of
a complex self is the history of that self, which is the recorded memory-traces
of past experiences. We have seen that the human environment is unique, in
that it is the product of many consciousnesses, embedded in concrete cultural
phenomena. Dawkins gave us the term memes with which we could roughly
delineate "units" of cultural phenomena. In this final chapter we have seen
that consciousness is not only something that we can attain knowledge about,
the structural characteristics of consciousness that make this attainment
possible are also the characteristics that are responsible for forming
consciousness. Not only can we talk about consciousness, the manifestations
of consciousness in culture, memes, are involved in structuring both
consciousness and self.
A self, as an emergent property of the complex system human mental
apparatus + environment/culture is the conscious sense of self, the conscious
model of itself that the human organism needs in order for it to function
successfully. This model that a human being might have of him/herself can be
radically contingent, in accordance with the cultural factors that a person is
exposed to. The model is also constrained by factors that we have likened to
attractors within a complex system. Given certain possible variations from
person to person, the mental apparatus, at base, seems to be genetically
wired in a relatively stable pattern. Genetic changes will occur over time, of
course, but we would argue that most homo sapiens, even over time, have
enough characteristics in common, that given the ability to simulate
experience through language, they can understand what it is like for a
particular person, to be that person.
197
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
By the same token, if the medium of simulation, language in its various
forms, does play such a significant part in the development of the human mind
as Freud, Dennett, Trevarthen and even Popper contend, it stands to reason
that what "developing young brains" are exposed to, should be brought under
careful consideration. If one's brain is structured in part by the meme-effects
of only those memes that one is exposed to, it stands to reason that what
would emerge as one's self would be significantly constrained by the memes
that one has been exposed to during one's lifetime. If these memes are all of
a particular sort, inaccurate or not conducive to the formation of a self that is
an asset to one's ability to live well, the resultant sense of self might become
a liability. So much so that it might inhibit a person's ability to project
possibilities accurately and factor its own nature into decisions to such an
extent that it manages to live successfully. Given the non-linearity of a
complex system, nothing that we are exposed to can reliably be expected to
be of no consequence. In the light of this it seems that we should be very
careful as to what memes we are exposed to, and what we expose others to.
It seems that the self is contingent in more ways than one. Therein lies both it
greatest strength: the ability to adapt and learn, and its greatest weakness:
the possibility that it can be completely erroneous in conception and hence
ineffectual or even counterproductive. The complex environment, consisting of
various cultural entities and of people, seems to be the single greatest
determining factor in how our self will be, and as such can be either
munificent or treacherous. Most probably it is an uneasy mixture of the two.
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Postscript
By way of conclusion we will give a short summary of the issues raised,
the arguments given, and the conclusions drawn in the preceding pages. At
issue here was the status of the self in its contemporary context. The question
arose as to the viability of some of the current assumptions about the self, as
well as possible origins of these assumptions. It was found that many of the
current preconceptions of the self had their origin in Cartesian dualism and
the subsequent centuries-long debate that the work of Descartes had
inspired. A central conception of the self to emerge from this debate is that of
the self as an immaterial entity, whether wholly independent from, or partly
connected to, the material body. This conception of the self, among other
things, postulates the self as not subject to the processes of causality
operating in the material world. In this manner the concept of the free will of
the subject can be accommodated into a causal world-view, ostensibly without
upsetting the principles of either concepts.
We proceeded to criticise the idea of the immaterial self as unfounded
and insufficient to the task of accounting for the formation and structure of the
self. Freud, in postulating the unconscious, opened up the possibility of
accounting for the material nature of a contingent self, bound both by its body
and its environment. Far from being an essence, the rational capacity of man,
for instance, the self becomes a complex function of brain processes. With the
advent of both psychology and neurology, rooting our theories of the self in
the empirical and the material becomes not only a viable option, but
seemingly inevitable. Summarily conceiving of the self as essentially non-
material when the possibility exists that the phenomenon can be subject to
empirical scrutiny and scientific research, in keeping with the principles of
both neurology and psychology, becomes indefensible. With this in mind we
discussed the work of Daniel Dennett, a philosopher very much concerned
with the self as material phenomenon. Accordingly, Dennett emphasises the
role that evolution plays in the formation of the self. We saw that, not only can
the existence of the self be accounted for as a product of an evolutionary
process, where an organism that can factor a realistic conception of itself into
its survival strategies would have a distinct advantage over organisms unable
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to do this, but that the human self is part and parcel of a relatively new
evolutionary medium, presumably unique to man, that of the cerebral cortex
and its resultant consciousness. Suddenly the self becomes a construct,
geared towards the survival of the species, and limited by the possibilities of a
specific mental apparatus in a specific environment.
Furthermore the possibility was raised that insights gained from a
distinctively contemporary discipline, that of complexity theory, could be used
to construct a viable and useful model of this "new", material self that does not
need to fall back on unfounded conceptions of the immateriality of the self. It
was argued that the self, as an emergent property of the interaction between
the mental apparatus and the environment, would be subject to many
complexities and intricacies, characteristics that would be best served by a
model that is based upon the principles of the complexity sciences. The
application possibilities of such a model was discussed in some detail in
chapter 4 and it was concluded that not only would such a complex model of
self be viable, it might also be useful in highlighting some important aspects
that feature in the formation and maintenance of a effective and healthy self.
Of particular importance in this regard is the role that the environment plays in
the formation of the self.
One interesting question that has been raised by this discussion, but
which has not received sufficient attention here is the implication that a theory
of a complex, material self would have on questions of free will and
determinism. Unfortunately an exploration of these issues will stretch far
beyond the scope of this work. We will have to content ourselves with
mentioning them as interesting and challenging issues that result out of our
discussion that will hopefully become the subject of study in the future.
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